The 1964 elections caused democrats and republicans to basically switch sides permanently, between that and the Vietnam War movement (with possibly substantial Soviet involvement) caused massive instability within the US and very extreme geopolitical weakness throughout the 70s (which happened to ultimately end up being reversed in the 80s, when the US made a comeback so big that it literally steamrolled over the Cold War order).
People with a college-level understanding of US history know that anything from the 1800s was out-of-distribution, mainly due to technology and civilization differences. People with an expert-level understanding usually know that the 1800s were back when democracy was an extremely new and unfolding global affair, and nowhere near a stable institution that could be considered the backbone of the western word.
Every single election date that Gwern mentioned after 1850 was almost immediately followed by a rather severe information war, and each one after 1900 was followed by either the Cuban Missile Crisis and the US becoming substantially geopolitically weaker than the USSR after losing the infowar over Vietnam, which both only ended up fine due to good luck, and the War On Terror which did ended with an unshakeable AI-powered surveillance state and ubiquitous network-connected sensors around 10 years later. However, all dates after 1850 were accompanied by massive lasting political shifts that dominated the trajectory of the US, each vastly larger and more powerful than the size of the entire AI safety movement today.
each one after 1900 was followed by either the Cuban Missile Crisis and the US becoming substantially geopolitically weaker than the USSR after losing the infowar over Vietnam
I’m sorry, what? That’s a huge assertion. The Vietnam War was a disaster, but I fail to see how it made the US “significantly geopolitically weaker”. One has to remember that, at the same time that the US was exiting Vietnam, its main rival, the Soviet Union, was entering a twenty-five year period of economic stagnation that would culminate in its collapse.
I looked into it, this is the kind of research that’s really hard to get good info on. I need to do some digging, but generally, it’s well known that the US had a historically unprecedented public opinion catastrophe (basically in free fall, by the standards of the time), was militarily weakened severely which was why the US allied with China against the USSR (the USSR asserting military forces on China’s border was a costly indicator of Soviet strength and Chinese turmoil), and failing to prevent the oil shocks in formerly US-friendly middle eastern regimes, which were economic catastrophes that each could have done far more damage if luck was worse (if they were mission-critical for the US economy, why couldn’t the CIA keep the oil going?). Meanwhile, the USSR remained strong militarily in spite of the economic stagnation.
I just found out that some historians might be claiming that the US wasn’t really weakened much at all, which absolutely REEKS of the usual suspects. Of course, it’s not hard to believe that the US moved much closer to parity with the USSR whereas during the 50s 60s and 70s it was the leader due to being vastly economically superior and substantially technologically superior. But the idea that the US was doing fine after Vietnam, including relative to the Soviets, is not very easy to believe, all things considered.
That’s another highly contentious assertion. Even at the height of Vietnam, the US never considered Southeast Asia to be the main domain of competition against the Soviet Union. The primary focus was always on fielding a military force capable of challenging the Soviets in Western Europe. Indeed, one of the reasons the US failed in Vietnam is because the military was unwilling to commit its best units and commanders to what the generals perceived was a sideshow.
why the US allied with China against the USSR
Was the US ever allied with China? What we did as a result of the Sino-Soviet split was simply let the People’s Republic of China back into the international system from which they had been excluded. The US certainly did not pursue any greater alignment with China until much later, at which point the Soviet Union was well into its terminal decline.
failing to prevent the oil shocks in formerly US-friendly middle eastern regimes, which were economic catastrophes that each could have done far more damage if luck was worse
More evidence is needed. The oil shocks were certainly very visible, but it’s not clear from the statistical data that they did much damage to the US economy. In fact, the political response to the oil shocks (rationing, price controls, etc) did arguably more to hurt the economy than the oil shocks themselves.
Meanwhile, the USSR remained strong militarily in spite of the economic stagnation.
The actual readiness of Soviet forces, as opposed to the hilariously false readiness reports published by unit commanders, is a matter of great debate. After the Cold War, when US commanders had a chance to tour Soviet facilities in ex-Warsaw Pact states, they were shocked at the poor level of repair of equipment and poor level of readiness among the troops. Furthermore, by the Soviets’ own admission, the performance of their troops in Afghanistan wasn’t very good, even when compared against the relatively poor level of training and equipment of the insurgent forces.
But the idea that the US was doing fine after Vietnam, including relative to the Soviets, is not very easy to believe, all things considered.
Vietnam was certainly a blow to US power, but it was nowhere near as serious a blow as you seem to believe.
The 1964 elections caused democrats and republicans to basically switch sides permanently, between that and the Vietnam War movement (with possibly substantial Soviet involvement) caused massive instability within the US and very extreme geopolitical weakness throughout the 70s (which happened to ultimately end up being reversed in the 80s, when the US made a comeback so big that it literally steamrolled over the Cold War order).
People with a college-level understanding of US history know that anything from the 1800s was out-of-distribution, mainly due to technology and civilization differences. People with an expert-level understanding usually know that the 1800s were back when democracy was an extremely new and unfolding global affair, and nowhere near a stable institution that could be considered the backbone of the western word.
Every single election date that Gwern mentioned after 1850 was almost immediately followed by a rather severe information war, and each one after 1900 was followed by either the Cuban Missile Crisis and the US becoming substantially geopolitically weaker than the USSR after losing the infowar over Vietnam, which both only ended up fine due to good luck, and the War On Terror which did ended with an unshakeable AI-powered surveillance state and ubiquitous network-connected sensors around 10 years later. However, all dates after 1850 were accompanied by massive lasting political shifts that dominated the trajectory of the US, each vastly larger and more powerful than the size of the entire AI safety movement today.
I’m sorry, what? That’s a huge assertion. The Vietnam War was a disaster, but I fail to see how it made the US “significantly geopolitically weaker”. One has to remember that, at the same time that the US was exiting Vietnam, its main rival, the Soviet Union, was entering a twenty-five year period of economic stagnation that would culminate in its collapse.
I looked into it, this is the kind of research that’s really hard to get good info on. I need to do some digging, but generally, it’s well known that the US had a historically unprecedented public opinion catastrophe (basically in free fall, by the standards of the time), was militarily weakened severely which was why the US allied with China against the USSR (the USSR asserting military forces on China’s border was a costly indicator of Soviet strength and Chinese turmoil), and failing to prevent the oil shocks in formerly US-friendly middle eastern regimes, which were economic catastrophes that each could have done far more damage if luck was worse (if they were mission-critical for the US economy, why couldn’t the CIA keep the oil going?). Meanwhile, the USSR remained strong militarily in spite of the economic stagnation.
I just found out that some historians might be claiming that the US wasn’t really weakened much at all, which absolutely REEKS of the usual suspects. Of course, it’s not hard to believe that the US moved much closer to parity with the USSR whereas during the 50s 60s and 70s it was the leader due to being vastly economically superior and substantially technologically superior. But the idea that the US was doing fine after Vietnam, including relative to the Soviets, is not very easy to believe, all things considered.
That’s another highly contentious assertion. Even at the height of Vietnam, the US never considered Southeast Asia to be the main domain of competition against the Soviet Union. The primary focus was always on fielding a military force capable of challenging the Soviets in Western Europe. Indeed, one of the reasons the US failed in Vietnam is because the military was unwilling to commit its best units and commanders to what the generals perceived was a sideshow.
Was the US ever allied with China? What we did as a result of the Sino-Soviet split was simply let the People’s Republic of China back into the international system from which they had been excluded. The US certainly did not pursue any greater alignment with China until much later, at which point the Soviet Union was well into its terminal decline.
More evidence is needed. The oil shocks were certainly very visible, but it’s not clear from the statistical data that they did much damage to the US economy. In fact, the political response to the oil shocks (rationing, price controls, etc) did arguably more to hurt the economy than the oil shocks themselves.
The actual readiness of Soviet forces, as opposed to the hilariously false readiness reports published by unit commanders, is a matter of great debate. After the Cold War, when US commanders had a chance to tour Soviet facilities in ex-Warsaw Pact states, they were shocked at the poor level of repair of equipment and poor level of readiness among the troops. Furthermore, by the Soviets’ own admission, the performance of their troops in Afghanistan wasn’t very good, even when compared against the relatively poor level of training and equipment of the insurgent forces.
Vietnam was certainly a blow to US power, but it was nowhere near as serious a blow as you seem to believe.