Ah, OK. When you said “it might even have good reasons to not care about whether you eat it or not after it’s dead—but what I’m disputing is whether it can have good reasons to want to be eaten” I thought you were contrasting indifference with active desire.
Sure, I agree that there’s a relevant difference between wanting X after I die and wanting X now, especially when X will kill me.
So, OK, revising… is the fact that the cow desires being eaten enough to accept death as a consequence of satisfying that desire sufficient evidence to justify the conclusion that the cow is unable to meaningfully consent to death?
Ah, OK. When you said “it might even have good reasons to not care about whether you eat it or not after it’s dead—but what I’m disputing is whether it can have good reasons to want to be eaten” I thought you were contrasting indifference with active desire.
Sure, I agree that there’s a relevant difference between wanting X after I die and wanting X now, especially when X will kill me.
So, OK, revising… is the fact that the cow desires being eaten enough to accept death as a consequence of satisfying that desire sufficient evidence to justify the conclusion that the cow is unable to meaningfully consent to death?