If we use cognitive enhancements on animals, we can turn them into highly intelligent, self-aware beings as well. And the argument from potentiality would also prohibit abortion or experimentation on embryos. I was thinking about including the argument from potentiality, but then I didn’t because the post is already long and because I didn’t want to make it look like I was just “knocking down a very weak argument or two”. I should have used a qualifier though in the sentence you quoted, to leave room for things I hadn’t considered.
If we use cognitive enhancements on animals, we can turn them into highly intelligent, self-aware beings as well.
And then arguments A through E will not argue for treating the enhanced animals differently from humans.
And the argument from potentiality would also prohibit abortion or experimentation on embryos.
It would make the difference between abortion and infanticide small. It does seem to me that the arguments for allowing abortion but not allowing infanticide are weak and the most convincing one hinges on legal convenience.
I was thinking about including the argument from potentiality, but then I didn’t because the post is already long and because I didn’t want to make it look like I was just “knocking down a very weak argument or two”.
I think this is a hazard for any “Arguments against X” post; the reason X is controversial is generally because there are many arguments on both sides, and an argument that seems strong to one person seems weak to another.
What level of “potential” is required here? A human baby has a certain amount of potential to reach whatever threshold you’re comparing it against—if it’s fed, kept warm, not killed, etc. A pig also has a certain level of potential—if we tweak its genetics.
If we develop AI, then any given pile of sand has just as much potential to reach “human level” as an infant. I would be amused if improved engineering knowledge gave beaches moral weight (though not completely opposed to the idea).
Your proposed category—“can develop to contain morally relevant quantity X”—tends to fail along similar edge cases as whatever morally relevant quality it’s replacing.
What level of “potential” is required here? A human baby has a certain amount of potential to reach whatever threshold you’re comparing it against—if it’s fed, kept warm, not killed, etc. A pig also has a certain level of potential—if we tweak its genetics.
I have given a gradualist answer to every question related to this topic, and unsurprisingly I will not veer from that here. The value of the potential is proportional to the difficulty involved in realizing that potential, as the value of oil in the ground depends on what lies between you and it.
If we use cognitive enhancements on animals, we can turn them into highly intelligent, self-aware beings as well. And the argument from potentiality would also prohibit abortion or experimentation on embryos. I was thinking about including the argument from potentiality, but then I didn’t because the post is already long and because I didn’t want to make it look like I was just “knocking down a very weak argument or two”. I should have used a qualifier though in the sentence you quoted, to leave room for things I hadn’t considered.
And then arguments A through E will not argue for treating the enhanced animals differently from humans.
It would make the difference between abortion and infanticide small. It does seem to me that the arguments for allowing abortion but not allowing infanticide are weak and the most convincing one hinges on legal convenience.
I think this is a hazard for any “Arguments against X” post; the reason X is controversial is generally because there are many arguments on both sides, and an argument that seems strong to one person seems weak to another.
What level of “potential” is required here? A human baby has a certain amount of potential to reach whatever threshold you’re comparing it against—if it’s fed, kept warm, not killed, etc. A pig also has a certain level of potential—if we tweak its genetics.
If we develop AI, then any given pile of sand has just as much potential to reach “human level” as an infant. I would be amused if improved engineering knowledge gave beaches moral weight (though not completely opposed to the idea).
Your proposed category—“can develop to contain morally relevant quantity X”—tends to fail along similar edge cases as whatever morally relevant quality it’s replacing.
I have given a gradualist answer to every question related to this topic, and unsurprisingly I will not veer from that here. The value of the potential is proportional to the difficulty involved in realizing that potential, as the value of oil in the ground depends on what lies between you and it.