On a conceptual level, is there more to QM than the Uncertainty Principle and Wave-Particle Duality?
Yes. Very yes. There are several different ways to get at that next conceptual level (matrix mechanics, the behavior of the Schrödinger equation, configuration spaces, Hamiltonian and Lagrangian mechanics, to name ones that I know at least a little about), but qualitative descriptions of the Uncertainty Principle, Schrödinger’s Cat, Wave-Particle Duality, and the Measurement Problem do not get you to that level.
Rejoice—the reality of quantum mechanics is way more awesome than you think it is, and you can find out about it!
Let me rephrase: I’m sure there is more to cutting edge QM than that which I understand (or even have heard of). Is any of that necessary to engage with the philosophy-of-science questions raised by the end of the Sequence, such as Science Doesn’t Trust Your Rationality?
From a writing point of view, some scientific controversy needed to be introduced to motivate the later discussion—and Eliezer choose QM. As examples go, it has advantages:
(1) QM is cutting edge—you can’t just go to Wikipedia to figure out who won. EY could have written a Lamarckian / Darwinian evolution sequence with similar concluding essays, but indisputably knowing who was right would slant how the philosophy-of-science point would be interpreted. (2) A non-expert should recognize that their intuitions are hopelessly misleading when dealing with QM, opening them to serious consideration of the new-to-them philosophy-of-science position EY articulates.
But let’s not confuse the benefits of the motivating example with arguing that there is philosophy-of-science benefit in writing an understandable description of QM.
In other words, if the essays in the sequence after and including The Failures of Eld Science were omitted from the Sequence, it wouldn’t belong on LessWrong.
Yes. Very yes. There are several different ways to get at that next conceptual level (matrix mechanics, the behavior of the Schrödinger equation, configuration spaces, Hamiltonian and Lagrangian mechanics, to name ones that I know at least a little about), but qualitative descriptions of the Uncertainty Principle, Schrödinger’s Cat, Wave-Particle Duality, and the Measurement Problem do not get you to that level.
Rejoice—the reality of quantum mechanics is way more awesome than you think it is, and you can find out about it!
Let me rephrase: I’m sure there is more to cutting edge QM than that which I understand (or even have heard of). Is any of that necessary to engage with the philosophy-of-science questions raised by the end of the Sequence, such as Science Doesn’t Trust Your Rationality?
From a writing point of view, some scientific controversy needed to be introduced to motivate the later discussion—and Eliezer choose QM. As examples go, it has advantages:
(1) QM is cutting edge—you can’t just go to Wikipedia to figure out who won. EY could have written a Lamarckian / Darwinian evolution sequence with similar concluding essays, but indisputably knowing who was right would slant how the philosophy-of-science point would be interpreted.
(2) A non-expert should recognize that their intuitions are hopelessly misleading when dealing with QM, opening them to serious consideration of the new-to-them philosophy-of-science position EY articulates.
But let’s not confuse the benefits of the motivating example with arguing that there is philosophy-of-science benefit in writing an understandable description of QM.
In other words, if the essays in the sequence after and including The Failures of Eld Science were omitted from the Sequence, it wouldn’t belong on LessWrong.