What properties do human beings possess that makes us think that it is wrong to torture them?
Does it have to be the case that “the properties that X possesses” is the only relevant input? It seems to me that the properties possessed by the would-be torturer or killer are also relevant.
For instance, if I came across a kid torturing a mouse (even a fly) I would be horrified, but I would respond differently to a cat torturing a mouse (or a fly).
What if it is done by a baby or a kid with mental impairments so she cannot follow moral/social norms? I see no reason to treat the situation differently in such a case. (Except that one might want to talk to the parents of the kid in order to have them consider a psychological check-up for their child.)
From the cat. I would in fact press a magic button that turns all carnivores into vegans. The cat (or the kid) doesn’t know what it is doing and cannot be meaningfully blamed, but I still consider this to be a harmful action and I would want to prevent it. Who commits the act makes no difference to me (or only for indirect reasons).
It seems to me that the properties possessed by the would-be torturer or killer are also relevant.
Why?
It seems to me like the only (consequentialist) justification is that they will then go on to torture others who have the ability to feel pain, and so it’s still only the victims’ properties which are relevant.
The more I perceive the torturer to be “like me”, the more seeing this undermines my confidence in my own moral intuitions—my sense of a shared identity.
The fly case is particularly puzzling, as I regard flies as not morally relevant.
I’d regard a kid pulling wings off a fly as worrying not because I particularly care about flies, but more because it indicates a propensity to do similar things to morally relevant agents. Not much chance of that becoming a problem for a cat.
Does it have to be the case that “the properties that X possesses” is the only relevant input? It seems to me that the properties possessed by the would-be torturer or killer are also relevant.
For instance, if I came across a kid torturing a mouse (even a fly) I would be horrified, but I would respond differently to a cat torturing a mouse (or a fly).
What if it is done by a baby or a kid with mental impairments so she cannot follow moral/social norms? I see no reason to treat the situation differently in such a case. (Except that one might want to talk to the parents of the kid in order to have them consider a psychological check-up for their child.)
Differently from a normal kid, or differently from a cat? (I share Morendil’s moral intuitions regarding his example.)
From the cat. I would in fact press a magic button that turns all carnivores into vegans. The cat (or the kid) doesn’t know what it is doing and cannot be meaningfully blamed, but I still consider this to be a harmful action and I would want to prevent it. Who commits the act makes no difference to me (or only for indirect reasons).
Why?
It seems to me like the only (consequentialist) justification is that they will then go on to torture others who have the ability to feel pain, and so it’s still only the victims’ properties which are relevant.
The more I perceive the torturer to be “like me”, the more seeing this undermines my confidence in my own moral intuitions—my sense of a shared identity.
The fly case is particularly puzzling, as I regard flies as not morally relevant.
I’d regard a kid pulling wings off a fly as worrying not because I particularly care about flies, but more because it indicates a propensity to do similar things to morally relevant agents. Not much chance of that becoming a problem for a cat.