You can claim that you are using such a decision theory and hence that I should find your precommitments credible, but if you have no way of proving this, then I shouldn’t believe you, since it is to your advantage to have me believe you are using such a decision theory without actually using it.
From your earlier writings I think you might be assuming that AIs would be intelligent enough to just know what decision algorithms others are using, without any explicit proof procedure. I think that’s an interesting possibility to consider, but not a very likely one. But maybe I’m missing something. If you wrote down any arguments in favor of this assumption, I’d be interested to see them.
That was an answer for your question about what should you replace CDT with. If you won’t be able to convince other agents that you now run on timeless CDT, you gain a little smaller advantage than otherwise, but that’s a separate problem. If you know that your claims of precommitment won’t be believed, you don’t precommit, it’s that easy. But sometimes, you’ll find a better solution than if you only lived in a moment.
Also note that even if you do convince other agents about the abstract fact that your decision theory is now timeless, it won’t help you very much, since it doesn’t prove that you’ll precommit in a specific situation. You only precommit in a given situation if you know that this action makes the situation better for you, which in case of cooperation means that the other side will be able to tell whether you actually precommited, and this is not at all the same as being able to tell what decision theory you use.
Since using a decision theory with precommitment is almost always an advantage, it’s easy to assume that a sufficiently intelligent agent always uses something of the sort, but that doesn’t allow you to know more about their actions—in fact, you know less, since such agent has more options now.
But sometimes, you’ll find a better solution than if you only lived in a moment.
Yes, I see that your decision theory (is it the same as Eliezer’s?) gives better solutions in the following circumstances:
dealing with Omega
dealing with copies of oneself
cooperating with a counterpart in another possible world
Do you think it gives better solutions in the case of AIs (who don’t initially think they’re copies of each other) trying to cooperate? If so, can you give a specific scenario and show how the solution is derived?
You can claim that you are using such a decision theory and hence that I should find your precommitments credible, but if you have no way of proving this, then I shouldn’t believe you, since it is to your advantage to have me believe you are using such a decision theory without actually using it.
From your earlier writings I think you might be assuming that AIs would be intelligent enough to just know what decision algorithms others are using, without any explicit proof procedure. I think that’s an interesting possibility to consider, but not a very likely one. But maybe I’m missing something. If you wrote down any arguments in favor of this assumption, I’d be interested to see them.
That was an answer for your question about what should you replace CDT with. If you won’t be able to convince other agents that you now run on timeless CDT, you gain a little smaller advantage than otherwise, but that’s a separate problem. If you know that your claims of precommitment won’t be believed, you don’t precommit, it’s that easy. But sometimes, you’ll find a better solution than if you only lived in a moment.
Also note that even if you do convince other agents about the abstract fact that your decision theory is now timeless, it won’t help you very much, since it doesn’t prove that you’ll precommit in a specific situation. You only precommit in a given situation if you know that this action makes the situation better for you, which in case of cooperation means that the other side will be able to tell whether you actually precommited, and this is not at all the same as being able to tell what decision theory you use.
Since using a decision theory with precommitment is almost always an advantage, it’s easy to assume that a sufficiently intelligent agent always uses something of the sort, but that doesn’t allow you to know more about their actions—in fact, you know less, since such agent has more options now.
Yes, I see that your decision theory (is it the same as Eliezer’s?) gives better solutions in the following circumstances:
dealing with Omega
dealing with copies of oneself
cooperating with a counterpart in another possible world
Do you think it gives better solutions in the case of AIs (who don’t initially think they’re copies of each other) trying to cooperate? If so, can you give a specific scenario and show how the solution is derived?