Firstly, your (1), while true, is misleading; it should read “If you believe that subjective opinions which are not based on evidence are morally acceptable, then you must believe that [long, LONG, probably literally infinite list of possible views, of which sexism and racism may be members but which contains innumerably more other stuff] are morally acceptable”. Sure, accepting beliefs without evidence may lead us to sexism and/or racism, but that’s hardly our biggest problem at that point.
Secondly, you presuppose that sexism and racism are necessarily not based on evidence. Of course, you may say that sexism and racism are by definition not based on evidence, because if there’s evidence, then it’s not sexist/racist, but that would be one of those “37 Ways That Bad Stuff Can Happen” or what have you; most people, after all, do not use your definition of “sexist” or “racist”; the common definition takes no notice of whether there’s evidence or not.
Thirdly, for every modus ponens there is a modus tollens — and, as in this case, vice versa: we could decide that “subjective” opinions not based on evidence are morally acceptable (after all, we’re not talking about empirical matters, right? These are moral positions). This, by your (1) and modus ponens, would lead us to accept sexism and racism. Intended? Or no?
Finally — and this is the big one — it strikes me as fundamentally backwards to start from broad moral positions, and reason from them to a decision about whether we need evidence for our moral positions.
There’s a bigger logical flaw: “belief that subjective opinions not based on evidence are acceptable” is an ambiguous English phrase. It can mean belief that:
1) if X is a subjective opinion, then X is acceptable.
2) there exists at least one X such that X is a subjective opinion and is acceptable
Needless to say, the argument depends on it being #1, while most people who would say such a thing would mean #2.
I believe that hairdryers are for sale at Wal-Mart. That doesn’t mean that every hairdryer in existence is for sale at Wal-Mart.
Thank you Said for your helpful comments. How is this:
Suppose we are considering whether being A is more morally valuable than being B. If we don’t require evidence when making that decision, then lots of ridiculous conclusions are possible, including racism and sexism.
We don’t want these ridiculous conclusions.
Therefore, when judging the moral worth of beings, the differentiation must be based on evidence.
Regarding your “Finally” point—I was responding to Lumifer’s statement:
Humans are special in the same way a roast is tasty or a host charming. It is entirely in the eye of the beholder, it’s a subjective opinion and as such there is no “actually” about it.
I agree that most people wouldn’t take this position, so my argument is usually more confusing than helpful. But in this case it seemed relevant.
This has the same flaw as before, just phrased a little differently. “Suppose I am ordering a pizza. If we don’t require it to be square, then all sorts of ridiculous possibilities are possible, such as a pizza a half inch wide and 20 feet long. We don’t want these ridiculous possibilities, so we better make sure to always order square pizzas.”
“If we don’t require evidence, then ridiculous conclusions are possible” can be interpreted in English to mean
1) In any case where we don’t require evidence, ridiculous conclusions are possible.
2) In at least one case where we don’t require evidence, ridiculous conclusions are possible.
Most people who think that the statement is true would be agreeing with it in sense #2, just like with the pizzas. And your argument depends on sense #1.
In other words, you’re assuming that if evidence isn’t used to rule out racism, then nothing else can rule out racism either.
If we allow subjective opinions, then ridiculous conclusions are possible.
Keep in mind that I was responding to Lumifer’s comment:
Humans are special in the same way a roast is tasty or a host charming. It is entirely in the eye of the beholder, it’s a subjective opinion and as such there is no “actually” about it.
This is not intended to be a grand, sweeping axiom of ethics. I was just pointing out that allowing these subjective opinions proves more than we probably want.
That still has the same flaw. If we allow any and all subjective opinions, then ridiculous conclusions are possible. But it doesn’t follow that if we allow some subjective opinions, ridiculous conclusions are possible. And nobody’s claiming the former.
Suppose we are considering whether being A is more morally valuable than being B. If we don’t require evidence when making that decision, then lots of ridiculous conclusions are possible, including racism and sexism.
The issue isn’t whether you require evidence. The issue is solely which moral yardstick are you using.
The “evidence” is the application of that particular moral metric to beings A and B, but it seems to me you’re should be more concerned with the metric itself.
To give a crude and trivial example, if the metric is “Long noses are better than short noses” then the evidence is length of noses of A and B and on the basis of this evidence we declare the long-nose being A to be more valuable (conditional on this metric, of course) than the short-nose being B. I don’t think you’ll be happy with this outcome :-)
Oh, and you are still starting with the predefined conclusion and then looking for ways to support it.
Y’got some… logical problems going on, there.
Firstly, your (1), while true, is misleading; it should read “If you believe that subjective opinions which are not based on evidence are morally acceptable, then you must believe that [long, LONG, probably literally infinite list of possible views, of which sexism and racism may be members but which contains innumerably more other stuff] are morally acceptable”. Sure, accepting beliefs without evidence may lead us to sexism and/or racism, but that’s hardly our biggest problem at that point.
Secondly, you presuppose that sexism and racism are necessarily not based on evidence. Of course, you may say that sexism and racism are by definition not based on evidence, because if there’s evidence, then it’s not sexist/racist, but that would be one of those “37 Ways That Bad Stuff Can Happen” or what have you; most people, after all, do not use your definition of “sexist” or “racist”; the common definition takes no notice of whether there’s evidence or not.
Thirdly, for every modus ponens there is a modus tollens — and, as in this case, vice versa: we could decide that “subjective” opinions not based on evidence are morally acceptable (after all, we’re not talking about empirical matters, right? These are moral positions). This, by your (1) and modus ponens, would lead us to accept sexism and racism. Intended? Or no?
Finally — and this is the big one — it strikes me as fundamentally backwards to start from broad moral positions, and reason from them to a decision about whether we need evidence for our moral positions.
There’s a bigger logical flaw: “belief that subjective opinions not based on evidence are acceptable” is an ambiguous English phrase. It can mean belief that:
1) if X is a subjective opinion, then X is acceptable.
2) there exists at least one X such that X is a subjective opinion and is acceptable
Needless to say, the argument depends on it being #1, while most people who would say such a thing would mean #2.
I believe that hairdryers are for sale at Wal-Mart. That doesn’t mean that every hairdryer in existence is for sale at Wal-Mart.
Yes, good point — the “some” vs. “all” distinction is being ignored.
Good point, thank you. I have tried again here.
Thank you Said for your helpful comments. How is this:
Suppose we are considering whether being A is more morally valuable than being B. If we don’t require evidence when making that decision, then lots of ridiculous conclusions are possible, including racism and sexism.
We don’t want these ridiculous conclusions.
Therefore, when judging the moral worth of beings, the differentiation must be based on evidence.
Regarding your “Finally” point—I was responding to Lumifer’s statement:
I agree that most people wouldn’t take this position, so my argument is usually more confusing than helpful. But in this case it seemed relevant.
This has the same flaw as before, just phrased a little differently. “Suppose I am ordering a pizza. If we don’t require it to be square, then all sorts of ridiculous possibilities are possible, such as a pizza a half inch wide and 20 feet long. We don’t want these ridiculous possibilities, so we better make sure to always order square pizzas.”
“If we don’t require evidence, then ridiculous conclusions are possible” can be interpreted in English to mean
1) In any case where we don’t require evidence, ridiculous conclusions are possible.
2) In at least one case where we don’t require evidence, ridiculous conclusions are possible.
Most people who think that the statement is true would be agreeing with it in sense #2, just like with the pizzas. And your argument depends on sense #1.
In other words, you’re assuming that if evidence isn’t used to rule out racism, then nothing else can rule out racism either.
Fair enough. What if we replace (1) with
If we allow subjective opinions, then ridiculous conclusions are possible.
Keep in mind that I was responding to Lumifer’s comment:
This is not intended to be a grand, sweeping axiom of ethics. I was just pointing out that allowing these subjective opinions proves more than we probably want.
That still has the same flaw. If we allow any and all subjective opinions, then ridiculous conclusions are possible. But it doesn’t follow that if we allow some subjective opinions, ridiculous conclusions are possible. And nobody’s claiming the former.
The issue isn’t whether you require evidence. The issue is solely which moral yardstick are you using.
The “evidence” is the application of that particular moral metric to beings A and B, but it seems to me you’re should be more concerned with the metric itself.
To give a crude and trivial example, if the metric is “Long noses are better than short noses” then the evidence is length of noses of A and B and on the basis of this evidence we declare the long-nose being A to be more valuable (conditional on this metric, of course) than the short-nose being B. I don’t think you’ll be happy with this outcome :-)
Oh, and you are still starting with the predefined conclusion and then looking for ways to support it.