You go from “there is no way to perfectly accurately reconstruct” reality from incomplete information, to “[observation of humanly comprehensible] causality should be a rare and fleeting thing”, but I see no argument.
Causality seems to be a property that we can infer in the Democritan atoms and how they interact with one another. But when you start reasoning with abstractions, rather than the interactions of the atoms directly, you lose information in the compression, which causes causality in the interactions of abstractions with another to be a harder thing to infer from watching them.
I don’t yet have a stronger argument than that; this is a fairly new topic of interest to me.
But we have no problem observing causality in nature as well as in man-made environments. It seems like human culture has not so much made the world friendly to human concepts of causality, rather it has built up a standard set of human-friendly abstractions that are selected for their ability to fit causal models onto a complex world. There are lots of parts of the world where causality exists but is not observable through abstractions (e.g. butterfly effects). We generally ignore these.
You go from “there is no way to perfectly accurately reconstruct” reality from incomplete information, to “[observation of humanly comprehensible] causality should be a rare and fleeting thing”, but I see no argument.
Causality seems to be a property that we can infer in the Democritan atoms and how they interact with one another. But when you start reasoning with abstractions, rather than the interactions of the atoms directly, you lose information in the compression, which causes causality in the interactions of abstractions with another to be a harder thing to infer from watching them.
I don’t yet have a stronger argument than that; this is a fairly new topic of interest to me.
But we have no problem observing causality in nature as well as in man-made environments. It seems like human culture has not so much made the world friendly to human concepts of causality, rather it has built up a standard set of human-friendly abstractions that are selected for their ability to fit causal models onto a complex world. There are lots of parts of the world where causality exists but is not observable through abstractions (e.g. butterfly effects). We generally ignore these.