Also, I’d say what I’m considering here isn’t really “infinite ethics”, or at least not what I understand infinite ethics to be, which is concerned with actual infinities, e.g. an infinite universe, infinitely long lives or infinite value. None of the arguments here assume such infinities, only infinitely many possible outcomes with finite (but unbounded) value.
The argument you made that I understood seemed to rest on allowing for an infinite expectation to occur, which seems pretty related to me to infinite ethics, though I’m no ethicist.
The argument can be generalized without using infinite expectations, and instead using violations of Limitedness in Russell and Isaacs, 2021 or reckless preferences in Beckstead and Thomas, 2023. However, intuitively, it involves prospects that look like they should be infinitely valuable or undefinably valuable relative to the things they’re made up of. Any violation of (the countable extension of) the Archimedean Property/continuity is going to look like you have some kind of infinity.
The issue could just be a categorization thing. I don’t think philosophers would normally include this in “infinite ethics”, because it involves no actual infinities out there in the world.
Also, I’d say what I’m considering here isn’t really “infinite ethics”, or at least not what I understand infinite ethics to be, which is concerned with actual infinities, e.g. an infinite universe, infinitely long lives or infinite value. None of the arguments here assume such infinities, only infinitely many possible outcomes with finite (but unbounded) value.
The argument you made that I understood seemed to rest on allowing for an infinite expectation to occur, which seems pretty related to me to infinite ethics, though I’m no ethicist.
The argument can be generalized without using infinite expectations, and instead using violations of Limitedness in Russell and Isaacs, 2021 or reckless preferences in Beckstead and Thomas, 2023. However, intuitively, it involves prospects that look like they should be infinitely valuable or undefinably valuable relative to the things they’re made up of. Any violation of (the countable extension of) the Archimedean Property/continuity is going to look like you have some kind of infinity.
The issue could just be a categorization thing. I don’t think philosophers would normally include this in “infinite ethics”, because it involves no actual infinities out there in the world.