Q: Why do I think there is something instead of nothing?
A: Because I think I’m experiencing, well, something.
Q: Why do I think I’m experiencing something?
A: uh… dang, the urge is overwelming for me to say “Because I actually am experiencing something. That’s the plainest fact of all, even though evidence in favor of it seems to be at the moment the least communicable sort of evidence of them all.”
argh!
So, I see at least two possibilities here:
Either I’m profoundly confused about something, causing me to seem to think that I can’t possibly be experiencing the thought of thinking I’m conscious without, well… experiencing it. (I think I experience the thought that I’m consciouss? But it sure seems like I’m experiencing that thought… argh...) so either way there’s some profound confusion going on in my head.
Or I’m confused partly because I’m trying to think of what sort of state of affairs could result in me seeming to think I’m conscious without actually being so (I’m not talking about philosophical zombies here, I mean from the inside), and am confused because it may really be as incoherent an idea as it seems to me.
The question of free will at least “feels” solvable. That it can be broken down into more basic things. These two (why is there something instead of nothing, and what’s the nature of consiousness (as in “feels like from the inside”/qualia/etc) are the Langford philosophical basilisk questions. May not have anything to do with the nature of the question itself, but seems to fry my brain any way I bang my head at it. :)
Don’t forget the third alternative : why is there something instead of something else ?
One idea is that there are unlimited potential universes, each running on different fundamental laws, most being poor and sterile. But because of survivor (existence ?) bias, intelligent forms can only observe a universe rich enough to hold them.
Scientist went this way and imagined other laws in order to prove that ours are the only possible. Instead, they found that some alternative algebras, geometries etc do make sense.
Children undergo a fundamental mind-building step when they realize they are not the universe. That there are things out there that don’t follow their thoughts, and (the horror !) don’t even know about them. That the self is separate from everything else. Thus, becoming aware of themselves, and their place in the world.
That’s starting at the finishing line. The hard problem of consciousness is about why there should be feelings at all, not about why we feel particular things.
A: Like all feelings, it was selected by evolution to signal an important situation and trigger appropriate behavior.
Q: What situation ? What behavior ?
A: Modeling oneself. Paying extra attention.
Q: And how ?
A: I expect a kluge fitting of the blind idiot god, like detecting when proprioception matches and/or drives agent modeling, probably with feedback loops. This would lower environment perception, inhibit attention zapping etc., leading to how consciousness feels.
It’s a far cry from a proper explanation, yet it already makes so much sense.
Asking the right questions did dispel much of the mystery.
A: Like all feelings, it was selected by evolution to signal an important situation and trigger appropriate behavior.
This is a design-stance explanation, which, firstly, is inherently problematic when applied to evolution (as opposed to a human designer), and, more importantly, doesn’t actually explain anything.
The Hard Problem of Consciousness is the problem of giving a functional (physical-stance, more or less—modulo the possibility of lossless abstraction away from “implementation details” of functional units) explanation of why we “feel conscious” (and just what exactly that alleged “feeling” consists of).
What’s more, even if we accept the rest of your (evolutionary) explanation, notice that it doesn’t actually answer the question, since everything you said about selection for certain functional properties, etc., would remain true even in the absence of phenomenal, a.k.a. subjective, consciousness (i.e., “what it is like to be” you).
You have, in short, managed to solve everything but the Hard Problem!
I worded poorly, but evolution does produce such apparent result.
The Hard Problem of Consciousness
Is way out my league, I did not pretend to solve it : “It’s a far cry from a proper explanation”.
But pondering it led to another find : “Feeling conscious” looks like an incentive to better model oneself, by thinking oneself special, as having something to preserve… which looks a lot like the soul.
A simple, plausible explanation that dissolves a mystery, works for me ! (until better is offered)
That line of thinking goes places, but here is not the place to develop it.
(That may be a useful clue for identifying the meaning of the question, as understood by the people pursuing it, but not necessarily a good reason to agree that it currently should be considered mysterious or that it’s a sensible question to pursue.)
Q: Why do I think there is something instead of nothing? A: Because I think I’m experiencing, well, something. Q: Why do I think I’m experiencing something?
A: uh… dang, the urge is overwelming for me to say “Because I actually am experiencing something. That’s the plainest fact of all, even though evidence in favor of it seems to be at the moment the least communicable sort of evidence of them all.”
argh!
So, I see at least two possibilities here:
Either I’m profoundly confused about something, causing me to seem to think that I can’t possibly be experiencing the thought of thinking I’m conscious without, well… experiencing it. (I think I experience the thought that I’m consciouss? But it sure seems like I’m experiencing that thought… argh...) so either way there’s some profound confusion going on in my head.
Or I’m confused partly because I’m trying to think of what sort of state of affairs could result in me seeming to think I’m conscious without actually being so (I’m not talking about philosophical zombies here, I mean from the inside), and am confused because it may really be as incoherent an idea as it seems to me.
The question of free will at least “feels” solvable. That it can be broken down into more basic things. These two (why is there something instead of nothing, and what’s the nature of consiousness (as in “feels like from the inside”/qualia/etc) are the Langford philosophical basilisk questions. May not have anything to do with the nature of the question itself, but seems to fry my brain any way I bang my head at it. :)
Don’t forget the third alternative : why is there something instead of something else ?
One idea is that there are unlimited potential universes, each running on different fundamental laws, most being poor and sterile. But because of survivor (existence ?) bias, intelligent forms can only observe a universe rich enough to hold them.
Scientist went this way and imagined other laws in order to prove that ours are the only possible. Instead, they found that some alternative algebras, geometries etc do make sense.
This neither answers nor dissolves the question, but it does hint to look elsewhere.
Children undergo a fundamental mind-building step when they realize they are not the universe. That there are things out there that don’t follow their thoughts, and (the horror !) don’t even know about them. That the self is separate from everything else. Thus, becoming aware of themselves, and their place in the world.
Feeling conscious seems the way we do that.
That’s starting at the finishing line. The hard problem of consciousness is about why there should be feelings at all, not about why we feel particular things.
Okay. Q: Why do I think I am conscious ?
A: Because I feel conscious.
Q: Why ?
A: Like all feelings, it was selected by evolution to signal an important situation and trigger appropriate behavior.
Q: What situation ? What behavior ?
A: Modeling oneself. Paying extra attention.
Q: And how ?
A: I expect a kluge fitting of the blind idiot god, like detecting when proprioception matches and/or drives agent modeling, probably with feedback loops. This would lower environment perception, inhibit attention zapping etc., leading to how consciousness feels.
It’s a far cry from a proper explanation, yet it already makes so much sense.
Asking the right questions did dispel much of the mystery.
This is a design-stance explanation, which, firstly, is inherently problematic when applied to evolution (as opposed to a human designer), and, more importantly, doesn’t actually explain anything.
The Hard Problem of Consciousness is the problem of giving a functional (physical-stance, more or less—modulo the possibility of lossless abstraction away from “implementation details” of functional units) explanation of why we “feel conscious” (and just what exactly that alleged “feeling” consists of).
What’s more, even if we accept the rest of your (evolutionary) explanation, notice that it doesn’t actually answer the question, since everything you said about selection for certain functional properties, etc., would remain true even in the absence of phenomenal, a.k.a. subjective, consciousness (i.e., “what it is like to be” you).
You have, in short, managed to solve everything but the Hard Problem!
I worded poorly, but evolution does produce such apparent result.
Is way out my league, I did not pretend to solve it : “It’s a far cry from a proper explanation”.
But pondering it led to another find : “Feeling conscious” looks like an incentive to better model oneself, by thinking oneself special, as having something to preserve… which looks a lot like the soul.
A simple, plausible explanation that dissolves a mystery, works for me ! (until better is offered)
That line of thinking goes places, but here is not the place to develop it.
Agian, you are assuming there is no big deal about
why do I feel (anything at all),
and therefore the only issue is
why do I feel conscious
Try taking a step back an wondering why consciousness is considered mysterious when it has such a simple explanation.
(That may be a useful clue for identifying the meaning of the question, as understood by the people pursuing it, but not necessarily a good reason to agree that it currently should be considered mysterious or that it’s a sensible question to pursue.)
If you had a general rule that anything any particular theory cannot explain is “unimportant”, that would be an epistemological nighmare.