In most conceptions of simulation, there is no meaning to “slowed down”, from the perspective of the simulated universe. Time is a local phenomenon in this view—it’s just a compression mechanism so the simulators don’t have to store ALL the states of the simulation, just the current state and the rules to progress it.
Note that this COULD be said of a non-simulated universe as well—past and future states are determined but not accessible, and the universe is self-discovering them by operating on the current state via physics rules. So there’s still no inside-observable difference between simulated and non-simulated universes.
UDASSA seems like anthropic reasoning to include Boltzmann Brain like conceptions of experience. I don’t put a lot of weight on it, because all anthropic reasoning requires an outside-view of possible observations to be meaningful.
And of course, none of this relates to upload, where a given sequence of experiences can span levels of simulation. There may or may not be a way to do it, but it’d be a copy, not a continuation.
The point you make in the your first paragraph is contained in the original shortform post.
The point of the post is exactly that an UDASSA-style argument can nevertheless recover something like a ‘distribution of likely slowdown factors’.
This seems quite curious.
I suggest reading Falkovich’s post on UDASSA to get a sense whats so intriguing abouy the UDASSA franework.
In most conceptions of simulation, there is no meaning to “slowed down”, from the perspective of the simulated universe. Time is a local phenomenon in this view—it’s just a compression mechanism so the simulators don’t have to store ALL the states of the simulation, just the current state and the rules to progress it.
Note that this COULD be said of a non-simulated universe as well—past and future states are determined but not accessible, and the universe is self-discovering them by operating on the current state via physics rules. So there’s still no inside-observable difference between simulated and non-simulated universes.
UDASSA seems like anthropic reasoning to include Boltzmann Brain like conceptions of experience. I don’t put a lot of weight on it, because all anthropic reasoning requires an outside-view of possible observations to be meaningful.
And of course, none of this relates to upload, where a given sequence of experiences can span levels of simulation. There may or may not be a way to do it, but it’d be a copy, not a continuation.
The point you make in the your first paragraph is contained in the original shortform post. The point of the post is exactly that an UDASSA-style argument can nevertheless recover something like a ‘distribution of likely slowdown factors’. This seems quite curious.
I suggest reading Falkovich’s post on UDASSA to get a sense whats so intriguing abouy the UDASSA franework.