You’ve written quite a lot of words but you’re still stuck on the idea that all importance is instrumental importance, importance for something that doesn’t need to be impoitant in itself. You should care about morality because it is a value and values are definitionally what is important and what should be cared about. If you suddenly started liking vanilla.nothing important would change. You wouldn’t stop
being you, and your new self wouldn’t be someone your old self would hate. That wouldn’t be the case if you suddenly started liking murder or gas chambers. You don’t now like people who like those things, and you wouldn’t now want to become one.
I claim that if we understand what is going on, we’ll all prefer to make the latter choice pragmatically.
If we understand what is going on , we should make the choice correctly—that
is, according to rational norms. If morality means something other than the merely
pragmatic, we should not label the pragmatic as the moral. And it must mean something different because it is an open, investigatable question whether some instrumentally useful thing is also ethically good, whereas questions like “is the pragmatic useful”
are trivial and tautologous.
You should care about morality because it is a value and values are definitionally what is important and what should be cared about.
You’re not getting the distinction between morality-the-concept-worth-having and morality-the-value-worth-enacting.
I’m looking for a useful definition of morality here, and if I frame what you say as a definition you seem to be defining a preference to be a moral preference if it’s strongly held, which doesn’t seem very interesting. If we’re going to have the distinction, I like Eugene’s proposal that a moral preference is one that’s worth talking about better, but we need to make the distinction in such a way that something doesn’t get promoted to being a moral preference just because people are easily deceived about it. There should be true things to say about it.
and if I frame what you say as a definition you seem to be defining a preference to be a moral preference if it’s strongly held,
But what I actually gave as a definition is the concept of morality is the concept
of ultimate value and importance. A concept which even the nihilists need so that they
can express their disbelief in it. A concept which even social and cognitive scientists need so they can describe the behaviour surrounding it.
You are apparently claiming there is some important difference between a strongly held preference and something of ultimate value and importance. Seems like splitting hairs to me. Can you describe how those two things are different?
Just because you do have a stongly held preference, it doesn’t mean you should. The difference between true beliefs and fervently held ones is similar.
Just because you do have a stongly held preference, it doesn’t mean you should. The difference between true beliefs and fervently held ones is similar.
One can do experiments to determine whether beliefs are true, for the beliefs that matter. What can one do with a preference to figure out if it should be strongly held?
If that question has no answer, the claim that the two are similar seems indefensible.
Empirical content. That is, a belief matters if it makes or implies statements about things one might observe.
So it doesn’t matter if it only affects what you will do?
If I’m thinking for the purpose of figuring out my future actions, that’s a plan, not a belief, since planning is relevant when I haven’t yet decided what to do.
I suppose beliefs about other people’s actions are empirical.
I’ve lost the relevance of this thread. Please state a purpose if you wish to continue, and if I like it, I’ll reply.
You’ve written quite a lot of words but you’re still stuck on the idea that all importance is instrumental importance, importance for something that doesn’t need to be impoitant in itself. You should care about morality because it is a value and values are definitionally what is important and what should be cared about. If you suddenly started liking vanilla.nothing important would change. You wouldn’t stop being you, and your new self wouldn’t be someone your old self would hate. That wouldn’t be the case if you suddenly started liking murder or gas chambers. You don’t now like people who like those things, and you wouldn’t now want to become one.
If we understand what is going on , we should make the choice correctly—that is, according to rational norms. If morality means something other than the merely pragmatic, we should not label the pragmatic as the moral. And it must mean something different because it is an open, investigatable question whether some instrumentally useful thing is also ethically good, whereas questions like “is the pragmatic useful” are trivial and tautologous.
You’re not getting the distinction between morality-the-concept-worth-having and morality-the-value-worth-enacting.
I’m looking for a useful definition of morality here, and if I frame what you say as a definition you seem to be defining a preference to be a moral preference if it’s strongly held, which doesn’t seem very interesting. If we’re going to have the distinction, I like Eugene’s proposal that a moral preference is one that’s worth talking about better, but we need to make the distinction in such a way that something doesn’t get promoted to being a moral preference just because people are easily deceived about it. There should be true things to say about it.
But what I actually gave as a definition is the concept of morality is the concept of ultimate value and importance. A concept which even the nihilists need so that they can express their disbelief in it. A concept which even social and cognitive scientists need so they can describe the behaviour surrounding it.
You are apparently claiming there is some important difference between a strongly held preference and something of ultimate value and importance. Seems like splitting hairs to me. Can you describe how those two things are different?
Just because you do have a stongly held preference, it doesn’t mean you should. The difference between true beliefs and fervently held ones is similar.
One can do experiments to determine whether beliefs are true, for the beliefs that matter. What can one do with a preference to figure out if it should be strongly held?
If that question has no answer, the claim that the two are similar seems indefensible.
What makes them matter?
Reason about it?
Empirical content. That is, a belief matters if it makes or implies statements about things one might observe.
Can you give an example? I tried to make one at http://lesswrong.com/lw/5eh/what_is_metaethics/43fh, but it twisted around into revising a belief instead of revising a preference.
So it doesn’t matter if it only affects what you will do?
If I’m thinking for the purpose of figuring out my future actions, that’s a plan, not a belief, since planning is relevant when I haven’t yet decided what to do.
I suppose beliefs about other people’s actions are empirical.
I’ve lost the relevance of this thread. Please state a purpose if you wish to continue, and if I like it, I’ll reply.