while also not doing a serious effort to prolong the healthy lifespan (wallbangerific)
I agree with that! I’m interested in the work by Aubrey de Grey. It’s not useful to me now, but I predict that someday it will be.
But what jumped me, was that a long lifespan is fine, while a long lifespan with a coma/pause in the middle is not. I dont get that.
Well, I don’t suppose that there are many people who feel that way. If you can get across the idea that cryonics is a way of turning one’s death into a very long coma, then that may help make it more attractive.
But I get up in the morning because there are things that I left unfinished the day before. By the time that I am revived from cryonics, they will all be finished.
Of course cryo people would love to take their loved ones with them, and are horrified when they ignore the chance.
If my loved ones signed up for cryonics, that would be reason enough for me.
Well, I don’t suppose that there are many people who feel that way. If you can get across the idea that cryonics is a way of turning one’s death into a very long coma, then that may help make it more attractive.
Yes. Exploring how people would feel about a very long coma could be a good way of exploring how they feel about cryonics-minus-the-creep-factor. In other words, if they didn’t have the psychological obstacles centered around cryonics, how would they really feel about it?
It is a horrendous case of a sub-optimal equilibrium in a coordination game. You know, one of the examples of game theory that isn’t the @#%@ Prisoner’s Dilemma.
I’ve been spending so much of my social time among people who treat swearing with complete nonchalance that I had forgotten how much power even a censored swearword can have in a setting where it is never used.
Yes, I’m wrong about this being prisoner’s dilemma. One side defecting (dieing) against other cooperating (cryopreserving) won’t make first side better off and second one worse off.
So it’s just insufficient communication/coordination.
We could also consider a game that was perhaps a step closer to the original. Leave cooperation and defection (and their PD laden connotations) behind and just consider a pair who would sincerely rather die than live on without the other. This is plausible even without trawling Shakespeare for fictional examples. Here on lesswrong I have seen the prospect of living on via cryopreservation without a friend joining them described as ‘extrovert hell’. Then, as you say, a ‘cremation’ equilibrium would be the result of insufficient communication/coordination. A high time and or emotional cost to transitioning preferences would contribute to that kind of undesirable outcome.
Incidentally, if we were to consider pair-cryo selection as an actual PD the most obvious scenario seems to be one in which both parties are overwhelmingly spiteful. Cryopreservation is the defect option. Where life is preferred but it is far more important to ensure that the other dies.
If my loved ones signed up for cryonics, that would be reason enough for me.
What a horrendous case of prisoner’s dilemma...
Not really. If any of my loved ones were at all interested in cryonics, then we could discuss it and choose to sign up together. In the Prisoner’s Dilemma, you don’t know what your counterpart is doing.
I agree with that! I’m interested in the work by Aubrey de Grey. It’s not useful to me now, but I predict that someday it will be.
Well, I don’t suppose that there are many people who feel that way. If you can get across the idea that cryonics is a way of turning one’s death into a very long coma, then that may help make it more attractive.
But I get up in the morning because there are things that I left unfinished the day before. By the time that I am revived from cryonics, they will all be finished.
If my loved ones signed up for cryonics, that would be reason enough for me.
Yes. Exploring how people would feel about a very long coma could be a good way of exploring how they feel about cryonics-minus-the-creep-factor. In other words, if they didn’t have the psychological obstacles centered around cryonics, how would they really feel about it?
What a horrendous case of prisoner’s dilemma...
It is a horrendous case of a sub-optimal equilibrium in a coordination game. You know, one of the examples of game theory that isn’t the @#%@ Prisoner’s Dilemma.
I’ve been spending so much of my social time among people who treat swearing with complete nonchalance that I had forgotten how much power even a censored swearword can have in a setting where it is never used.
Yes, I’m wrong about this being prisoner’s dilemma. One side defecting (dieing) against other cooperating (cryopreserving) won’t make first side better off and second one worse off.
So it’s just insufficient communication/coordination.
We could also consider a game that was perhaps a step closer to the original. Leave cooperation and defection (and their PD laden connotations) behind and just consider a pair who would sincerely rather die than live on without the other. This is plausible even without trawling Shakespeare for fictional examples. Here on lesswrong I have seen the prospect of living on via cryopreservation without a friend joining them described as ‘extrovert hell’. Then, as you say, a ‘cremation’ equilibrium would be the result of insufficient communication/coordination. A high time and or emotional cost to transitioning preferences would contribute to that kind of undesirable outcome.
Incidentally, if we were to consider pair-cryo selection as an actual PD the most obvious scenario seems to be one in which both parties are overwhelmingly spiteful. Cryopreservation is the defect option. Where life is preferred but it is far more important to ensure that the other dies.
Not really. If any of my loved ones were at all interested in cryonics, then we could discuss it and choose to sign up together. In the Prisoner’s Dilemma, you don’t know what your counterpart is doing.