The privilege-framework says that the way to do that is to call out privilege when you see it.
Be careful not to confuse “Online SJ-oriented callout culture” with “the idea of power gradiants and institutionalized privilege as a tool for analyzing complex social and cultural phenomena.”
Absolutely, but it’s not necessarily as simple as patternmatching to “claims label” and “is visible and obvious to me personally.” Especially when you’re dealing with stuff like religion, ideology, culture or politics, it can be hard to make any really meaningful statements that generalize usefully.
How does socialism work out in practice? It’s tempting for some folks to point to the USSR, but that’s just because it’s a big obvious thing with the word “Socialism” prominently emblazoned on it. The EU is pretty darn relevant there as well.
When most Westerners think “Islam”, they don’t think “polyandric, matrifocal, highly-educated pluralists comfortable with secularism” either, but the Minangkabau people outnumber al-Qaeda, Hamas, Hezbollah and the Taliban combined. Those latter have a lot more to do with the first things that spring to mind when Westerners hear the word “Islam” though.
What I’m saying is, “How does this work out in practice” is terribly vulnerable to the availability bias.
For what it’s worth, I don’t think socialism (State Communism) and socialism (western Europe—I’m not sure what the best name is for democracies with strong safety nets) are the same thing—they have extremely different practices and trajectories. I think this supports your point that you need to actually know something before you try to address the question of how an idea works out in practice.
If it’s any consolation, I don’t just wonder that sort of thing for social justice. I’ve thought how Atlas Shrugged, a novel which is an extended attack on crony capitalism, has led to people who support corporations in general.
Now that I think about it, Rand’s “concrete bound mentality” (grabbing on to a specific and not necessarily relevant example—she’s against it) is a special case of availability bias.
nod But they both draw from a common wellspring of thought, and are influenced by many of the same formative works (having since developed themselves in greatly different directions). They’re both socialism, in the same sense that a platypus (lays eggs, sweats milk, senses electricity, has simple teeth) and a human (gives live birth to well-developed offspring, has dedicated milk glands, no electroception at all, complex teeth) are both mammals: it’s a fact of their origins. They’ve simply diverged substantially—but this divergence isn’t so great that it’s meaningless to speak of them as both forms of mammal (has hair, endothermic metabolism, produces milk, three middle ear bones, has neocortex, is of amniote clade—the critical bit is that these commonalities are not coincidental, they are not convergent traits).
If I’m doing something analytically wrong here, please feel free to give specifics. Crocker’s Rule: I promise not to withdraw or lash out simply because I’m defensive about your criticism—I’m saying this to you, not the world.
PS. I don’t understand the relevance of the quoted text.
The discussion here appears to be talking about “privilege” in a way that looks, from the outside of the conversation, like the use of the term “privilege” by both participants is based on attempting to reverse-engineer its theoretical structure from the way it’s used online by social justice activists.
The idea of “privilege”, as an academic notion within critical theories, does not boil down to “the thing that when you see it, you should call it out.” Exploring and unpacking the idea may or may not come with exhortations to any particular course of action; this is especially so in the case of texts where the idea is being formulated, criticized, elaborated upon or revisited. That isn’t even necessarily implied.
On the other hand it’s very common to the use of the term by a certain subset of online activists, and it seems like for a lot of LWers group is their first or primary exposure to the idea. The result is akin to talking about socialism in general, by modelling it in terms of the Red Guard youth movement during China’s Cultural Revolution.
Here was my attempt at a brief articulation, early in this conversation. I’m trying not to just reverse engineer from social justice blogging. But if I screwed things up, I’m open to suggestion.
I agree that privilege isn’t inherently unjust. It just turns out that certain kinds of privilege are antithetical to my terminal values—and calling out appears to be the best response.
On the other hand it’s very common to the use of the term by a certain subset of online activists, and it seems like for a lot of LWers group is their first or primary exposure to the idea. The result is akin to talking about socialism in general, by modelling it in terms of the Red Guard youth movement during China’s Cultural Revolution.
Well, I didn’t say that (I’m not aware offhand of a plausible instance of the thing the term refers to that doesn’t strike me as undesirable/wrong insofar as Jandila’s morality function ouputs wrong).
From the bit you linked:
I’m not sure this is the case anymore on the cutting edge of so-called privilege theory.
Your wording makes me wince a little but I’m not sure if I can unpack why here (something about the implied model of intellectual discourse). In any case, you are quite correct that a simplistic analysis of the idea is not the best that critical theory has to offer, although LW doesn’t have many people in the cluster (it’s more than a matter of just reading a couple texts).
LW doesn’t have many people in the [critical theory] cluster
Yes, the core problem is that LW lacks this population—and doesn’t seem to care.
Your wording [about cutting edge theory] makes me wince a little but I’m not sure if I can unpack why here
Maybe it’s a relic of fact that most of my contact with “soft” academics is legal academia.
Legal issues go from non-existent to unsettled to settled. Tenure lies in writing only about unsettled. Cutting edge legal theories are a thing, even for practicing lawyers (I’ve even got one I’m waiting for the right case to test). Then the caselaw thickens—and your theory is now settled practice or Timecube level crazy.
In short, sorry for making you wince. Well, sorta sorry. :)
Yes, the core problem is that LW lacks this population—and doesn’t seem to care.
nod It’s pretty synonymous with stuff like the Sokal affair to them.
Maybe it’s a relic of fact that most of my contact with “soft” academics is legal academia.
That does go rather a long way toward explaining it, yeah. I come at it from anthropology and linguistics, with a side order each of biology and semiotics, so my go-to ideas about “the progression of theories and the state of the art in this field” are...substantially harder to capture, but basically it looks a bit like evolution in language or biology with a generous dose of lateral transfer a la art.
Then the caselaw thickens—and your theory is now settled practice or Timecube level crazy.Then the caselaw thickens—and your theory is now settled practice or Timecube level crazy.
A law graduate friend of mean feels compelled to add: “Or both.”
In short, sorry for making you wince. Well, sorta sorry. :)
Is there any discussion in this literature about whether this cluster of theory necessarily implies an anti-realist metaethical position? My own metaethical theories have mostly been driven by the implications of these types of social theories—but it wouldn’t surprise me if my conclusions in that regard were unsophisticated and suspect.
EDIT: WTF, copypaste. I meant to quote this bit:
Be careful not to confuse “Online SJ-oriented callout culture” with “the idea of power gradiants and institutionalized privilege as a tool for analyzing complex social and cultural phenomena.”
This raises a problem I’ve seen in other forms.… is it fair to ask how an idea works out in practice?
Absolutely, but it’s not necessarily as simple as patternmatching to “claims label” and “is visible and obvious to me personally.” Especially when you’re dealing with stuff like religion, ideology, culture or politics, it can be hard to make any really meaningful statements that generalize usefully.
How does socialism work out in practice? It’s tempting for some folks to point to the USSR, but that’s just because it’s a big obvious thing with the word “Socialism” prominently emblazoned on it. The EU is pretty darn relevant there as well.
When most Westerners think “Islam”, they don’t think “polyandric, matrifocal, highly-educated pluralists comfortable with secularism” either, but the Minangkabau people outnumber al-Qaeda, Hamas, Hezbollah and the Taliban combined. Those latter have a lot more to do with the first things that spring to mind when Westerners hear the word “Islam” though.
What I’m saying is, “How does this work out in practice” is terribly vulnerable to the availability bias.
For what it’s worth, I don’t think socialism (State Communism) and socialism (western Europe—I’m not sure what the best name is for democracies with strong safety nets) are the same thing—they have extremely different practices and trajectories. I think this supports your point that you need to actually know something before you try to address the question of how an idea works out in practice.
If it’s any consolation, I don’t just wonder that sort of thing for social justice. I’ve thought how Atlas Shrugged, a novel which is an extended attack on crony capitalism, has led to people who support corporations in general.
Now that I think about it, Rand’s “concrete bound mentality” (grabbing on to a specific and not necessarily relevant example—she’s against it) is a special case of availability bias.
Social democracy.
nod But they both draw from a common wellspring of thought, and are influenced by many of the same formative works (having since developed themselves in greatly different directions). They’re both socialism, in the same sense that a platypus (lays eggs, sweats milk, senses electricity, has simple teeth) and a human (gives live birth to well-developed offspring, has dedicated milk glands, no electroception at all, complex teeth) are both mammals: it’s a fact of their origins. They’ve simply diverged substantially—but this divergence isn’t so great that it’s meaningless to speak of them as both forms of mammal (has hair, endothermic metabolism, produces milk, three middle ear bones, has neocortex, is of amniote clade—the critical bit is that these commonalities are not coincidental, they are not convergent traits).
If I’m doing something analytically wrong here, please feel free to give specifics. Crocker’s Rule: I promise not to withdraw or lash out simply because I’m defensive about your criticism—I’m saying this to you, not the world.
PS. I don’t understand the relevance of the quoted text.
PPS. “SJ-oriented callout culture” --> SJ = ?
SJ = abbreviation for “social justice.”
The discussion here appears to be talking about “privilege” in a way that looks, from the outside of the conversation, like the use of the term “privilege” by both participants is based on attempting to reverse-engineer its theoretical structure from the way it’s used online by social justice activists.
The idea of “privilege”, as an academic notion within critical theories, does not boil down to “the thing that when you see it, you should call it out.” Exploring and unpacking the idea may or may not come with exhortations to any particular course of action; this is especially so in the case of texts where the idea is being formulated, criticized, elaborated upon or revisited. That isn’t even necessarily implied.
On the other hand it’s very common to the use of the term by a certain subset of online activists, and it seems like for a lot of LWers group is their first or primary exposure to the idea. The result is akin to talking about socialism in general, by modelling it in terms of the Red Guard youth movement during China’s Cultural Revolution.
Here was my attempt at a brief articulation, early in this conversation. I’m trying not to just reverse engineer from social justice blogging. But if I screwed things up, I’m open to suggestion.
I agree that privilege isn’t inherently unjust. It just turns out that certain kinds of privilege are antithetical to my terminal values—and calling out appears to be the best response.
Yes—I suspect this causal story is the reason why my original complaint—that LW is bad at this type of social engineering theory—is true.
Well, I didn’t say that (I’m not aware offhand of a plausible instance of the thing the term refers to that doesn’t strike me as undesirable/wrong insofar as Jandila’s morality function ouputs wrong).
From the bit you linked:
Your wording makes me wince a little but I’m not sure if I can unpack why here (something about the implied model of intellectual discourse). In any case, you are quite correct that a simplistic analysis of the idea is not the best that critical theory has to offer, although LW doesn’t have many people in the cluster (it’s more than a matter of just reading a couple texts).
Yes, the core problem is that LW lacks this population—and doesn’t seem to care.
Maybe it’s a relic of fact that most of my contact with “soft” academics is legal academia.
Legal issues go from non-existent to unsettled to settled. Tenure lies in writing only about unsettled. Cutting edge legal theories are a thing, even for practicing lawyers (I’ve even got one I’m waiting for the right case to test). Then the caselaw thickens—and your theory is now settled practice or Timecube level crazy.
In short, sorry for making you wince. Well, sorta sorry. :)
nod It’s pretty synonymous with stuff like the Sokal affair to them.
That does go rather a long way toward explaining it, yeah. I come at it from anthropology and linguistics, with a side order each of biology and semiotics, so my go-to ideas about “the progression of theories and the state of the art in this field” are...substantially harder to capture, but basically it looks a bit like evolution in language or biology with a generous dose of lateral transfer a la art.
A law graduate friend of mean feels compelled to add: “Or both.”
No worries, nothing like upsetting.
On a different topic:
Is there any discussion in this literature about whether this cluster of theory necessarily implies an anti-realist metaethical position? My own metaethical theories have mostly been driven by the implications of these types of social theories—but it wouldn’t surprise me if my conclusions in that regard were unsophisticated and suspect.