Hm. To me, “choose” sounds like invoking the idea of multiple possibilities, while “control” sounds more determinism-compatible. Of course that is a mere matter of terminology.
Though I’m not sure what you mean by “in the special case where a means-end link is causal”—my thesis was that if you are uncertain about the output of your decision computation, and you factor the universe the Pearlian way, then your logical decision will end up being, in the graph, the logical cause of box B containing a million dollars. You mean the special case where a means-end link is physical? But what is physics except math? Or are we assuming that the local causal relations in physics are more privileged as ontologically basic causes, whereas “logical causality” is just a convenient way of factoring uncertainty and a winning way to construe counterfactuals? (That last one may have some justice to it.)
I agree that “choose” connotes multiple alternatives, but they’re counterfactual antecedents, and when construed as such, are not inconsistent with determinism.
I don’t know about being ontologically basic, but (what I think of as) physical/causal laws have the important property that they compactly specify the entirety of space-time (together with a specification of the initial conditions).
Hm. To me, “choose” sounds like invoking the idea of multiple possibilities, while “control” sounds more determinism-compatible. Of course that is a mere matter of terminology.
Though I’m not sure what you mean by “in the special case where a means-end link is causal”—my thesis was that if you are uncertain about the output of your decision computation, and you factor the universe the Pearlian way, then your logical decision will end up being, in the graph, the logical cause of box B containing a million dollars. You mean the special case where a means-end link is physical? But what is physics except math? Or are we assuming that the local causal relations in physics are more privileged as ontologically basic causes, whereas “logical causality” is just a convenient way of factoring uncertainty and a winning way to construe counterfactuals? (That last one may have some justice to it.)
I agree that “choose” connotes multiple alternatives, but they’re counterfactual antecedents, and when construed as such, are not inconsistent with determinism.
I don’t know about being ontologically basic, but (what I think of as) physical/causal laws have the important property that they compactly specify the entirety of space-time (together with a specification of the initial conditions).