Here was my attempt at a brief articulation, early in this conversation. I’m trying not to just reverse engineer from social justice blogging. But if I screwed things up, I’m open to suggestion.
I agree that privilege isn’t inherently unjust. It just turns out that certain kinds of privilege are antithetical to my terminal values—and calling out appears to be the best response.
On the other hand it’s very common to the use of the term by a certain subset of online activists, and it seems like for a lot of LWers group is their first or primary exposure to the idea. The result is akin to talking about socialism in general, by modelling it in terms of the Red Guard youth movement during China’s Cultural Revolution.
Well, I didn’t say that (I’m not aware offhand of a plausible instance of the thing the term refers to that doesn’t strike me as undesirable/wrong insofar as Jandila’s morality function ouputs wrong).
From the bit you linked:
I’m not sure this is the case anymore on the cutting edge of so-called privilege theory.
Your wording makes me wince a little but I’m not sure if I can unpack why here (something about the implied model of intellectual discourse). In any case, you are quite correct that a simplistic analysis of the idea is not the best that critical theory has to offer, although LW doesn’t have many people in the cluster (it’s more than a matter of just reading a couple texts).
LW doesn’t have many people in the [critical theory] cluster
Yes, the core problem is that LW lacks this population—and doesn’t seem to care.
Your wording [about cutting edge theory] makes me wince a little but I’m not sure if I can unpack why here
Maybe it’s a relic of fact that most of my contact with “soft” academics is legal academia.
Legal issues go from non-existent to unsettled to settled. Tenure lies in writing only about unsettled. Cutting edge legal theories are a thing, even for practicing lawyers (I’ve even got one I’m waiting for the right case to test). Then the caselaw thickens—and your theory is now settled practice or Timecube level crazy.
In short, sorry for making you wince. Well, sorta sorry. :)
Yes, the core problem is that LW lacks this population—and doesn’t seem to care.
nod It’s pretty synonymous with stuff like the Sokal affair to them.
Maybe it’s a relic of fact that most of my contact with “soft” academics is legal academia.
That does go rather a long way toward explaining it, yeah. I come at it from anthropology and linguistics, with a side order each of biology and semiotics, so my go-to ideas about “the progression of theories and the state of the art in this field” are...substantially harder to capture, but basically it looks a bit like evolution in language or biology with a generous dose of lateral transfer a la art.
Then the caselaw thickens—and your theory is now settled practice or Timecube level crazy.Then the caselaw thickens—and your theory is now settled practice or Timecube level crazy.
A law graduate friend of mean feels compelled to add: “Or both.”
In short, sorry for making you wince. Well, sorta sorry. :)
Is there any discussion in this literature about whether this cluster of theory necessarily implies an anti-realist metaethical position? My own metaethical theories have mostly been driven by the implications of these types of social theories—but it wouldn’t surprise me if my conclusions in that regard were unsophisticated and suspect.
Here was my attempt at a brief articulation, early in this conversation. I’m trying not to just reverse engineer from social justice blogging. But if I screwed things up, I’m open to suggestion.
I agree that privilege isn’t inherently unjust. It just turns out that certain kinds of privilege are antithetical to my terminal values—and calling out appears to be the best response.
Yes—I suspect this causal story is the reason why my original complaint—that LW is bad at this type of social engineering theory—is true.
Well, I didn’t say that (I’m not aware offhand of a plausible instance of the thing the term refers to that doesn’t strike me as undesirable/wrong insofar as Jandila’s morality function ouputs wrong).
From the bit you linked:
Your wording makes me wince a little but I’m not sure if I can unpack why here (something about the implied model of intellectual discourse). In any case, you are quite correct that a simplistic analysis of the idea is not the best that critical theory has to offer, although LW doesn’t have many people in the cluster (it’s more than a matter of just reading a couple texts).
Yes, the core problem is that LW lacks this population—and doesn’t seem to care.
Maybe it’s a relic of fact that most of my contact with “soft” academics is legal academia.
Legal issues go from non-existent to unsettled to settled. Tenure lies in writing only about unsettled. Cutting edge legal theories are a thing, even for practicing lawyers (I’ve even got one I’m waiting for the right case to test). Then the caselaw thickens—and your theory is now settled practice or Timecube level crazy.
In short, sorry for making you wince. Well, sorta sorry. :)
nod It’s pretty synonymous with stuff like the Sokal affair to them.
That does go rather a long way toward explaining it, yeah. I come at it from anthropology and linguistics, with a side order each of biology and semiotics, so my go-to ideas about “the progression of theories and the state of the art in this field” are...substantially harder to capture, but basically it looks a bit like evolution in language or biology with a generous dose of lateral transfer a la art.
A law graduate friend of mean feels compelled to add: “Or both.”
No worries, nothing like upsetting.
On a different topic:
Is there any discussion in this literature about whether this cluster of theory necessarily implies an anti-realist metaethical position? My own metaethical theories have mostly been driven by the implications of these types of social theories—but it wouldn’t surprise me if my conclusions in that regard were unsophisticated and suspect.