That much makes intuitive sense to me—I might go as far as to say that when we cherry-pick we are deliberately trolling ourselves with old evidence. I think I keep expecting that many of these problems are resolved by considering the details of how we, the agent, actually do the procedure. For example, say you have a Bayesian Confirmation Theoretic treatment of a hypothesis, but then you learn about LI, does re-interpreting the evidence with LI still count as the old evidence problem? Do we have a formal account of how to transition from one interpretation to the other, like a gauge theory of decisions (I expect not)?
I wrote a partial review of Shafer & Vovk’s book on the subject here. I am still reading the book and it was published in 2001, so it doesn’t reflect the current state of scholarship—but if you’ll take a lay opinion, I recommend it.
That much makes intuitive sense to me—I might go as far as to say that when we cherry-pick we are deliberately trolling ourselves with old evidence. I think I keep expecting that many of these problems are resolved by considering the details of how we, the agent, actually do the procedure. For example, say you have a Bayesian Confirmation Theoretic treatment of a hypothesis, but then you learn about LI, does re-interpreting the evidence with LI still count as the old evidence problem? Do we have a formal account of how to transition from one interpretation to the other, like a gauge theory of decisions (I expect not)?
I wrote a partial review of Shafer & Vovk’s book on the subject here. I am still reading the book and it was published in 2001, so it doesn’t reflect the current state of scholarship—but if you’ll take a lay opinion, I recommend it.
Maybe Shafer & Vovk would like to hear about logical induction.