the same can be said of race: I may subjectively prefer white people.
Yes. That’s perfectly fine. In fact, if you examine the revealed preferences (e.g. who people prefer to have as their neighbours or who do they prefer to marry) you will see that most people in reality do prefer others of their own race.
And, of course, the same can be said of sex, too. Unless you are an evenhanded bi, you’re most certainly guilty of preferring some specific sex (or maybe gender, it varies).
You might bite the bullet here and say that yes, in fact, racism, sexism etc. is morally acceptable
“Morally acceptable” is a judgement, it is conditional on which morality you’re using as your standard. Different moralities will produce different moral acceptability for the same actions.
Perhaps you wanted to say “socially acceptable”? In particular, “socially acceptable in contemporary US”? That, of course, is a very different thing.
I think most people would agree that these __isms are wrong, and so speciesism must also be wrong.
Sigh. This is a rationality forum, no? And you’re using emotionally charged guilt-by-association arguments? (it’s actually designed guilt-by-association since the word “speciesism” was explicitly coined to resemble “racism”, etc.).
Lumifer, should the charge of “mind-killers” be levelled at anti-speciesists or meat-eaters?
(If you were being ironic, apologies for being so literal-minded.)
Neither. It just looks like it would be a useful sign in front of animal-rights discussions.
I see people having strong emotional priors and marshaling arguments in favour of predefined conclusions. Not that different from politics, really, except maybe there’s less tribal identity involved.
I apologize for presenting the argument in a way that’s difficult to understand. Here are the facts:
If you believe that subjective opinions which are not based on evidence are morally acceptable, then you must believe that sexism, racism, etc. are acceptable
We* don’t believe that sexism, racism, etc. are acceptable
Therefore, we cannot accept arguments based on subjective opinions
Is there a better way to phrase this?
(* “We” here means the broader LW community. I realize that you disagree, but I didn’t know that at the time of writing.)
Firstly, your (1), while true, is misleading; it should read “If you believe that subjective opinions which are not based on evidence are morally acceptable, then you must believe that [long, LONG, probably literally infinite list of possible views, of which sexism and racism may be members but which contains innumerably more other stuff] are morally acceptable”. Sure, accepting beliefs without evidence may lead us to sexism and/or racism, but that’s hardly our biggest problem at that point.
Secondly, you presuppose that sexism and racism are necessarily not based on evidence. Of course, you may say that sexism and racism are by definition not based on evidence, because if there’s evidence, then it’s not sexist/racist, but that would be one of those “37 Ways That Bad Stuff Can Happen” or what have you; most people, after all, do not use your definition of “sexist” or “racist”; the common definition takes no notice of whether there’s evidence or not.
Thirdly, for every modus ponens there is a modus tollens — and, as in this case, vice versa: we could decide that “subjective” opinions not based on evidence are morally acceptable (after all, we’re not talking about empirical matters, right? These are moral positions). This, by your (1) and modus ponens, would lead us to accept sexism and racism. Intended? Or no?
Finally — and this is the big one — it strikes me as fundamentally backwards to start from broad moral positions, and reason from them to a decision about whether we need evidence for our moral positions.
There’s a bigger logical flaw: “belief that subjective opinions not based on evidence are acceptable” is an ambiguous English phrase. It can mean belief that:
1) if X is a subjective opinion, then X is acceptable.
2) there exists at least one X such that X is a subjective opinion and is acceptable
Needless to say, the argument depends on it being #1, while most people who would say such a thing would mean #2.
I believe that hairdryers are for sale at Wal-Mart. That doesn’t mean that every hairdryer in existence is for sale at Wal-Mart.
Thank you Said for your helpful comments. How is this:
Suppose we are considering whether being A is more morally valuable than being B. If we don’t require evidence when making that decision, then lots of ridiculous conclusions are possible, including racism and sexism.
We don’t want these ridiculous conclusions.
Therefore, when judging the moral worth of beings, the differentiation must be based on evidence.
Regarding your “Finally” point—I was responding to Lumifer’s statement:
Humans are special in the same way a roast is tasty or a host charming. It is entirely in the eye of the beholder, it’s a subjective opinion and as such there is no “actually” about it.
I agree that most people wouldn’t take this position, so my argument is usually more confusing than helpful. But in this case it seemed relevant.
This has the same flaw as before, just phrased a little differently. “Suppose I am ordering a pizza. If we don’t require it to be square, then all sorts of ridiculous possibilities are possible, such as a pizza a half inch wide and 20 feet long. We don’t want these ridiculous possibilities, so we better make sure to always order square pizzas.”
“If we don’t require evidence, then ridiculous conclusions are possible” can be interpreted in English to mean
1) In any case where we don’t require evidence, ridiculous conclusions are possible.
2) In at least one case where we don’t require evidence, ridiculous conclusions are possible.
Most people who think that the statement is true would be agreeing with it in sense #2, just like with the pizzas. And your argument depends on sense #1.
In other words, you’re assuming that if evidence isn’t used to rule out racism, then nothing else can rule out racism either.
If we allow subjective opinions, then ridiculous conclusions are possible.
Keep in mind that I was responding to Lumifer’s comment:
Humans are special in the same way a roast is tasty or a host charming. It is entirely in the eye of the beholder, it’s a subjective opinion and as such there is no “actually” about it.
This is not intended to be a grand, sweeping axiom of ethics. I was just pointing out that allowing these subjective opinions proves more than we probably want.
That still has the same flaw. If we allow any and all subjective opinions, then ridiculous conclusions are possible. But it doesn’t follow that if we allow some subjective opinions, ridiculous conclusions are possible. And nobody’s claiming the former.
Suppose we are considering whether being A is more morally valuable than being B. If we don’t require evidence when making that decision, then lots of ridiculous conclusions are possible, including racism and sexism.
The issue isn’t whether you require evidence. The issue is solely which moral yardstick are you using.
The “evidence” is the application of that particular moral metric to beings A and B, but it seems to me you’re should be more concerned with the metric itself.
To give a crude and trivial example, if the metric is “Long noses are better than short noses” then the evidence is length of noses of A and B and on the basis of this evidence we declare the long-nose being A to be more valuable (conditional on this metric, of course) than the short-nose being B. I don’t think you’ll be happy with this outcome :-)
Oh, and you are still starting with the predefined conclusion and then looking for ways to support it.
By the way, thank you for spelling out your position with a clear, valid argument that keeps the conversation moving forward. In the heat of argument we often forget to express our appreciation of well-posed comments.
You keep using that word. I do not think it means what you think it means.
If you believe that subjective opinions which are not based on evidence are morally acceptable, then you must believe that sexism, racism, etc. are acceptable
That’s curious. My and your ideas of morality are radically different. There’s even not that much of a common base.
Let me start by re-expressing in my words how do I read your position (so that you could fix my misinterpretations). First, you’re using “morally acceptable” without any qualifiers of conditionals. This means that you believe there is One True Morality, the Correct One, on the basis of which we can and should judge actions and opinions. Given your emphasis on “evidence”, you also seem to believe that this One True Morality is objective, that is, can be derived from actual reality and proven by facts.
Second, you divide subjective opinions into two classes: “not based on evidence” and, presumably, “based on evidence”. Note that this is not at all the same thing as “falsifiable” vs. “non-falsifiable”. For example, let’s say I try two kinds of wine and declare that I like the second wine better. Is such a subjective opinion “based on evidence”?
You also have major logic problems here (starting with the all/some issue), but it’s a mess and I think other comments have addressed it.
To contrast, I’ll give a brief outline of how I view morality. I think of morality as a more or less coherent set of values at the core of which is a subset of moral axioms. These moral axioms are certainly not arbitrary—many factors influence them, the three biggest ones are probably biology, societal/cultural influence, and individual upbringing and history—but they are not falsifiable. You cannot prove them right or wrong.
Evidence certainly matters, but it matters mostly at the interface of moral values and actions: evidence tells you whether the actual outcomes of your actions match your intent and your values. It is, of course, often the case that they do not. However evidence cannot tell you what you should want or what you should value.
We* don’t believe that sexism, racism, etc. are acceptable
Heh. I neither believe you have the power to speak for the entire LW community, nor do I care what you find morally acceptable or unacceptable.
Therefore, we cannot accept arguments based on subjective opinions
As has been noted, your logic is flawed. However the bigger issue is your confusion between arguments and declarative statements (that e.g. reflect personal values). Arguments serve to persuade, to change someone’s mind—subjective opinions do not. If I say I hate tomatoes that’s not a reason for you to modify your attitude towards tomatoes, it’s just an observation about myself. I am not sure what do you mean by “accepting” it.
If you believe that subjective opinions which are not based on evidence are morally acceptable, then you must believe that sexism, racism, etc. are acceptable
This does not follow. (It can be repaired by adding an “all” to the antecedent but then then the conclusion in ‘3’ would not follow from 1 and 2.)
Is there a better way to phrase this?
Basically, no. Your argument is irredeemably flawed.
Yes. That’s perfectly fine. In fact, if you examine the revealed preferences (e.g. who people prefer to have as their neighbours or who do they prefer to marry) you will see that most people in reality do prefer others of their own race.
And, of course, the same can be said of sex, too. Unless you are an evenhanded bi, you’re most certainly guilty of preferring some specific sex (or maybe gender, it varies).
“Morally acceptable” is a judgement, it is conditional on which morality you’re using as your standard. Different moralities will produce different moral acceptability for the same actions.
Perhaps you wanted to say “socially acceptable”? In particular, “socially acceptable in contemporary US”? That, of course, is a very different thing.
Sigh. This is a rationality forum, no? And you’re using emotionally charged guilt-by-association arguments? (it’s actually designed guilt-by-association since the word “speciesism” was explicitly coined to resemble “racism”, etc.).
Warning: HERE BE MIND-KILLERS!
Lumifer, should the charge of “mind-killers” be levelled at anti-speciesists or meat-eaters? (If you were being ironic, apologies for being so literal-minded.)
I’m fairly sure it’s for the examples referencing the politically charged issues of racism and sexism.
It can be levelled at most people who use employ either of those terms.
Neither. It just looks like it would be a useful sign in front of animal-rights discussions.
I see people having strong emotional priors and marshaling arguments in favour of predefined conclusions. Not that different from politics, really, except maybe there’s less tribal identity involved.
I apologize for presenting the argument in a way that’s difficult to understand. Here are the facts:
If you believe that subjective opinions which are not based on evidence are morally acceptable, then you must believe that sexism, racism, etc. are acceptable
We* don’t believe that sexism, racism, etc. are acceptable
Therefore, we cannot accept arguments based on subjective opinions
Is there a better way to phrase this?
(* “We” here means the broader LW community. I realize that you disagree, but I didn’t know that at the time of writing.)
Y’got some… logical problems going on, there.
Firstly, your (1), while true, is misleading; it should read “If you believe that subjective opinions which are not based on evidence are morally acceptable, then you must believe that [long, LONG, probably literally infinite list of possible views, of which sexism and racism may be members but which contains innumerably more other stuff] are morally acceptable”. Sure, accepting beliefs without evidence may lead us to sexism and/or racism, but that’s hardly our biggest problem at that point.
Secondly, you presuppose that sexism and racism are necessarily not based on evidence. Of course, you may say that sexism and racism are by definition not based on evidence, because if there’s evidence, then it’s not sexist/racist, but that would be one of those “37 Ways That Bad Stuff Can Happen” or what have you; most people, after all, do not use your definition of “sexist” or “racist”; the common definition takes no notice of whether there’s evidence or not.
Thirdly, for every modus ponens there is a modus tollens — and, as in this case, vice versa: we could decide that “subjective” opinions not based on evidence are morally acceptable (after all, we’re not talking about empirical matters, right? These are moral positions). This, by your (1) and modus ponens, would lead us to accept sexism and racism. Intended? Or no?
Finally — and this is the big one — it strikes me as fundamentally backwards to start from broad moral positions, and reason from them to a decision about whether we need evidence for our moral positions.
There’s a bigger logical flaw: “belief that subjective opinions not based on evidence are acceptable” is an ambiguous English phrase. It can mean belief that:
1) if X is a subjective opinion, then X is acceptable.
2) there exists at least one X such that X is a subjective opinion and is acceptable
Needless to say, the argument depends on it being #1, while most people who would say such a thing would mean #2.
I believe that hairdryers are for sale at Wal-Mart. That doesn’t mean that every hairdryer in existence is for sale at Wal-Mart.
Yes, good point — the “some” vs. “all” distinction is being ignored.
Good point, thank you. I have tried again here.
Thank you Said for your helpful comments. How is this:
Suppose we are considering whether being A is more morally valuable than being B. If we don’t require evidence when making that decision, then lots of ridiculous conclusions are possible, including racism and sexism.
We don’t want these ridiculous conclusions.
Therefore, when judging the moral worth of beings, the differentiation must be based on evidence.
Regarding your “Finally” point—I was responding to Lumifer’s statement:
I agree that most people wouldn’t take this position, so my argument is usually more confusing than helpful. But in this case it seemed relevant.
This has the same flaw as before, just phrased a little differently. “Suppose I am ordering a pizza. If we don’t require it to be square, then all sorts of ridiculous possibilities are possible, such as a pizza a half inch wide and 20 feet long. We don’t want these ridiculous possibilities, so we better make sure to always order square pizzas.”
“If we don’t require evidence, then ridiculous conclusions are possible” can be interpreted in English to mean
1) In any case where we don’t require evidence, ridiculous conclusions are possible.
2) In at least one case where we don’t require evidence, ridiculous conclusions are possible.
Most people who think that the statement is true would be agreeing with it in sense #2, just like with the pizzas. And your argument depends on sense #1.
In other words, you’re assuming that if evidence isn’t used to rule out racism, then nothing else can rule out racism either.
Fair enough. What if we replace (1) with
If we allow subjective opinions, then ridiculous conclusions are possible.
Keep in mind that I was responding to Lumifer’s comment:
This is not intended to be a grand, sweeping axiom of ethics. I was just pointing out that allowing these subjective opinions proves more than we probably want.
That still has the same flaw. If we allow any and all subjective opinions, then ridiculous conclusions are possible. But it doesn’t follow that if we allow some subjective opinions, ridiculous conclusions are possible. And nobody’s claiming the former.
The issue isn’t whether you require evidence. The issue is solely which moral yardstick are you using.
The “evidence” is the application of that particular moral metric to beings A and B, but it seems to me you’re should be more concerned with the metric itself.
To give a crude and trivial example, if the metric is “Long noses are better than short noses” then the evidence is length of noses of A and B and on the basis of this evidence we declare the long-nose being A to be more valuable (conditional on this metric, of course) than the short-nose being B. I don’t think you’ll be happy with this outcome :-)
Oh, and you are still starting with the predefined conclusion and then looking for ways to support it.
By the way, thank you for spelling out your position with a clear, valid argument that keeps the conversation moving forward. In the heat of argument we often forget to express our appreciation of well-posed comments.
This is not a core belief of the broader LW community. An actual core belief of the LW community:
I’m not sure that is quite true. It is controversial and many are not comfortable with it without caveats.
You keep using that word. I do not think it means what you think it means.
That’s curious. My and your ideas of morality are radically different. There’s even not that much of a common base.
Let me start by re-expressing in my words how do I read your position (so that you could fix my misinterpretations). First, you’re using “morally acceptable” without any qualifiers of conditionals. This means that you believe there is One True Morality, the Correct One, on the basis of which we can and should judge actions and opinions. Given your emphasis on “evidence”, you also seem to believe that this One True Morality is objective, that is, can be derived from actual reality and proven by facts.
Second, you divide subjective opinions into two classes: “not based on evidence” and, presumably, “based on evidence”. Note that this is not at all the same thing as “falsifiable” vs. “non-falsifiable”. For example, let’s say I try two kinds of wine and declare that I like the second wine better. Is such a subjective opinion “based on evidence”?
You also have major logic problems here (starting with the all/some issue), but it’s a mess and I think other comments have addressed it.
To contrast, I’ll give a brief outline of how I view morality. I think of morality as a more or less coherent set of values at the core of which is a subset of moral axioms. These moral axioms are certainly not arbitrary—many factors influence them, the three biggest ones are probably biology, societal/cultural influence, and individual upbringing and history—but they are not falsifiable. You cannot prove them right or wrong.
Evidence certainly matters, but it matters mostly at the interface of moral values and actions: evidence tells you whether the actual outcomes of your actions match your intent and your values. It is, of course, often the case that they do not. However evidence cannot tell you what you should want or what you should value.
Heh. I neither believe you have the power to speak for the entire LW community, nor do I care what you find morally acceptable or unacceptable.
As has been noted, your logic is flawed. However the bigger issue is your confusion between arguments and declarative statements (that e.g. reflect personal values). Arguments serve to persuade, to change someone’s mind—subjective opinions do not. If I say I hate tomatoes that’s not a reason for you to modify your attitude towards tomatoes, it’s just an observation about myself. I am not sure what do you mean by “accepting” it.
This does not follow. (It can be repaired by adding an “all” to the antecedent but then then the conclusion in ‘3’ would not follow from 1 and 2.)
Basically, no. Your argument is irredeemably flawed.