Note that there is no such thing as agency or free will in the world where perfect predictors exist.
I am explicitly disputing this. I do not believe assuming there is both free will and perfect predictors runs into contradictions, as long as the agent cannot observe predictions of their future actions. See the first post on the hypothesis “I effectively run on computer C”.
I do not believe assuming there is both free will and perfect predictors runs into contradictions, as long as the agent cannot observe predictions of their future actions.
The objection is more that perfect predictors cannot operate without determinism, and determinism excludes free will.
We see, now, that if free will and determinism are compatible, it is due to limitations on the agent’s knowledge. The agent, knowing it runs on C, cannot thereby determine what action it takes at time t, until a later time. And the initial attempt to provide this knowledge externally fails.
The way I interpret it is “my belief in free will is compatible with determinism”, not “I have free will, defined as ‘the ability to choose between different possible courses of action unimpeded,’ if ‘unimpeded’ is interpreted as ‘unimpeded by an algorithm that runs on C’.” I have no objection to something like “my algorithm running on C includes subroutines that generate different possible worlds and evaluate their utility, thus giving me a perception of making choices.” However, a perfect predictor would know what your algorithm will do before you are ever instantiated, whether by analyzing the algorithm, by running it on a “virtual Jessica machine” or through some combination of both. In that sense, you are not free to make decisions, but, after being run for some time as an algorithm on C, you get to learn what your algorithm is up to that moment.
My assertion is that, subjectively, at the time of the decision, it is not the case that this decision is “impeded” by the algorithm that C is running. There is no way that, at that time, one could even possibly “be blocked by” C. It is never the case, nor could it possibly be the case, that I try to take action A and am prevented somehow by C. The action taken by C at the time of decision is not even known, so there isn’t a paradox created either.
In my view, the conflict between free will and determinism only comes about due to being uncareful about distinguishing different perspectives and paying attention to the ontology and knowledge appropriate to each perspective. E.g. confusing between my perspective and the perspective of a predictor outside me, such that it seems like I should believe my action is determined because the predictor should believe this. Perhaps the main point of my original post is to be very detail-oriented about what a perspective is, and how ontology relativizes to a perspective.
. E.g. confusing between my perspective and the perspective of a predictor outside me, such that it seems like I should believe my action is determined because the predictor should believe this.
If a predictor can predict your actions because, from a third person perspective perspective, then you don’t have libertarian free will, and all you are left with is the
illusion that you do, based on not being able to predict your decisions, as per Thou Art Physics. That notoriously isn’t showing that free will as such is compatible with determinism, only that an illusion thereof is.
You’re saying the third person perspective is “real” and the first person perspective is “illusory” and I am disputing that. This is a matter of reference frame like in special relativity. Maybe an outside observer believes I am moving slower than I believe I am moving but that doesn’t mean either belief is wrong, they’re relative to different reference frames.
You’re saying the third person perspective is “real” and the first person perspective is “illusory”
I am not saying that the first person perspective is necessarily illusory purely because it is a first person perspective. I am saying that it is trumped by the third person perspective. I you feel like a million dollars, but don’t have a million in the bank, you are not a millionaire. That’s a standard, uncontentious and usually unstated epistemological assumption behind most rational , science-based thinking.
and I am disputing that.
If you are going to invert the most basic principle of rationality—“things aren’t real just because they seem real to you”—you should probably make that explicit. BTW, relativity doesn’t prove relativism. There’s a similarity in the name, that’s all.
Interpreting relativism as “thinking something is real makes it real” is a strawman; no individual subject makes such a map-territory error. Relativism means that truth is a two+ place predicate.
Here’s analogy. Say it’s a few days ago and I haven’t made this post. At that time I believe that it has not yet been determined whether I will make the post.
Later I have made the post. Then I believe that it has now already been determined.
Are these beliefs incompatible? No. They’re both true in the ordinary common-sense way.
And this is possible because they’re relative to different reference frames. All spaciotemporal references are indexical (i.e. in some way starting from a spaciotemporally local center of reference), most obviously explicitly indexical ones like “me” and “now”.
The relativity/relativism thing isn’t just nominal. Relativity means references are resolved differently depending on the time and place of the observer, and paying attention to these different resolutions is critical to avoid paradox.
There is no view from nowhere. All “third person perspectives” are first person perspectives from a different time and place.
Interpreting relativism as “thinking something is real makes it real” is a strawman; no individual subject makes such a map-territory error.
People make all sorts of errors.
Relativism means that truth is a two+ place predicate.
Relativism is a family of claims. The specific claim depends on what is in the two places.
Here’s analogy. Say it’s a few days ago and I haven’t made this post. At that time I believe that it has not yet been determined whether I will make the post.
Later I have made the post. Then I believe that it has now already been determined.
Are these beliefs incompatible?
Yes. “is determined” and “is not determined” are incompatible.
Determinism means that the whole future is determined at any point in time. That means that at time T1, your belief that your decision at time T2 is not determined is a false belief.
No. They’re both true in the ordinary common-sense way.
They can’t both be true. But someone who doesn’t understand determinism could hold both beliefs. That isn’t very significant.
And this is possible because they’re relative to different reference frames. All spaciotemporal references are indexical
Says who? Where does it say that determinism is a “spatiotemporal reference”?
The relativity/relativism thing isn’t just nominal. Relativity means references are resolved differently depending on the time and place of the observer, and paying attention to these different resolutions is critical to avoid paradox.
Relativity does not assert that everything is relative to an observer, and in fact insists that some things, such as the speed of light, are not.
Since you don’t have a basis for saying that everything is relative, you need a specific reason for asserting that determinism is relative.
There is no view from nowhere. All “third person perspectives” are first person perspectives from a different time and place.
It was confusing that I used the word “determined” in the analogy. The meaning is clearer if I say it has “already happened” at the later time and not the previous time.
Since you don’t have a basis for saying that everything is relative, you need a specific reason for asserting that determinism is relative.
Burden of proof issue. I’ve explicated a metaphysics that claims that whether something has been determined (i.e. is independent of future choices) depends on the standpoint. You claim this metaphysics is wrong. Your argument was that the third-person view overrides the first-person view. My argument is that this is wrong because of, among other things, relativity. Now you’re saying I need a “specific reason” for asserting that determinism is relative. But I’ve refuted your argument, which is that the third-person view in-general overrides the first-person view.
The positive case is the explication of the metaphysics! You have not located a contradiction in it. This doesn’t prove it to be true but I have never claimed to have such a proof.
Says who?
It’s relatively clear if you think physically (how could any observer even potentially imagine accessing a view that isn’t from a place? Their imagining-accessing proceeds starting from their own time and place; see deixis). Besides this, see Nagel and Brian Cantwell Smith, who have more detailed arguments.
It was confusing that I used the word “determined” in the analogy. The meaning is clearer if I say it has “already happened” at the later time and not the previous time.
That’s clearly true, but it’s harder to see the connection to determinism.
You claim this metaphysics is wrong.
I claim it’s insufficently supported. You have a version of the claim that applies to spatio-temporal objects, but determinism isn’t a spatio temporal object, it’s a putative property of the universe as a whole.
Your argument was that the third-person view overrides the first-person view.
I point out that that is what this audience believes, so the burden is on you to argue otherwise.
Now you’re saying I need a “specific reason” for asserting that determinism is relative.
Relativity does not say that determinism is relative, so you need another argument.
But I’ve refuted your argument, which is that the third-person view in-general overrides the first-person view.
Disagreement is not refutation. If you had an argument that proved relativism to be true of everyhthing whatsoever, then that would be a refutation—but all the arguments you are resting apply only to specific categories.
You have not located a contradiction in it.
Non contradiction is not a sufficient criterion of truth.
This doesn’t prove it to be true but I have never claimed to have such a proof.
So you agree that your theory is insufficiently supported?
It’s relatively clear if you think physically (how could any observer even potentially imagine accessing a view that isn’t from a place
Look at google Earth. This is a solved problem.
Its entirely true that some kinds of objective, mathematical science require things to be indexed to an observer. But,so long as you are dealing with quantifiable physical properties ,it is still possible to predict exactly how things will appear to an observer other than yourself. That kind of thing is much more objective than subjective
On the other hand , there is another set of arguments,such as Nagel’s “what is it like to be a bat” ,which tend to the conclusion that subjective experience cannot be captured mathematically at all. You might be able to capture the XYZ coordinates of a bat ,and it’s velocity and so on, but that tells you very little about its inner world,its subjective, sensations and feelings.
Qualiaphilic arguments go much further in the direction of “view from nowhere” than physics or maths based arguments. Relativity goes a little further than classsical physics,because it holds a larger set of properties to be observed dependent … energy velocity and momentum in addition to location. But that still falls very far short of
full subjectivism.
But it’s still not clear how Chalmers or Nagel style arguments, that deal with consciousness and subjectivity would relate to determinism.
Perhaps the main point of my original post is to be very detail-oriented about what a perspective is, and how ontology relativizes to a perspective.
I have no argument that in most circumstances this difference in perspectives is essential. However, if you are talking about decision theories, the agents who do not believe that their actions are determined just because the predictor knows this (definitely knows, by definition, not just believes), those agents’s algorithms end up two-boxing, because they believe that “their actions are not determined,” and so two-boxing is the higher-utility choice. Unless I’m missing something in your argument again. But if not, then my point is that this relativization does not make a better decision-making algorithm.
The agents I’m considering one-box, as shown in this post. This is because the agent logically knows (as a consequence of their beliefs) that, if they take 1 box, they get $1,000,000, and if they take both boxes, they get $1000. That is, the agent believes the contents of the box are a logical consequence of their own action.
I am explicitly disputing this. I do not believe assuming there is both free will and perfect predictors runs into contradictions, as long as the agent cannot observe predictions of their future actions. See the first post on the hypothesis “I effectively run on computer C”.
The objection is more that perfect predictors cannot operate without determinism, and determinism excludes free will.
I addressed this argument in the previous post.
From your companion post:
The way I interpret it is “my belief in free will is compatible with determinism”, not “I have free will, defined as ‘the ability to choose between different possible courses of action unimpeded,’ if ‘unimpeded’ is interpreted as ‘unimpeded by an algorithm that runs on C’.” I have no objection to something like “my algorithm running on C includes subroutines that generate different possible worlds and evaluate their utility, thus giving me a perception of making choices.” However, a perfect predictor would know what your algorithm will do before you are ever instantiated, whether by analyzing the algorithm, by running it on a “virtual Jessica machine” or through some combination of both. In that sense, you are not free to make decisions, but, after being run for some time as an algorithm on C, you get to learn what your algorithm is up to that moment.
My assertion is that, subjectively, at the time of the decision, it is not the case that this decision is “impeded” by the algorithm that C is running. There is no way that, at that time, one could even possibly “be blocked by” C. It is never the case, nor could it possibly be the case, that I try to take action A and am prevented somehow by C. The action taken by C at the time of decision is not even known, so there isn’t a paradox created either.
In my view, the conflict between free will and determinism only comes about due to being uncareful about distinguishing different perspectives and paying attention to the ontology and knowledge appropriate to each perspective. E.g. confusing between my perspective and the perspective of a predictor outside me, such that it seems like I should believe my action is determined because the predictor should believe this. Perhaps the main point of my original post is to be very detail-oriented about what a perspective is, and how ontology relativizes to a perspective.
If a predictor can predict your actions because, from a third person perspective perspective, then you don’t have libertarian free will, and all you are left with is the illusion that you do, based on not being able to predict your decisions, as per Thou Art Physics. That notoriously isn’t showing that free will as such is compatible with determinism, only that an illusion thereof is.
You’re saying the third person perspective is “real” and the first person perspective is “illusory” and I am disputing that. This is a matter of reference frame like in special relativity. Maybe an outside observer believes I am moving slower than I believe I am moving but that doesn’t mean either belief is wrong, they’re relative to different reference frames.
I am not saying that the first person perspective is necessarily illusory purely because it is a first person perspective. I am saying that it is trumped by the third person perspective. I you feel like a million dollars, but don’t have a million in the bank, you are not a millionaire. That’s a standard, uncontentious and usually unstated epistemological assumption behind most rational , science-based thinking.
If you are going to invert the most basic principle of rationality—“things aren’t real just because they seem real to you”—you should probably make that explicit. BTW, relativity doesn’t prove relativism. There’s a similarity in the name, that’s all.
Interpreting relativism as “thinking something is real makes it real” is a strawman; no individual subject makes such a map-territory error. Relativism means that truth is a two+ place predicate.
Here’s analogy. Say it’s a few days ago and I haven’t made this post. At that time I believe that it has not yet been determined whether I will make the post.
Later I have made the post. Then I believe that it has now already been determined.
Are these beliefs incompatible? No. They’re both true in the ordinary common-sense way. And this is possible because they’re relative to different reference frames. All spaciotemporal references are indexical (i.e. in some way starting from a spaciotemporally local center of reference), most obviously explicitly indexical ones like “me” and “now”.
The relativity/relativism thing isn’t just nominal. Relativity means references are resolved differently depending on the time and place of the observer, and paying attention to these different resolutions is critical to avoid paradox.
There is no view from nowhere. All “third person perspectives” are first person perspectives from a different time and place.
People make all sorts of errors.
Relativism is a family of claims. The specific claim depends on what is in the two places.
Yes. “is determined” and “is not determined” are incompatible.
Determinism means that the whole future is determined at any point in time. That means that at time T1, your belief that your decision at time T2 is not determined is a false belief.
They can’t both be true. But someone who doesn’t understand determinism could hold both beliefs. That isn’t very significant.
Says who? Where does it say that determinism is a “spatiotemporal reference”?
Relativity does not assert that everything is relative to an observer, and in fact insists that some things, such as the speed of light, are not.
Since you don’t have a basis for saying that everything is relative, you need a specific reason for asserting that determinism is relative.
Says who?
It was confusing that I used the word “determined” in the analogy. The meaning is clearer if I say it has “already happened” at the later time and not the previous time.
Burden of proof issue. I’ve explicated a metaphysics that claims that whether something has been determined (i.e. is independent of future choices) depends on the standpoint. You claim this metaphysics is wrong. Your argument was that the third-person view overrides the first-person view. My argument is that this is wrong because of, among other things, relativity. Now you’re saying I need a “specific reason” for asserting that determinism is relative. But I’ve refuted your argument, which is that the third-person view in-general overrides the first-person view.
The positive case is the explication of the metaphysics! You have not located a contradiction in it. This doesn’t prove it to be true but I have never claimed to have such a proof.
It’s relatively clear if you think physically (how could any observer even potentially imagine accessing a view that isn’t from a place? Their imagining-accessing proceeds starting from their own time and place; see deixis). Besides this, see Nagel and Brian Cantwell Smith, who have more detailed arguments.
That’s clearly true, but it’s harder to see the connection to determinism.
I claim it’s insufficently supported. You have a version of the claim that applies to spatio-temporal objects, but determinism isn’t a spatio temporal object, it’s a putative property of the universe as a whole.
I point out that that is what this audience believes, so the burden is on you to argue otherwise.
Relativity does not say that determinism is relative, so you need another argument.
Disagreement is not refutation. If you had an argument that proved relativism to be true of everyhthing whatsoever, then that would be a refutation—but all the arguments you are resting apply only to specific categories.
Non contradiction is not a sufficient criterion of truth.
So you agree that your theory is insufficiently supported?
Look at google Earth. This is a solved problem.
Its entirely true that some kinds of objective, mathematical science require things to be indexed to an observer. But,so long as you are dealing with quantifiable physical properties ,it is still possible to predict exactly how things will appear to an observer other than yourself. That kind of thing is much more objective than subjective
On the other hand , there is another set of arguments,such as Nagel’s “what is it like to be a bat” ,which tend to the conclusion that subjective experience cannot be captured mathematically at all. You might be able to capture the XYZ coordinates of a bat ,and it’s velocity and so on, but that tells you very little about its inner world,its subjective, sensations and feelings.
Qualiaphilic arguments go much further in the direction of “view from nowhere” than physics or maths based arguments. Relativity goes a little further than classsical physics,because it holds a larger set of properties to be observed dependent … energy velocity and momentum in addition to location. But that still falls very far short of
full subjectivism.
But it’s still not clear how Chalmers or Nagel style arguments, that deal with consciousness and subjectivity would relate to determinism.
I have no argument that in most circumstances this difference in perspectives is essential. However, if you are talking about decision theories, the agents who do not believe that their actions are determined just because the predictor knows this (definitely knows, by definition, not just believes), those agents’s algorithms end up two-boxing, because they believe that “their actions are not determined,” and so two-boxing is the higher-utility choice. Unless I’m missing something in your argument again. But if not, then my point is that this relativization does not make a better decision-making algorithm.
The agents I’m considering one-box, as shown in this post. This is because the agent logically knows (as a consequence of their beliefs) that, if they take 1 box, they get $1,000,000, and if they take both boxes, they get $1000. That is, the agent believes the contents of the box are a logical consequence of their own action.