By previous state, I meant current. I misspoke.
Yes, the last table is for the (1,0) table.
So the utility for S+B is 0 and the utility for R+R is 0.5. The equilibrium is where both players reload with probability = 2⁄3. The utility of the (1,0) state is +2/3.
Thanks. I now see my mistake. I shouldn’t have subtracted the expected utility of the current state from the expected utility of the next.
By previous state, I meant current. I misspoke.
Yes, the last table is for the (1,0) table.
So the utility for S+B is 0 and the utility for R+R is 0.5. The equilibrium is where both players reload with probability = 2⁄3. The utility of the (1,0) state is +2/3.
Thanks. I now see my mistake. I shouldn’t have subtracted the expected utility of the current state from the expected utility of the next.