I have no idea why you’re asking me that. That is: I see no reason why what you’re commenting on gives any reason to think I might answer yes to it.
We have evidence that the N fundamentals of physics nonetheless interrelate.
Yup. And the richness of their interrelations is what makes it appropriate to classify them all as part of the same physical reality; and the level of detail in our ideas about those fundamentals is (part of) what makes our thinking about them scientific. So far, every attempt at postulating consciousness as fundamental has entirely failed to specify how consciousness relates to everything else (a cynic might surmise that this is because the people doing it want to be careful to avoid saying anything refutable, since they know they haven’t taken the measures necessary to make it unlikely that they’d then get refuted). If those details were filled in—which is part of what it would take to make sense of the observed relationship between consciousness and brains—then “consciousness”, even if still fundamental, would cease to be properly regarded as non-physical, and would become a fit subject for further scientific investigation. That would be an interesting outcome, but I don’t expect it ever to happen, because I think what people saying “let’s take consciousness as fundamental” want above all else is to keep scientific thinking away from the topic.
that does not mean the correct number of fundamentals is 0.
Of course it doesn’t. (It’s not clear that 0 is even possible.) But any time you propose that some high-level thing—minds, life, etc. -- is fundamental, it’s a reasonable guess that you’re making a mistake; so far every attempt at doing that seems to have been wrong. (Whereas it’s not true that every attempt at postulating anything as fundamental has failed.)
) But any time you propose that some high-level thing—minds, life, etc. -- is fundamental, it’s a reasonable guess that you’re making a mistake; so far every attempt at doing that seems to have been wrong.
That’s a much better version of the anti-intrinsicism argument: it would be strange if you had a few fundamental things at the bottom of the stack,then a whole bunch of reducible things in the middle,and then suddenly another irreducible thing.
I was asking that since it seemed to me that the argument you were making against consc. being fundamental would apply,if it aplies at all, to positing anything else as fundamental.
If those details were filled in—which is part of what it would take to make sense of the observed relationship between consciousness and brains—then “consciousness”, even if still fundamental, would cease to be properly regarded as non-physical, and would become a fit subject for further scientific investigation.
I couldn’t agree more. That is why I prefer the term “intrinsicism” to “dualism”.
There could be any number of things wrong with dualism/intrinsicism aposteriori. I am just saying that
intrinsicism should not be ruled out apriori just for being intrinsicism.
the argument you were making against consciousness being fundamental would apply, if it applies at all, to positing anything else as fundamental.
It would apply to claiming that anything else is fundamental. Not necessarily to taking it, provisionally, as fundamental. My impression of those who talk about making consciousness fundamental is that they are generally not doing so provisionally with the hope that later on something will be found that’s more genuinely fundamental. I think that proposing something as vague and as complicated as consciousness as a fundamental element of reality is such a desperate move that anyone doing it really ought to be hoping for something simpler to be found underlying it.
I have no idea why you’re asking me that. That is: I see no reason why what you’re commenting on gives any reason to think I might answer yes to it.
Yup. And the richness of their interrelations is what makes it appropriate to classify them all as part of the same physical reality; and the level of detail in our ideas about those fundamentals is (part of) what makes our thinking about them scientific. So far, every attempt at postulating consciousness as fundamental has entirely failed to specify how consciousness relates to everything else (a cynic might surmise that this is because the people doing it want to be careful to avoid saying anything refutable, since they know they haven’t taken the measures necessary to make it unlikely that they’d then get refuted). If those details were filled in—which is part of what it would take to make sense of the observed relationship between consciousness and brains—then “consciousness”, even if still fundamental, would cease to be properly regarded as non-physical, and would become a fit subject for further scientific investigation. That would be an interesting outcome, but I don’t expect it ever to happen, because I think what people saying “let’s take consciousness as fundamental” want above all else is to keep scientific thinking away from the topic.
Of course it doesn’t. (It’s not clear that 0 is even possible.) But any time you propose that some high-level thing—minds, life, etc. -- is fundamental, it’s a reasonable guess that you’re making a mistake; so far every attempt at doing that seems to have been wrong. (Whereas it’s not true that every attempt at postulating anything as fundamental has failed.)
That’s a much better version of the anti-intrinsicism argument: it would be strange if you had a few fundamental things at the bottom of the stack,then a whole bunch of reducible things in the middle,and then suddenly another irreducible thing.
I was asking that since it seemed to me that the argument you were making against consc. being fundamental would apply,if it aplies at all, to positing anything else as fundamental.
I couldn’t agree more. That is why I prefer the term “intrinsicism” to “dualism”. There could be any number of things wrong with dualism/intrinsicism aposteriori. I am just saying that intrinsicism should not be ruled out apriori just for being intrinsicism.
It would apply to claiming that anything else is fundamental. Not necessarily to taking it, provisionally, as fundamental. My impression of those who talk about making consciousness fundamental is that they are generally not doing so provisionally with the hope that later on something will be found that’s more genuinely fundamental. I think that proposing something as vague and as complicated as consciousness as a fundamental element of reality is such a desperate move that anyone doing it really ought to be hoping for something simpler to be found underlying it.