Let me make sure I understand this: the fact that the cow consents to death is sufficient evidence to justify the conclusion that the cow is unable to meaningfully consent to death?
No, absolutely not. The fact that the cow consents to being eaten is potentially evidence that the cow in unable to meaningfully consent to death. Again, the cow might have good reasons to want to die—it might even have good reasons to not care about whether you eat it or not after it’s dead—but what I’m disputing is whether it can have good reasons to want to be eaten. These are all extremely different things. Likewise, there may be good reasons for a person to want to die but sexual gratification is not a good reason and it’s highly likely to signify mental derangement.
So, I’ve asked this elsewhere, but… why is “well, geez, it’s more useful than just having me rot in the ground” not a good enough reason to prefer (and not just be indifferent to) being eaten after I’m dead?
Conversely, what makes wanting to be buried underground after I die not evidence that I’m unable to consent? (Many people in the real world seem to have this desire.)
(I don’t mean to collide with the cryonics conversation here; we can assume my brain has been cryopreserved in all of these cases if we like. Or not. It has nothing to do with my question.)
There’s a difference between wanting to be eaten and wanting to die in addition to either being indifferent to being eaten afterwards or preferring it. The difference is that in the former case dying is a consequence of the desire to be eaten whereas in the latter case presumably the cow would have a reason to want to die in addition to its preference to want to be eaten afterwards.
The cow that wants to be eaten does not necessarily want to die at all. Death is a consequence of fulfilling its desire to be eaten and to want to be eaten implies that it finds dying an acceptable consequence of being eaten but no more. The cow could say “I don’t want to die, I love living, but I want to be eaten and I’m willing to accept the consequences.” It could simply value being eaten over living without necessarily wanting to die.
Likewise, I can say, “I don’t want to die, but if I do, I’d like to be buried afterwards” and this is obviously a very different thing that saying “I want to be buried and if I have to die in order to be buried I’m willing to accept that consequence.”
Ah, OK. When you said “it might even have good reasons to not care about whether you eat it or not after it’s dead—but what I’m disputing is whether it can have good reasons to want to be eaten” I thought you were contrasting indifference with active desire.
Sure, I agree that there’s a relevant difference between wanting X after I die and wanting X now, especially when X will kill me.
So, OK, revising… is the fact that the cow desires being eaten enough to accept death as a consequence of satisfying that desire sufficient evidence to justify the conclusion that the cow is unable to meaningfully consent to death?
Let me make sure I understand this: the fact that the cow consents to death is sufficient evidence to justify the conclusion that the cow is unable to meaningfully consent to death?
No, absolutely not. The fact that the cow consents to being eaten is potentially evidence that the cow in unable to meaningfully consent to death. Again, the cow might have good reasons to want to die—it might even have good reasons to not care about whether you eat it or not after it’s dead—but what I’m disputing is whether it can have good reasons to want to be eaten. These are all extremely different things. Likewise, there may be good reasons for a person to want to die but sexual gratification is not a good reason and it’s highly likely to signify mental derangement.
So, I’ve asked this elsewhere, but… why is “well, geez, it’s more useful than just having me rot in the ground” not a good enough reason to prefer (and not just be indifferent to) being eaten after I’m dead?
Conversely, what makes wanting to be buried underground after I die not evidence that I’m unable to consent? (Many people in the real world seem to have this desire.)
(I don’t mean to collide with the cryonics conversation here; we can assume my brain has been cryopreserved in all of these cases if we like. Or not. It has nothing to do with my question.)
There’s a difference between wanting to be eaten and wanting to die in addition to either being indifferent to being eaten afterwards or preferring it. The difference is that in the former case dying is a consequence of the desire to be eaten whereas in the latter case presumably the cow would have a reason to want to die in addition to its preference to want to be eaten afterwards.
The cow that wants to be eaten does not necessarily want to die at all. Death is a consequence of fulfilling its desire to be eaten and to want to be eaten implies that it finds dying an acceptable consequence of being eaten but no more. The cow could say “I don’t want to die, I love living, but I want to be eaten and I’m willing to accept the consequences.” It could simply value being eaten over living without necessarily wanting to die.
Likewise, I can say, “I don’t want to die, but if I do, I’d like to be buried afterwards” and this is obviously a very different thing that saying “I want to be buried and if I have to die in order to be buried I’m willing to accept that consequence.”
Ah, OK. When you said “it might even have good reasons to not care about whether you eat it or not after it’s dead—but what I’m disputing is whether it can have good reasons to want to be eaten” I thought you were contrasting indifference with active desire.
Sure, I agree that there’s a relevant difference between wanting X after I die and wanting X now, especially when X will kill me.
So, OK, revising… is the fact that the cow desires being eaten enough to accept death as a consequence of satisfying that desire sufficient evidence to justify the conclusion that the cow is unable to meaningfully consent to death?