Quarks are made of matter/energy, not vice versa.
Note that it is not logically impossible to reductively explain everything in terms of nothing.
Science only has inexplicables AFTER it has tried as hard as it can to explain.
How do you know it has reached the point of “having tried as hard as it can”? Science certainly has tried to explain
mind. Physicalists judge that more trying is needed; dualists judge that the “as hard as it can” point
has been reached. Since no one can say in a definite, quantitive way where the point is, it remains a
legitmiately a matter of personal judgment.
Science can never be assumed to have tried as hard as it can; it’s always possible that some new information will come along and explain something that wasn’t explained before. So if you’re thinking scientifically, the appropriate notion isn’t “inexplicable” but “not explained as yet”.
Anyone—dualist or otherwise—who says “OK, we’ve done enough now; time to give up” is engaged in thoroughly unscientific thinking. Since scientific thinking demonstrably works well, that’s probably a bad thing.
(The above leaves some space for a sort of provisional dualism. You could say “So far, no physical explanation of consciousness is apparent. So we might as well treat it as an independent thing until such time as a physical explanation comes along.” That would be fine if we had no information at all about the relationship between consciousness and matter. But in fact we do have some information. We have evidence that particular aspects of consciousness are related to particular bits of the brain and particular things the brain does. We have partial explanations, where some things about consciousness have somewhat-handwavy explanations in physical terms. And we have a long history of trying out non-physicalist hypotheses about things—gods and ghosts and vital spirits and so forth—and finding them, again and again, smashed to bits once knowledge advances far enough for them to come into contact with reality.)
Science can never be assumed to have tried as hard as it can; it’s always possible that some new information will come along and explain something that wasn’t explained before.
So were the cases where, as a matter of fact, science has posited a new property or force (spin, colour charge, etc) illegitimate?
We have evidence that particular aspects of consciousness are related to particular bits of the brain
We have evidence that the N fundamentals of physics nonetheless interrelate.
ETA
And we have a long history of trying out non-physicalist hypotheses about things
Many explanations in terms of “let’s say it is fundamental” have failed, but that does not mean the correct number of fundamentals is 0.
I have no idea why you’re asking me that. That is: I see no reason why what you’re commenting on gives any reason to think I might answer yes to it.
We have evidence that the N fundamentals of physics nonetheless interrelate.
Yup. And the richness of their interrelations is what makes it appropriate to classify them all as part of the same physical reality; and the level of detail in our ideas about those fundamentals is (part of) what makes our thinking about them scientific. So far, every attempt at postulating consciousness as fundamental has entirely failed to specify how consciousness relates to everything else (a cynic might surmise that this is because the people doing it want to be careful to avoid saying anything refutable, since they know they haven’t taken the measures necessary to make it unlikely that they’d then get refuted). If those details were filled in—which is part of what it would take to make sense of the observed relationship between consciousness and brains—then “consciousness”, even if still fundamental, would cease to be properly regarded as non-physical, and would become a fit subject for further scientific investigation. That would be an interesting outcome, but I don’t expect it ever to happen, because I think what people saying “let’s take consciousness as fundamental” want above all else is to keep scientific thinking away from the topic.
that does not mean the correct number of fundamentals is 0.
Of course it doesn’t. (It’s not clear that 0 is even possible.) But any time you propose that some high-level thing—minds, life, etc. -- is fundamental, it’s a reasonable guess that you’re making a mistake; so far every attempt at doing that seems to have been wrong. (Whereas it’s not true that every attempt at postulating anything as fundamental has failed.)
) But any time you propose that some high-level thing—minds, life, etc. -- is fundamental, it’s a reasonable guess that you’re making a mistake; so far every attempt at doing that seems to have been wrong.
That’s a much better version of the anti-intrinsicism argument: it would be strange if you had a few fundamental things at the bottom of the stack,then a whole bunch of reducible things in the middle,and then suddenly another irreducible thing.
I was asking that since it seemed to me that the argument you were making against consc. being fundamental would apply,if it aplies at all, to positing anything else as fundamental.
If those details were filled in—which is part of what it would take to make sense of the observed relationship between consciousness and brains—then “consciousness”, even if still fundamental, would cease to be properly regarded as non-physical, and would become a fit subject for further scientific investigation.
I couldn’t agree more. That is why I prefer the term “intrinsicism” to “dualism”.
There could be any number of things wrong with dualism/intrinsicism aposteriori. I am just saying that
intrinsicism should not be ruled out apriori just for being intrinsicism.
the argument you were making against consciousness being fundamental would apply, if it applies at all, to positing anything else as fundamental.
It would apply to claiming that anything else is fundamental. Not necessarily to taking it, provisionally, as fundamental. My impression of those who talk about making consciousness fundamental is that they are generally not doing so provisionally with the hope that later on something will be found that’s more genuinely fundamental. I think that proposing something as vague and as complicated as consciousness as a fundamental element of reality is such a desperate move that anyone doing it really ought to be hoping for something simpler to be found underlying it.
Quarks are made of matter/energy, not vice versa.
Note that it is not logically impossible to reductively explain everything in terms of nothing.
How do you know it has reached the point of “having tried as hard as it can”? Science certainly has tried to explain mind. Physicalists judge that more trying is needed; dualists judge that the “as hard as it can” point has been reached. Since no one can say in a definite, quantitive way where the point is, it remains a legitmiately a matter of personal judgment.
Science can never be assumed to have tried as hard as it can; it’s always possible that some new information will come along and explain something that wasn’t explained before. So if you’re thinking scientifically, the appropriate notion isn’t “inexplicable” but “not explained as yet”.
Anyone—dualist or otherwise—who says “OK, we’ve done enough now; time to give up” is engaged in thoroughly unscientific thinking. Since scientific thinking demonstrably works well, that’s probably a bad thing.
(The above leaves some space for a sort of provisional dualism. You could say “So far, no physical explanation of consciousness is apparent. So we might as well treat it as an independent thing until such time as a physical explanation comes along.” That would be fine if we had no information at all about the relationship between consciousness and matter. But in fact we do have some information. We have evidence that particular aspects of consciousness are related to particular bits of the brain and particular things the brain does. We have partial explanations, where some things about consciousness have somewhat-handwavy explanations in physical terms. And we have a long history of trying out non-physicalist hypotheses about things—gods and ghosts and vital spirits and so forth—and finding them, again and again, smashed to bits once knowledge advances far enough for them to come into contact with reality.)
So were the cases where, as a matter of fact, science has posited a new property or force (spin, colour charge, etc) illegitimate?
We have evidence that the N fundamentals of physics nonetheless interrelate.
ETA
Many explanations in terms of “let’s say it is fundamental” have failed, but that does not mean the correct number of fundamentals is 0.
I have no idea why you’re asking me that. That is: I see no reason why what you’re commenting on gives any reason to think I might answer yes to it.
Yup. And the richness of their interrelations is what makes it appropriate to classify them all as part of the same physical reality; and the level of detail in our ideas about those fundamentals is (part of) what makes our thinking about them scientific. So far, every attempt at postulating consciousness as fundamental has entirely failed to specify how consciousness relates to everything else (a cynic might surmise that this is because the people doing it want to be careful to avoid saying anything refutable, since they know they haven’t taken the measures necessary to make it unlikely that they’d then get refuted). If those details were filled in—which is part of what it would take to make sense of the observed relationship between consciousness and brains—then “consciousness”, even if still fundamental, would cease to be properly regarded as non-physical, and would become a fit subject for further scientific investigation. That would be an interesting outcome, but I don’t expect it ever to happen, because I think what people saying “let’s take consciousness as fundamental” want above all else is to keep scientific thinking away from the topic.
Of course it doesn’t. (It’s not clear that 0 is even possible.) But any time you propose that some high-level thing—minds, life, etc. -- is fundamental, it’s a reasonable guess that you’re making a mistake; so far every attempt at doing that seems to have been wrong. (Whereas it’s not true that every attempt at postulating anything as fundamental has failed.)
That’s a much better version of the anti-intrinsicism argument: it would be strange if you had a few fundamental things at the bottom of the stack,then a whole bunch of reducible things in the middle,and then suddenly another irreducible thing.
I was asking that since it seemed to me that the argument you were making against consc. being fundamental would apply,if it aplies at all, to positing anything else as fundamental.
I couldn’t agree more. That is why I prefer the term “intrinsicism” to “dualism”. There could be any number of things wrong with dualism/intrinsicism aposteriori. I am just saying that intrinsicism should not be ruled out apriori just for being intrinsicism.
It would apply to claiming that anything else is fundamental. Not necessarily to taking it, provisionally, as fundamental. My impression of those who talk about making consciousness fundamental is that they are generally not doing so provisionally with the hope that later on something will be found that’s more genuinely fundamental. I think that proposing something as vague and as complicated as consciousness as a fundamental element of reality is such a desperate move that anyone doing it really ought to be hoping for something simpler to be found underlying it.