I think the very idea of “I am a typical observer” is misguided. Because “observer” is a target drawn around where the arrow is. The arrow is the first person “I” in this analogy.
Everyone knows who the first-person “I” refers to since the only subjective experience felt is due to that particular physical body. We then put physical systems similar to this body into a category, and give it a name. But what similar feature is chosen to perform this grouping is arbitrary. From my personal perspective, such groups can be middle-aged men, things that can do simple arithmetic, synapsids, carbon-based lifeforms, macroscopic physical system, etc. It would be rather absurd to think the first-person “I” is typical for all these groups.
Furthermore, what does “typical” among a group really mean? If we look at the features that define a category, then of course I am similar to everything else. Since this grouping is based on me having that feature in the first place. This gives a false sense of mediocracy. But why would I be typical in terms of other features? e.g. for macroscopic physical systems, the defining feature is its scale, why should I expect myself exist at a typical time for this group? There is no reason for it. Various anthropic camps try to support this by regarding “I” as a random sample of some sort. But that is just adding ad-hoc assumptions.
It is not a coincidence that most anthropic theories have trouble defining what “observer” really means, which in turn messes up the reference class. (This is not exclusive to SSA. SIA and FNC are plagued by it too). Because it has no hard definition. It is just a circle drawn around the first-person “I” with a radius of anyone’s choosing.
Many think “observer” can be conclusively defined as someone/something that is conscious. But what is consciousness in the first place? The only consciousness that anyone has access to is that of the first person. “I know I am conscious, and can never be sure if you are just auto-piloting philosophical zombies.” I guess other people/animals/programs might also be conscious only because of their similarity to myself.
All in all, I feel people who hold “I am a typical observer” as an indisputable truth didn’t take a hard look at what the word “I” or “observer” or “typical” really means.
I think that what you said here and elsewhere could boil down to two different views:
Going from 1 position to 3 position in probabilities sense is ontologically impossible, period. No meaningful probability updates.
We need to take hard look on what is “I”, “observer”, and “typical”, and only after we clearly define them, we could said something meaningful about probabilities.
I tend here to agree with the second view, and I explored different aspects of it in some of my posts.
I’m not sure what 1 position and 3 position mean here. I would summarize my argument as the first-person perspective is based on subjective experience. It is a primitive notion that cannot be logically analyzed. Just like in Euclidean geometry we can’t analyze any of its axioms. Take then as given, that’s it.
All the rest, like no self-locating probability, perspective disagreement, rejection of doomsday argument and presumptuous philosopher, double-halving in sleeping beauty, and rejection of fine-tuned universe, are just conclusions based on that.
Well in that case yes. 3rd person’s perspective is just a shorthand for the perspective of a god’s eye view. We should not switch perspectives halfway in any given analysis.
BTW, what is your opinion about medocrity principle, that is, the idea of typicality of you, me and Earth?
I think the very idea of “I am a typical observer” is misguided. Because “observer” is a target drawn around where the arrow is. The arrow is the first person “I” in this analogy.
Everyone knows who the first-person “I” refers to since the only subjective experience felt is due to that particular physical body. We then put physical systems similar to this body into a category, and give it a name. But what similar feature is chosen to perform this grouping is arbitrary. From my personal perspective, such groups can be middle-aged men, things that can do simple arithmetic, synapsids, carbon-based lifeforms, macroscopic physical system, etc. It would be rather absurd to think the first-person “I” is typical for all these groups.
Furthermore, what does “typical” among a group really mean? If we look at the features that define a category, then of course I am similar to everything else. Since this grouping is based on me having that feature in the first place. This gives a false sense of mediocracy. But why would I be typical in terms of other features? e.g. for macroscopic physical systems, the defining feature is its scale, why should I expect myself exist at a typical time for this group? There is no reason for it. Various anthropic camps try to support this by regarding “I” as a random sample of some sort. But that is just adding ad-hoc assumptions.
It is not a coincidence that most anthropic theories have trouble defining what “observer” really means, which in turn messes up the reference class. (This is not exclusive to SSA. SIA and FNC are plagued by it too). Because it has no hard definition. It is just a circle drawn around the first-person “I” with a radius of anyone’s choosing.
Many think “observer” can be conclusively defined as someone/something that is conscious. But what is consciousness in the first place? The only consciousness that anyone has access to is that of the first person. “I know I am conscious, and can never be sure if you are just auto-piloting philosophical zombies.” I guess other people/animals/programs might also be conscious only because of their similarity to myself.
All in all, I feel people who hold “I am a typical observer” as an indisputable truth didn’t take a hard look at what the word “I” or “observer” or “typical” really means.
I think that what you said here and elsewhere could boil down to two different views:
Going from 1 position to 3 position in probabilities sense is ontologically impossible, period. No meaningful probability updates.
We need to take hard look on what is “I”, “observer”, and “typical”, and only after we clearly define them, we could said something meaningful about probabilities.
I tend here to agree with the second view, and I explored different aspects of it in some of my posts.
I’m not sure what 1 position and 3 position mean here. I would summarize my argument as the first-person perspective is based on subjective experience. It is a primitive notion that cannot be logically analyzed. Just like in Euclidean geometry we can’t analyze any of its axioms. Take then as given, that’s it.
All the rest, like no self-locating probability, perspective disagreement, rejection of doomsday argument and presumptuous philosopher, double-halving in sleeping beauty, and rejection of fine-tuned universe, are just conclusions based on that.
1 position = first-person perspective, 3 position = third-person perspective
Well in that case yes. 3rd person’s perspective is just a shorthand for the perspective of a god’s eye view. We should not switch perspectives halfway in any given analysis.