Many-worlds are there at the level of quantum mechanics, and there is the single world at the level of classical mechanics, both views correct in their respective frameworks for describing reality. The world-counting is how human intuitions read math, not obviously something inherent in reality (unless there is a better understanding of what “inherent in reality” should mean). What picture is right for a deeper level can be completely different once again.
Another, more important question, is how morally relevant are these conceptions of reality, but I don’t know in what way to trust my intuition about morality of concepts it’s using for interpreting math. So far, MWI looks to me morally indistinguishable from epistemic uncertainty, and so many-worlds of QM are no more real than single-world of classical mechanics. Many-worldness of QM might well be more due to the properties of math rather than “character of reality”, whatever that should mean.
The fact that quantum mechanics is deeper in physics places it further away from human experience and from human morality, and so makes it less obviously adequately evaluated intuitively. The measure of reality lies in human preference, not in the turtles of physics. Exploration of physics starts from human plans, and the fact that humans are made of the stuff doesn’t give it more status than a distant star—it’s just a substrate.
If MWI is simpler than nonMWI, then by Solomonoffish reasoning it’s more likely that TOE reduces to observed reality via MWI than that it reduces to observed reality via nonMWI, correct? I agree all these properties that Eliezer mentions are helpful only as a proxy for simplicity, and I’m not sure they’re all independent arguments for MWI’s relative simplicity, but it seems extremely hard to argue that MWI isn’t in fact simpler given all these properties.
I don’t assume the reality has a bottom, but in human realm it has a beginning, and that’s human experience. What we know we learn from experiments, observe more and more about the bigger system, and this process is probably not going to end, even in principle. What’s to judge this process rather than us?
If, for example, in prior/utility framework, prior is just one half of preference, that alone demonstrates dependence of notion of “degree of reality” for concepts on human morality, in its technical sense. While I’m not convinced that prior/utility is the right framework for human preference, the case is in point.
P.S. Just to be sure, I’m not arguing for one-world QM, I’m comparing many-world QM to one-world classical mechanics.
If reality is finitely complex, how does it get to have no bottom?
P.S. Just to be sure, I’m not arguing for one-world QM, I’m comparing many-world QM to one-world classical mechanics.
I don’t understand. Surely things like the double-slit experiment have some explanation, and that explanation is some kind of QM, and we’re forced to compare these different kinds of QM.
Vladimir_Nesov’s post is regarding where we should look for morally-relevant conceptions of reality. He is advocating building out our morality starting from human-scale physics, which is well-approximated by one-world classical mechanics.
If reality is finitely complex, how does it get to have no bottom?
What does it mean for reality to be finitely complex? At some point you not just need to become able to predict everything, you need to become sure in your predictions, and that I consider an incorrect thing to do at any point. Therefore, complexity of reality, as people perceive it is never going to run out (I’m not sure, but it looks this way).
Surely things like the double-slit experiment have some explanation, and that explanation is some kind of QM, and we’re forced to compare these different kinds of QM.
Quantum mechanics is valid predictive math. The extent to which interpretation of this math in terms of human intuitions about worlds is adequate is tricky. For example, it’s hard to intuitively tell a difference between another person in the same world and another person described by a different MWI world: should these patterns be of equal moral worth? How should we know, how can we trust intuition on this, without technical understanding of morality? Intuitions break down even for our almost-ancestral-environment situations.
Many-worlds are there at the level of quantum mechanics, and there is the single world at the level of classical mechanics, both views correct in their respective frameworks for describing reality. The world-counting is how human intuitions read math, not obviously something inherent in reality (unless there is a better understanding of what “inherent in reality” should mean). What picture is right for a deeper level can be completely different once again.
Another, more important question, is how morally relevant are these conceptions of reality, but I don’t know in what way to trust my intuition about morality of concepts it’s using for interpreting math. So far, MWI looks to me morally indistinguishable from epistemic uncertainty, and so many-worlds of QM are no more real than single-world of classical mechanics. Many-worldness of QM might well be more due to the properties of math rather than “character of reality”, whatever that should mean.
The fact that quantum mechanics is deeper in physics places it further away from human experience and from human morality, and so makes it less obviously adequately evaluated intuitively. The measure of reality lies in human preference, not in the turtles of physics. Exploration of physics starts from human plans, and the fact that humans are made of the stuff doesn’t give it more status than a distant star—it’s just a substrate.
If MWI is simpler than nonMWI, then by Solomonoffish reasoning it’s more likely that TOE reduces to observed reality via MWI than that it reduces to observed reality via nonMWI, correct? I agree all these properties that Eliezer mentions are helpful only as a proxy for simplicity, and I’m not sure they’re all independent arguments for MWI’s relative simplicity, but it seems extremely hard to argue that MWI isn’t in fact simpler given all these properties.
I don’t assume the reality has a bottom, but in human realm it has a beginning, and that’s human experience. What we know we learn from experiments, observe more and more about the bigger system, and this process is probably not going to end, even in principle. What’s to judge this process rather than us?
If, for example, in prior/utility framework, prior is just one half of preference, that alone demonstrates dependence of notion of “degree of reality” for concepts on human morality, in its technical sense. While I’m not convinced that prior/utility is the right framework for human preference, the case is in point.
P.S. Just to be sure, I’m not arguing for one-world QM, I’m comparing many-world QM to one-world classical mechanics.
If reality is finitely complex, how does it get to have no bottom?
I don’t understand. Surely things like the double-slit experiment have some explanation, and that explanation is some kind of QM, and we’re forced to compare these different kinds of QM.
Vladimir_Nesov’s post is regarding where we should look for morally-relevant conceptions of reality. He is advocating building out our morality starting from human-scale physics, which is well-approximated by one-world classical mechanics.
What does it mean for reality to be finitely complex? At some point you not just need to become able to predict everything, you need to become sure in your predictions, and that I consider an incorrect thing to do at any point. Therefore, complexity of reality, as people perceive it is never going to run out (I’m not sure, but it looks this way).
Quantum mechanics is valid predictive math. The extent to which interpretation of this math in terms of human intuitions about worlds is adequate is tricky. For example, it’s hard to intuitively tell a difference between another person in the same world and another person described by a different MWI world: should these patterns be of equal moral worth? How should we know, how can we trust intuition on this, without technical understanding of morality? Intuitions break down even for our almost-ancestral-environment situations.