This comment may be a little scattered; I apologize. (In particular, much of this discussion is beside the point of my original claim that Eliezer really is a meta-ethical relativist, about which see my last paragraph).
I certainly don’t think we have to escalate to violence. But I do think there are subjects on which we might never come to agreement even given arbitrary time and self-improvement and processing power. Some of these are minor judgments; some are more important. But they’re very real.
In a number of places Eliezer commented that he’s not too worried about, say, two systems morality_1 and morality_2 that differ in the third decimal place. I think it’s actually really interesting when they differ in the third decimal place; it’s probably not important to the project of designing an AI but I don’t find that project terribly interesting so that doesn’t bother me.
But I’m also more willing to say to someone, “”We have nothing to argue about [on this subject], we are only different optimization processes.” With most of my friends I really do have to say this, as far as I can tell, on at least one subject.
However, I really truly don’t think this is as all-or-nothing as you or Eliezer seem to paint it. First, because while morality may be a compact algorithm relative to its output, it can still be pretty big, and disagreeing seriously about one component doesn’t mean you don’t agree about the other several hundred. (A big sticking point between me and my friends is that I think getting angry is in general deeply morally blameworthy, whereas many of them believe that failing to get angry at outrageous things is morally blameworthy; and as far as I can tell this is more or less irreducible in the specification for all of us). But I can still talk to these people and have rewarding conversations on other subjects.
Second, because I realize there are other means of persuasion than argument. You can’t argue someone into changing their terminal values, but you can often persuade them to do so through literature and emotional appeal, largely due to psychological unity. I claim that this is one of the important roles that story-telling plays: it focuses and unifies our moralities through more-or-less arational means. But this isn’t an argument per se and has no particular reason one would expect it to converge to a particular outcome—among other things, the result is highly contingent on what talented artists happen to believe. (See Rorty’s Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity for discussion of this).
Humans have a lot of psychological similarity. They also have some very interesting and deep psychological variation (see e.g. Haidt’s work on the five moral systems). And it’s actually useful to a lot of societies to have variation in moral systems—it’s really useful to have some altruistic punishers, but not really for everyone to be an altruistic punisher.
But really, this is beside the point of the original question, whether Eliezer is really a meta-ethical relativist, because the limit of this sequence which he claims converges isn’t what anyone else is talking about when they say “morality”. Because generally, “morality” is defined more or less to be a consideration that would/should be compelling to all sufficiently complex optimization processes. Eliezer clearly doesn’t believe any such thing exists. And he’s right.
A big sticking point between me and my friends is that I think getting angry is in general deeply morally blameworthy, whereas many of them believe that failing to get angry at outrageous things is morally blameworthy
Your friends can understand why humans have positive personality descriptors for people who don’t get angry in various situations: descriptors like reflective, charming, polite, solemn, respecting, humble, tranquil, agreeable, open-minded, approachable, cooperative, curious, hospitable, sensitive, sympathetic, trusting, merciful, gracious.
You can understand why we have positive personality descriptors for people who get angry in various situations: descriptors like impartial, loyal, decent, passionate, courageous, boldness, leadership, strength, resilience, candor, vigilance, independence, reputation, and dignity.
Both you and your friends can see how either group could pattern match their behavioral bias as being friendly, supportive, mature, disciplined, or prudent.
These are not deep variations, they are relative strengths of reliance on the exact same intuitions.
You can’t argue someone into changing their terminal values, but you can often persuade them to do so through literature and emotional appeal, largely due to psychological unity. I claim that this is one of the important roles that story-telling plays: it focuses and unifies our moralities through more-or-less arational means. But this isn’t an argument per se and has no particular reason one would expect it to converge to a particular outcome—among other things, the result is highly contingent on what talented artists happen to believe.
Stories strengthen our associations of different emotions in response to analogous situations, which doesn’t have much of a converging effect (Edit: unless, you know, it’s something like the bible that a billion people read. That certainly pushes humanity in some direction), but they can also create associations to moral evaluative machinery that previously wasn’t doing its job. There’s nothing arational about this: neurons firing in the inferior frontal gyrus are evidence relevant to a certain useful categorizing inference, “things which are sentient”.
Because generally, “morality” is defined more or less to be a consideration that would/should be compelling to all sufficiently complex optimization processes
I’m not in a mood to argue definitions, but “optimization process” is a very new concept, so I’d lean toward “less”.
You’re...very certain of what I understand. And of the implications of that understanding.
More generally, you’re correct that people don’t have a lot of direct access to their moral intuitions. But I don’t actually see any evidence for the proposition they should converge sufficiently other than a lot of handwaving about the fundamental psychological similarity of humankind, which is more-or-less true but probably not true enough. In contrast, I’ve seen lots of people with deeply, radically separated moral beliefs, enough so that it seems implausible that these all are attributable to computational error.
I’m not disputing that we share a lot of mental circuitry, or that we can basically understand each other. But we can understand without agreeing, and be similar without being the same.
As for the last bit—I don’t want to argue definitions either. It’s a stupid pastime. But to the extent Eliezer claims not to be a meta-ethical relativist he’s doing it purely through a definitional argument.
He does intend to convey something real and nontrivial (well, some people might find it trivial, but enough people don’t that it is important to be explicit) by saying that he is not a meta-ethical realist. The basic idea is that, while his brain is the causal reason for him wanting to do certain things, it is not referenced in the abstract computation that defines what is right. To use a metaphor from the meta-ethics sequence, it is a fact about a calculator that it is computing 1234 * 5678, but the fact that 1234 * 5678 = 7 006 652 is not a fact about that calculator.
This distinguishes him from some types of relativism, which I would guess to be the most common types. I am unsure whether people understand that he is trying to draw this distinction and still think that it is misleading to say that he is not a moral relativist or whether people are confused/have a different explanation for why he does not identify as a relativist.
In contrast, I’ve seen lots of people with deeply, radically separated moral beliefs, enough so that it seems implausible that these all are attributable to computational error.
The claim wasn’t that it happens too often to attribute to computation error, but that the types of differences seem unlikely to stem from computational errors.
This comment may be a little scattered; I apologize. (In particular, much of this discussion is beside the point of my original claim that Eliezer really is a meta-ethical relativist, about which see my last paragraph).
I certainly don’t think we have to escalate to violence. But I do think there are subjects on which we might never come to agreement even given arbitrary time and self-improvement and processing power. Some of these are minor judgments; some are more important. But they’re very real.
In a number of places Eliezer commented that he’s not too worried about, say, two systems morality_1 and morality_2 that differ in the third decimal place. I think it’s actually really interesting when they differ in the third decimal place; it’s probably not important to the project of designing an AI but I don’t find that project terribly interesting so that doesn’t bother me.
But I’m also more willing to say to someone, “”We have nothing to argue about [on this subject], we are only different optimization processes.” With most of my friends I really do have to say this, as far as I can tell, on at least one subject.
However, I really truly don’t think this is as all-or-nothing as you or Eliezer seem to paint it. First, because while morality may be a compact algorithm relative to its output, it can still be pretty big, and disagreeing seriously about one component doesn’t mean you don’t agree about the other several hundred. (A big sticking point between me and my friends is that I think getting angry is in general deeply morally blameworthy, whereas many of them believe that failing to get angry at outrageous things is morally blameworthy; and as far as I can tell this is more or less irreducible in the specification for all of us). But I can still talk to these people and have rewarding conversations on other subjects.
Second, because I realize there are other means of persuasion than argument. You can’t argue someone into changing their terminal values, but you can often persuade them to do so through literature and emotional appeal, largely due to psychological unity. I claim that this is one of the important roles that story-telling plays: it focuses and unifies our moralities through more-or-less arational means. But this isn’t an argument per se and has no particular reason one would expect it to converge to a particular outcome—among other things, the result is highly contingent on what talented artists happen to believe. (See Rorty’s Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity for discussion of this).
Humans have a lot of psychological similarity. They also have some very interesting and deep psychological variation (see e.g. Haidt’s work on the five moral systems). And it’s actually useful to a lot of societies to have variation in moral systems—it’s really useful to have some altruistic punishers, but not really for everyone to be an altruistic punisher.
But really, this is beside the point of the original question, whether Eliezer is really a meta-ethical relativist, because the limit of this sequence which he claims converges isn’t what anyone else is talking about when they say “morality”. Because generally, “morality” is defined more or less to be a consideration that would/should be compelling to all sufficiently complex optimization processes. Eliezer clearly doesn’t believe any such thing exists. And he’s right.
Calling something a terminal value is the default behavior when humans look for a justification and don’t find anything. This happens because we perceive little of our own mental processes and in the absence of that information we form post-hoc rationalizations. In short, we know very little about our own values. But that lack of retrieved / constructed justification doesn’t mean it’s impossible to unpack moral intuitions into algorithms so that we can more fully debate which factors we recognize and find relevant.
Your friends can understand why humans have positive personality descriptors for people who don’t get angry in various situations: descriptors like reflective, charming, polite, solemn, respecting, humble, tranquil, agreeable, open-minded, approachable, cooperative, curious, hospitable, sensitive, sympathetic, trusting, merciful, gracious.
You can understand why we have positive personality descriptors for people who get angry in various situations: descriptors like impartial, loyal, decent, passionate, courageous, boldness, leadership, strength, resilience, candor, vigilance, independence, reputation, and dignity.
Both you and your friends can see how either group could pattern match their behavioral bias as being friendly, supportive, mature, disciplined, or prudent.
These are not deep variations, they are relative strengths of reliance on the exact same intuitions.
Stories strengthen our associations of different emotions in response to analogous situations, which doesn’t have much of a converging effect (Edit: unless, you know, it’s something like the bible that a billion people read. That certainly pushes humanity in some direction), but they can also create associations to moral evaluative machinery that previously wasn’t doing its job. There’s nothing arational about this: neurons firing in the inferior frontal gyrus are evidence relevant to a certain useful categorizing inference, “things which are sentient”.
I’m not in a mood to argue definitions, but “optimization process” is a very new concept, so I’d lean toward “less”.
You’re...very certain of what I understand. And of the implications of that understanding.
More generally, you’re correct that people don’t have a lot of direct access to their moral intuitions. But I don’t actually see any evidence for the proposition they should converge sufficiently other than a lot of handwaving about the fundamental psychological similarity of humankind, which is more-or-less true but probably not true enough. In contrast, I’ve seen lots of people with deeply, radically separated moral beliefs, enough so that it seems implausible that these all are attributable to computational error.
I’m not disputing that we share a lot of mental circuitry, or that we can basically understand each other. But we can understand without agreeing, and be similar without being the same.
As for the last bit—I don’t want to argue definitions either. It’s a stupid pastime. But to the extent Eliezer claims not to be a meta-ethical relativist he’s doing it purely through a definitional argument.
He does intend to convey something real and nontrivial (well, some people might find it trivial, but enough people don’t that it is important to be explicit) by saying that he is not a meta-ethical realist. The basic idea is that, while his brain is the causal reason for him wanting to do certain things, it is not referenced in the abstract computation that defines what is right. To use a metaphor from the meta-ethics sequence, it is a fact about a calculator that it is computing 1234 * 5678, but the fact that 1234 * 5678 = 7 006 652 is not a fact about that calculator.
This distinguishes him from some types of relativism, which I would guess to be the most common types. I am unsure whether people understand that he is trying to draw this distinction and still think that it is misleading to say that he is not a moral relativist or whether people are confused/have a different explanation for why he does not identify as a relativist.
Do you know anyone who never makes computational errors? If ‘mistakes’ happen at all, we would expect to see them in cases involving tribal loyalties. See von Neumann and those who trusted him on hidden variables.
The claim wasn’t that it happens too often to attribute to computation error, but that the types of differences seem unlikely to stem from computational errors.