The likely answer is “If I’m willpower-depleted, I’d do the immoral thing I prefer, but on a good day I’d have enough willpower and I’d do the moral thing. I prefer to have enough willpower to do the moral thing in general.” In that case, I would have to admit that I’m in the same situation, except with a vocabulary change. I define “preference” to include everything that drives a person’s behavior,
But preference itself is influenced by reasoning and experience. The Preference theory focuses on proximate causes, but there are more distal ones too.
if we assume that they aren’t suffering from false beliefs, poor planning, or purposeless behavior (like a seizure, for example). So if your behavior is controlled by a combination of preference and morality, then what I’m calling “preference” is the same as what you’re calling “preference and morality”
I am not and never was using “preference” to mean something disjoint from morality.
If some preferences are moral preferences, then whole issue of morality is not disposed of by only talking about preferences. That is not an argument for nihilism
or relativism. You could have an epistemology where everything is talked about as belief, and the difference between true belief and false belief is ignored.
Okay, you’re making a distinction between amoral preference and moral preference. This distinction is obviously important to you. What makes it important?
If by a straightforward answer. you mean an answer framed in terms of some instrumental value that i fulfils, I can’t do that. I can only continue to challenge the
frame itself. Morality is already, in itself, the most important value. It isn’t “made” important by some greater good.
I am not and never was using “preference” to mean something disjoint from morality. If some preferences are moral preferences, then whole issue of morality is not disposed of by only talking about preferences.
There’s a choice you’re making here, differently from me, and I’d like to get clear on what that choice is and understand why we’re making it differently.
I have a bunch of things I prefer. I’d rather eat strawberry ice cream than vanilla, and I’d rather not design higher-throughput gas chambers. For me those two preferences are similar in kind—they’re stuff I prefer and that’s all there is to be said about it.
You might share my taste in ice cream and you said you share my taste in designing gas chambers. But for you, those two preferences are different in kind. The ice cream preference is not about morality, but designing gas chambers is immoral and that distinction is important for you.
I hope we all agree that the preference not to design high-throughput gas chambers is commonly and strongly held, and that it’s even a consensus in the sense that I prefer that you prefer not to design high-throughput gas chambers. That’s not what I’m talking about. What I’m talking about is the question of why the distinction is important to you. For example, I could define the preferences of mine that can be easily desscribed without using the letter “s” to be “blort” preferences, and the others to be non-blort, and rant about how we all need to distinguish blort preferences from non-blort preferences, and you’d be left wondering “Why does he care?”
And the answer would be that there is no good reason for me to care about the distinction between blort and non-blort preferences. The distinction is completely useless. A given concept takes mental effort to use and discuss, so the decision to use or not use a concept is a pragmatic one: we use a concept if the mental effort of forming it and communicating about it is paid for by the improved clarity when we use it. The concept of blort prefrerences does not improve the clarity of our thoughts, so nobody uses it.
The decision to use the concept of “morality” is like any other decision to define and use a concept. We should use it if the cost of talking about it is paid for by the added clarity it brings. If we don’t use the concept, that doesn’t change whether anyone wants to build high-throughput gas chambers—it just means that we don’t have the tools to talk about the difference in kind between ice cream flavor preferences and gas chamber building preferences. If there’s no use for such talk, then we should discard the concept, and if there is a use for such talk, we should keep the concept and try to assign a useful and clear meaning to it.
So what use is the concept of morality? How do people benefit from regarding ice cream flavor preferences as a different sort of thing from gas chamber building preferences?
Morality is already, in itself, the most important value.
I hope we’re agreed that there are two different kinds of things here—the strongly held preference to not design high-throughput gas chambers is a different kind of thing from the decision to label that preference as a moral one. The former influences the options available to a well-organized mass murderer, and the latter determines the structure of conversations like this one. The former is a value, the latter is a choice about how words label things. I claim that if we understand what is going on, we’ll all prefer to make the latter choice pragmatically.
You’ve written quite a lot of words but you’re still stuck on the idea that all importance is instrumental importance, importance for something that doesn’t need to be impoitant in itself. You should care about morality because it is a value and values are definitionally what is important and what should be cared about. If you suddenly started liking vanilla.nothing important would change. You wouldn’t stop
being you, and your new self wouldn’t be someone your old self would hate. That wouldn’t be the case if you suddenly started liking murder or gas chambers. You don’t now like people who like those things, and you wouldn’t now want to become one.
I claim that if we understand what is going on, we’ll all prefer to make the latter choice pragmatically.
If we understand what is going on , we should make the choice correctly—that
is, according to rational norms. If morality means something other than the merely
pragmatic, we should not label the pragmatic as the moral. And it must mean something different because it is an open, investigatable question whether some instrumentally useful thing is also ethically good, whereas questions like “is the pragmatic useful”
are trivial and tautologous.
You should care about morality because it is a value and values are definitionally what is important and what should be cared about.
You’re not getting the distinction between morality-the-concept-worth-having and morality-the-value-worth-enacting.
I’m looking for a useful definition of morality here, and if I frame what you say as a definition you seem to be defining a preference to be a moral preference if it’s strongly held, which doesn’t seem very interesting. If we’re going to have the distinction, I like Eugene’s proposal that a moral preference is one that’s worth talking about better, but we need to make the distinction in such a way that something doesn’t get promoted to being a moral preference just because people are easily deceived about it. There should be true things to say about it.
and if I frame what you say as a definition you seem to be defining a preference to be a moral preference if it’s strongly held,
But what I actually gave as a definition is the concept of morality is the concept
of ultimate value and importance. A concept which even the nihilists need so that they
can express their disbelief in it. A concept which even social and cognitive scientists need so they can describe the behaviour surrounding it.
You are apparently claiming there is some important difference between a strongly held preference and something of ultimate value and importance. Seems like splitting hairs to me. Can you describe how those two things are different?
Just because you do have a stongly held preference, it doesn’t mean you should. The difference between true beliefs and fervently held ones is similar.
Just because you do have a stongly held preference, it doesn’t mean you should. The difference between true beliefs and fervently held ones is similar.
One can do experiments to determine whether beliefs are true, for the beliefs that matter. What can one do with a preference to figure out if it should be strongly held?
If that question has no answer, the claim that the two are similar seems indefensible.
Empirical content. That is, a belief matters if it makes or implies statements about things one might observe.
So it doesn’t matter if it only affects what you will do?
If I’m thinking for the purpose of figuring out my future actions, that’s a plan, not a belief, since planning is relevant when I haven’t yet decided what to do.
I suppose beliefs about other people’s actions are empirical.
I’ve lost the relevance of this thread. Please state a purpose if you wish to continue, and if I like it, I’ll reply.
But preference itself is influenced by reasoning and experience. The Preference theory focuses on proximate causes, but there are more distal ones too.
I am not and never was using “preference” to mean something disjoint from morality. If some preferences are moral preferences, then whole issue of morality is not disposed of by only talking about preferences. That is not an argument for nihilism or relativism. You could have an epistemology where everything is talked about as belief, and the difference between true belief and false belief is ignored.
If by a straightforward answer. you mean an answer framed in terms of some instrumental value that i fulfils, I can’t do that. I can only continue to challenge the frame itself. Morality is already, in itself, the most important value. It isn’t “made” important by some greater good.
There’s a choice you’re making here, differently from me, and I’d like to get clear on what that choice is and understand why we’re making it differently.
I have a bunch of things I prefer. I’d rather eat strawberry ice cream than vanilla, and I’d rather not design higher-throughput gas chambers. For me those two preferences are similar in kind—they’re stuff I prefer and that’s all there is to be said about it.
You might share my taste in ice cream and you said you share my taste in designing gas chambers. But for you, those two preferences are different in kind. The ice cream preference is not about morality, but designing gas chambers is immoral and that distinction is important for you.
I hope we all agree that the preference not to design high-throughput gas chambers is commonly and strongly held, and that it’s even a consensus in the sense that I prefer that you prefer not to design high-throughput gas chambers. That’s not what I’m talking about. What I’m talking about is the question of why the distinction is important to you. For example, I could define the preferences of mine that can be easily desscribed without using the letter “s” to be “blort” preferences, and the others to be non-blort, and rant about how we all need to distinguish blort preferences from non-blort preferences, and you’d be left wondering “Why does he care?”
And the answer would be that there is no good reason for me to care about the distinction between blort and non-blort preferences. The distinction is completely useless. A given concept takes mental effort to use and discuss, so the decision to use or not use a concept is a pragmatic one: we use a concept if the mental effort of forming it and communicating about it is paid for by the improved clarity when we use it. The concept of blort prefrerences does not improve the clarity of our thoughts, so nobody uses it.
The decision to use the concept of “morality” is like any other decision to define and use a concept. We should use it if the cost of talking about it is paid for by the added clarity it brings. If we don’t use the concept, that doesn’t change whether anyone wants to build high-throughput gas chambers—it just means that we don’t have the tools to talk about the difference in kind between ice cream flavor preferences and gas chamber building preferences. If there’s no use for such talk, then we should discard the concept, and if there is a use for such talk, we should keep the concept and try to assign a useful and clear meaning to it.
So what use is the concept of morality? How do people benefit from regarding ice cream flavor preferences as a different sort of thing from gas chamber building preferences?
I hope we’re agreed that there are two different kinds of things here—the strongly held preference to not design high-throughput gas chambers is a different kind of thing from the decision to label that preference as a moral one. The former influences the options available to a well-organized mass murderer, and the latter determines the structure of conversations like this one. The former is a value, the latter is a choice about how words label things. I claim that if we understand what is going on, we’ll all prefer to make the latter choice pragmatically.
You’ve written quite a lot of words but you’re still stuck on the idea that all importance is instrumental importance, importance for something that doesn’t need to be impoitant in itself. You should care about morality because it is a value and values are definitionally what is important and what should be cared about. If you suddenly started liking vanilla.nothing important would change. You wouldn’t stop being you, and your new self wouldn’t be someone your old self would hate. That wouldn’t be the case if you suddenly started liking murder or gas chambers. You don’t now like people who like those things, and you wouldn’t now want to become one.
If we understand what is going on , we should make the choice correctly—that is, according to rational norms. If morality means something other than the merely pragmatic, we should not label the pragmatic as the moral. And it must mean something different because it is an open, investigatable question whether some instrumentally useful thing is also ethically good, whereas questions like “is the pragmatic useful” are trivial and tautologous.
You’re not getting the distinction between morality-the-concept-worth-having and morality-the-value-worth-enacting.
I’m looking for a useful definition of morality here, and if I frame what you say as a definition you seem to be defining a preference to be a moral preference if it’s strongly held, which doesn’t seem very interesting. If we’re going to have the distinction, I like Eugene’s proposal that a moral preference is one that’s worth talking about better, but we need to make the distinction in such a way that something doesn’t get promoted to being a moral preference just because people are easily deceived about it. There should be true things to say about it.
But what I actually gave as a definition is the concept of morality is the concept of ultimate value and importance. A concept which even the nihilists need so that they can express their disbelief in it. A concept which even social and cognitive scientists need so they can describe the behaviour surrounding it.
You are apparently claiming there is some important difference between a strongly held preference and something of ultimate value and importance. Seems like splitting hairs to me. Can you describe how those two things are different?
Just because you do have a stongly held preference, it doesn’t mean you should. The difference between true beliefs and fervently held ones is similar.
One can do experiments to determine whether beliefs are true, for the beliefs that matter. What can one do with a preference to figure out if it should be strongly held?
If that question has no answer, the claim that the two are similar seems indefensible.
What makes them matter?
Reason about it?
Empirical content. That is, a belief matters if it makes or implies statements about things one might observe.
Can you give an example? I tried to make one at http://lesswrong.com/lw/5eh/what_is_metaethics/43fh, but it twisted around into revising a belief instead of revising a preference.
So it doesn’t matter if it only affects what you will do?
If I’m thinking for the purpose of figuring out my future actions, that’s a plan, not a belief, since planning is relevant when I haven’t yet decided what to do.
I suppose beliefs about other people’s actions are empirical.
I’ve lost the relevance of this thread. Please state a purpose if you wish to continue, and if I like it, I’ll reply.