Decision-theoretically, what matters is consequences, not experiences.
I’m confused by this distinction. Can you give me an example of an experience that is not a consequence and therefore doesn’t matter decision-theoretically? Can you give me an example of a consequence that is not an experience and therefore matters decision-theoretically?
For example, if you make a decision and then die, there will be consequences, but no future experiences. While future experiences are part of consequences, they don’t paint a balanced picture, as (predictable) things outside experiences are going to happen as well. You can send $X to charity, and expected consequences will predictably depend on specific (moderate) value of X, but you won’t expect differing future experiences depending on X.
I’m confused by this distinction. Can you give me an example of an experience that is not a consequence and therefore doesn’t matter decision-theoretically? Can you give me an example of a consequence that is not an experience and therefore matters decision-theoretically?
For example, if you make a decision and then die, there will be consequences, but no future experiences. While future experiences are part of consequences, they don’t paint a balanced picture, as (predictable) things outside experiences are going to happen as well. You can send $X to charity, and expected consequences will predictably depend on specific (moderate) value of X, but you won’t expect differing future experiences depending on X.
Gotcha! Sure, that makes sense. Thanks.