Given that Luke named his theory “pluralistic moral reductionism”, Eliezer said his theory is closest to “moral functionalism”, and Luke said his views are similar to Eliezers, I think one can safely deduce that it belongs somewhere around the bottom of the chart, not far away from “analytic moral functionalism” and “standard moral reductionism”. :)
Based on how I would answer the questions listed and that my views are similar to Eliezer’s, I agree. The last question, as I understand it, is equivalent to “If you had a full description of all possible worlds, could you then say which choices are right in each world? Say “no” if you instead think that you would you have to additionally actually observe the real world to make moral choices.” I might be misunderstanding something, since this seems like an obvious “yes”, but I might be understanding ‘too much’, perhaps by conflating two things that some philosophers claim to be different due to their confusion.
But don’t most philosophers do that: try to assemble all the other philosophers’ positions in a chart while maintaining that his own position is too nuanced to be assigned a point on a chart :)
My tone was facetious, but the content of my sentence above was literal. I don’t think it’s an advantage that my theory does or doesn’t fit neatly on the above chart. It’s just that my theory of metaethics doesn’t quite have the same aims or subject matter as the theories presented on this chart. But anyway, you’ll see what I mean once I have time to finish writing up the sequence...
Perhaps, but another general trend in philosophy seems to be that people spend centuries arguing over definitions. Anyone who points that out will be necessarily making a meta-critique and hence not be a point on a chart (not that lukeprog’s theory will necessarily be like that; just have to wait and see).
Where does pluralistic moral reductionism go on the flowchart?
Given that Luke named his theory “pluralistic moral reductionism”, Eliezer said his theory is closest to “moral functionalism”, and Luke said his views are similar to Eliezers, I think one can safely deduce that it belongs somewhere around the bottom of the chart, not far away from “analytic moral functionalism” and “standard moral reductionism”. :)
Based on how I would answer the questions listed and that my views are similar to Eliezer’s, I agree. The last question, as I understand it, is equivalent to “If you had a full description of all possible worlds, could you then say which choices are right in each world? Say “no” if you instead think that you would you have to additionally actually observe the real world to make moral choices.” I might be misunderstanding something, since this seems like an obvious “yes”, but I might be understanding ‘too much’, perhaps by conflating two things that some philosophers claim to be different due to their confusion.
It doesn’t fit anywhere on the chart cuz it’s just so freaking meta, yo. :)
But don’t most philosophers do that: try to assemble all the other philosophers’ positions in a chart while maintaining that his own position is too nuanced to be assigned a point on a chart :)
My tone was facetious, but the content of my sentence above was literal. I don’t think it’s an advantage that my theory does or doesn’t fit neatly on the above chart. It’s just that my theory of metaethics doesn’t quite have the same aims or subject matter as the theories presented on this chart. But anyway, you’ll see what I mean once I have time to finish writing up the sequence...
Perhaps, but another general trend in philosophy seems to be that people spend centuries arguing over definitions. Anyone who points that out will be necessarily making a meta-critique and hence not be a point on a chart (not that lukeprog’s theory will necessarily be like that; just have to wait and see).