I now agree with you. Or possibly with a steelmanned you, who can say. ;)
This is why I was stressing that “chaa” and “fair” are very different concepts, and that this equilibrium notion is very much based on threats. They just need to be asymmetric threats that the opponent can’t defuse in order to work (or ways of asymmetrically benefiting yourself that your opponent can’t ruin, that’ll work just as well).
in physical reality, payoffs outside of negotiations can depend very much on the players’ behavior inside the negotiations, and thus is not a constant. Nash himself wrote about this limitation (Nash, 1953) just three years after originally proposing the Nash bargaining solution. For instance, if someone makes an unacceptable threat against you during a business negotiation
I’m not really concerned about saying “but reputation matters; the solution you land on here affects your reputation later” since that should be baked into the payoffs.
But I do think it’s important to note the assumption that what happens during negotiation can affect the payoffs even of the current game which this analysis otherwise treats as constant.
I now agree with you. Or possibly with a steelmanned you, who can say. ;)
(from the next post in this sequence https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/RZNmNwc9SxdKayeQh/unifying-bargaining-notions-2-2)
and
(from Critch’s first boundary post https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/8oMF8Lv5jiGaQSFvo/boundaries-part-1-a-key-missing-concept-from-utility-theory)
I’m not really concerned about saying “but reputation matters; the solution you land on here affects your reputation later” since that should be baked into the payoffs.
But I do think it’s important to note the assumption that what happens during negotiation can affect the payoffs even of the current game which this analysis otherwise treats as constant.