Rolf Nelson wanted to know what everyday problems evidential decision theory produces. Newcomb’s Problem can be mapped onto the Prisoner’s Dilemma, but are there similarly common Smoking Lesion like problems?
Well, if you’re using TDT, then conditioning on the initial state of your physical computation screens off most such problems. But if you don’t break down your causal graph that finely, then there are all sorts of situations in which crazy people might be tempted to use EDT. I think Drescher in his book gives the case of someone who observes that people usually decide to cross the street only when it is safe to do so, who concludes that by deciding to cross the street they can make it safe.
Majoritarianism may frequently be the result of the application of evidential decision theory, ignoring all of the non-naturalistic vagueness in the formulations of CDT and EDT, might it not?
Some kinds of majoritarianism, certainly. The confusion is based on mistaking correlation of votes with commonality of interests. “If we can all agree to vote for proposition X, then it must be in our favor, right?”
Rolf Nelson wanted to know what everyday problems evidential decision theory produces. Newcomb’s Problem can be mapped onto the Prisoner’s Dilemma, but are there similarly common Smoking Lesion like problems?
Well, if you’re using TDT, then conditioning on the initial state of your physical computation screens off most such problems. But if you don’t break down your causal graph that finely, then there are all sorts of situations in which crazy people might be tempted to use EDT. I think Drescher in his book gives the case of someone who observes that people usually decide to cross the street only when it is safe to do so, who concludes that by deciding to cross the street they can make it safe.
Majoritarianism may frequently be the result of the application of evidential decision theory, ignoring all of the non-naturalistic vagueness in the formulations of CDT and EDT, might it not?
Some kinds of majoritarianism, certainly. The confusion is based on mistaking correlation of votes with commonality of interests. “If we can all agree to vote for proposition X, then it must be in our favor, right?”