That’s the opposite of the point being made in the post, not a generalization of it.
At least, if I’ve understood you correctly — you’re saying that when people make jokes about coercive/irresponsible men and passive-aggressive/nagging women, they are expressing a universal truth that society refuses to hear stated. To grossly oversimplify, we could state the blurred view proposed by the jokes being referred to as “All relationships are abusive”.
The post TimS links to asserts, rather, that these jokes represent a blurring of distinctions that society fails to recognize. There actually do exist relationships that are more consensual and ones that are more abusive — the distinction — but insofar as everyone pretends that all men are coercive and all women passive-aggressive, they blur this distinction.
Moreover, blurring this distinction provides cover for the actual abusers by making the good relationships out to be just as bad as the abusive ones. If everyone is required to talk about their relationships in nonconsensual/abusive terms, then the people in consensual relationships cannot distinguish themselves as such. Hence, the post: “Even though Rowdy’s brother-in-law wasn’t really coercing his wife into a major responsibility she didn’t want, he was cheerfully playing into a story created by, and validating for, men who really would.”
It’s a little like Soviet-era “moral equivalence” arguments, or more generally the tu quoque fallacy, when tu don’t actually do quoque!
There’s a lot of truth in stereotypes. Not all women nag, but more do than men. Not all men are irresponsible, but more are than women. Since it’s very difficult to make statements like that seriously in modern society—usually, you can only say it either anonymously or in groups of close friends whom you trust to not take it personally—a lot of people embed it in comedy, where the filters are lower, and where there’s more reason for it to come up in the first place than just expressing bias.
It’s not a harmless practice, of course, but it does provide a useful safety valve sometimes.
I seriously doubt that most people who make up jokes or stereotypes truly have enough data on hand to reasonably support even a generalization of this nature.
Stereotypes are largely consensus-based, which gives them a larger data pool than any individual would have. If a comedian starts making jokes about the foibles of a large group, and most people haven’t experienced those same foibles, they’re not going to find it funny. Now, smaller groups can get a lot nastier treatment, both because there’s less evidence to contradict a stereotype, and because they can turn into the token butt of jokes(Newfies being the stereotypical example where I’m from—nobody actually believes the jokes, but everybody makes them just because they’re the group you make dumb-people jokes about). But “women” is a far too common group to get much in the way of false stereotypes, for example.
At this point, I should also point out the dangers of stereotypes that are true only because culture forces them to be. For example, saying that women needed protection in the 19th century was basically true, but it was largely true because we didn’t let women protect themselves. Feedback loops are a real danger.
I think you are discounting effects such as confirmation bias, which lead us to notice what we expect and can easily label while leading us to ignore information that contradicts our beliefs. If 99 out of 100 women don’t nag and 95 out of 100 men don’t nag, given a stereotype that women nag, I would expect people think of the one woman they know that nags, rather than the 5 men they know that do the same.
Frankly, without data to support the claim that:
There is a lot of truth in stereotypes
I would find the claim highly suspect, given even a rudimentary understanding of our psychological framework.
It’s a system seriously prone to false positives, of course. But I think the odds of a true stereotype getting established are sufficiently higher than the odds of a false one getting established that it still counts as positive evidence.
Edit: Per discussion below, I should clarify that I’m referring to a particular think that a particular group engages in(“political correctness”), not the psychological phenomenon in general.
And, sure, if nobody can seriously express the sentiment that women nag more than men do, or that men are more irresponsible than women, then being able to humorously express the sentiment that all women nag and all men are irresponsible is, as you say, a useful way of averting groupthink. It’s not good, but it’s better than nothing.
I’m not nearly as confident as you sound that the premise is true, but I agree that the conclusion follows from it.
It’s sometimes helpful to draw a distinction between “lots of people do X” and “nobody is allowed to do Y.”
The groupthink Alsadius is positing is the latter; it involves nobody being allowed to express certain sentiments. As I said, I don’t see where he’s getting his confidence that this is true, as I don’t see much compelling evidence for it, but accepting it as a hypothetical I agree that the “safety valve” theory he’s talking about follows from it.
The groupthink you’re positing is the former and suggests different tactics.
FWIW, I don’t think it is true—you don’t have far to go to find a claim that, say, women are crazy, or black people steal, or half a dozen other terribly politically incorrect things(true ones and false ones). But a big part of the reason is because we have these unofficial lines of communication. Good luck finding official data on things like racial crime stats—self-censorship has basically destroyed that. Chris Rock is all we’re left with.
Huh, it seems it’s not as bad as I’ve thought. I’ve heard a lot of debate over the years about police forces not collecting the data, but I suppose that’s not true everywhere. Good to know.
So, OK, if you don’t think it’s true that the use of stereotypes in humor is a safety valve to avert groupthink, I’m not exactly sure why you said that when I asked, but I’m happy to drop that line of discussion.
Now you seem to be saying that the use of stereotypes in humor is a safety valve to avert censorship… do you actually think that?
It’s a way of saying things that aren’t supposed to be said. Whether the level of “supposed to” is a bit of moral outrage(like it is today), or a gulag(like it was in the Soviet Union), people use jokes to get around barriers. That serves the function of evading censorship sometimes, as well as the function of undermining certain kinds of groupthink to a certain extent. It’s not perfect, but it serves a role.
And now we’ve switched from talking about the value of stereotypes in humor to the value of humor more generally. I agree with your statements about the value of humor more generally, and am otherwise tapping out here.
I tend to think of stereotypes as a comedic aid, at least the sort that can easily be discussed here. I think that’s why the conversation has shifted. I will admit that I sort of lost the plot, though.
The stereotypes I actually use to guess at people’s traits tend to be embedded in details of how people dress, talk, and act—I’ve successfully pegged people’s personalities pretty closely from nothing more than the glasses they wear before—but that’s not the sort of thing you can discuss very easily on a text board.
For stereotypes specifically, I think the only dangerous thing that they really avert is excessive political correctness. Insisting that people be perfectly blind to observable characteristics of others is a silly position to take, and stereotypes are sort of an implicit summary of the evidence attached to an observable characteristic. Actual data is preferable, when it’s available, but for some of the soft attributes it’s not. “Groupthink” was a bit of a snarky way of phrasing it, and not a particularly accurate one. I’m not speaking about groupthink in general, I’m speaking about a particular kind that happens to be present in some parts of modern society.
I agree that insisting that people be perfectly blind to observable characteristics of others is a silly position to take, and I can see where using stereotypes in humor stands in opposition to that position, and therefore provides some (though not necessarily net) positive value.
I didn’t think I was dismissing an opposing argument; rather, pointing out that the article TimS linked to was making the opposite of the claim that you stated as a generalization of its point: not “these jokes express unstated general truths” but rather “these jokes express false generalizations … and thereby leave significant distinctions unstated and, indeed, more difficult to state.”
That’s the opposite of the point being made in the post, not a generalization of it.
At least, if I’ve understood you correctly — you’re saying that when people make jokes about coercive/irresponsible men and passive-aggressive/nagging women, they are expressing a universal truth that society refuses to hear stated. To grossly oversimplify, we could state the blurred view proposed by the jokes being referred to as “All relationships are abusive”.
The post TimS links to asserts, rather, that these jokes represent a blurring of distinctions that society fails to recognize. There actually do exist relationships that are more consensual and ones that are more abusive — the distinction — but insofar as everyone pretends that all men are coercive and all women passive-aggressive, they blur this distinction.
Moreover, blurring this distinction provides cover for the actual abusers by making the good relationships out to be just as bad as the abusive ones. If everyone is required to talk about their relationships in nonconsensual/abusive terms, then the people in consensual relationships cannot distinguish themselves as such. Hence, the post: “Even though Rowdy’s brother-in-law wasn’t really coercing his wife into a major responsibility she didn’t want, he was cheerfully playing into a story created by, and validating for, men who really would.”
It’s a little like Soviet-era “moral equivalence” arguments, or more generally the tu quoque fallacy, when tu don’t actually do quoque!
There’s a lot of truth in stereotypes. Not all women nag, but more do than men. Not all men are irresponsible, but more are than women. Since it’s very difficult to make statements like that seriously in modern society—usually, you can only say it either anonymously or in groups of close friends whom you trust to not take it personally—a lot of people embed it in comedy, where the filters are lower, and where there’s more reason for it to come up in the first place than just expressing bias.
It’s not a harmless practice, of course, but it does provide a useful safety valve sometimes.
I seriously doubt that most people who make up jokes or stereotypes truly have enough data on hand to reasonably support even a generalization of this nature.
Stereotypes are largely consensus-based, which gives them a larger data pool than any individual would have. If a comedian starts making jokes about the foibles of a large group, and most people haven’t experienced those same foibles, they’re not going to find it funny. Now, smaller groups can get a lot nastier treatment, both because there’s less evidence to contradict a stereotype, and because they can turn into the token butt of jokes(Newfies being the stereotypical example where I’m from—nobody actually believes the jokes, but everybody makes them just because they’re the group you make dumb-people jokes about). But “women” is a far too common group to get much in the way of false stereotypes, for example.
At this point, I should also point out the dangers of stereotypes that are true only because culture forces them to be. For example, saying that women needed protection in the 19th century was basically true, but it was largely true because we didn’t let women protect themselves. Feedback loops are a real danger.
I think you are discounting effects such as confirmation bias, which lead us to notice what we expect and can easily label while leading us to ignore information that contradicts our beliefs. If 99 out of 100 women don’t nag and 95 out of 100 men don’t nag, given a stereotype that women nag, I would expect people think of the one woman they know that nags, rather than the 5 men they know that do the same.
Frankly, without data to support the claim that:
I would find the claim highly suspect, given even a rudimentary understanding of our psychological framework.
It’s a system seriously prone to false positives, of course. But I think the odds of a true stereotype getting established are sufficiently higher than the odds of a false one getting established that it still counts as positive evidence.
What are you envisioning this “safety valve” averting?
Groupthink.
Edit: Per discussion below, I should clarify that I’m referring to a particular think that a particular group engages in(“political correctness”), not the psychological phenomenon in general.
Ah, I see what you mean. Thanks for explaining.
And, sure, if nobody can seriously express the sentiment that women nag more than men do, or that men are more irresponsible than women, then being able to humorously express the sentiment that all women nag and all men are irresponsible is, as you say, a useful way of averting groupthink. It’s not good, but it’s better than nothing.
I’m not nearly as confident as you sound that the premise is true, but I agree that the conclusion follows from it.
If people are making a large number of similar jokes, then that’s another sort of group think.
(nods)
It’s sometimes helpful to draw a distinction between “lots of people do X” and “nobody is allowed to do Y.”
The groupthink Alsadius is positing is the latter; it involves nobody being allowed to express certain sentiments. As I said, I don’t see where he’s getting his confidence that this is true, as I don’t see much compelling evidence for it, but accepting it as a hypothetical I agree that the “safety valve” theory he’s talking about follows from it.
The groupthink you’re positing is the former and suggests different tactics.
FWIW, I don’t think it is true—you don’t have far to go to find a claim that, say, women are crazy, or black people steal, or half a dozen other terribly politically incorrect things(true ones and false ones). But a big part of the reason is because we have these unofficial lines of communication. Good luck finding official data on things like racial crime stats—self-censorship has basically destroyed that. Chris Rock is all we’re left with.
huh?
Huh, it seems it’s not as bad as I’ve thought. I’ve heard a lot of debate over the years about police forces not collecting the data, but I suppose that’s not true everywhere. Good to know.
Oh.
So, OK, if you don’t think it’s true that the use of stereotypes in humor is a safety valve to avert groupthink, I’m not exactly sure why you said that when I asked, but I’m happy to drop that line of discussion.
Now you seem to be saying that the use of stereotypes in humor is a safety valve to avert censorship… do you actually think that?
It’s a way of saying things that aren’t supposed to be said. Whether the level of “supposed to” is a bit of moral outrage(like it is today), or a gulag(like it was in the Soviet Union), people use jokes to get around barriers. That serves the function of evading censorship sometimes, as well as the function of undermining certain kinds of groupthink to a certain extent. It’s not perfect, but it serves a role.
And now we’ve switched from talking about the value of stereotypes in humor to the value of humor more generally. I agree with your statements about the value of humor more generally, and am otherwise tapping out here.
I tend to think of stereotypes as a comedic aid, at least the sort that can easily be discussed here. I think that’s why the conversation has shifted. I will admit that I sort of lost the plot, though.
The stereotypes I actually use to guess at people’s traits tend to be embedded in details of how people dress, talk, and act—I’ve successfully pegged people’s personalities pretty closely from nothing more than the glasses they wear before—but that’s not the sort of thing you can discuss very easily on a text board.
For stereotypes specifically, I think the only dangerous thing that they really avert is excessive political correctness. Insisting that people be perfectly blind to observable characteristics of others is a silly position to take, and stereotypes are sort of an implicit summary of the evidence attached to an observable characteristic. Actual data is preferable, when it’s available, but for some of the soft attributes it’s not. “Groupthink” was a bit of a snarky way of phrasing it, and not a particularly accurate one. I’m not speaking about groupthink in general, I’m speaking about a particular kind that happens to be present in some parts of modern society.
I agree that insisting that people be perfectly blind to observable characteristics of others is a silly position to take, and I can see where using stereotypes in humor stands in opposition to that position, and therefore provides some (though not necessarily net) positive value.
Yes, it’s amazing how easy it is to dismiss opposing arguments when you start by “grossly oversimplifying” them into something clearly false.
I didn’t think I was dismissing an opposing argument; rather, pointing out that the article TimS linked to was making the opposite of the claim that you stated as a generalization of its point: not “these jokes express unstated general truths” but rather “these jokes express false generalizations … and thereby leave significant distinctions unstated and, indeed, more difficult to state.”