I looked into it, this is the kind of research that’s really hard to get good info on. I need to do some digging, but generally, it’s well known that the US had a historically unprecedented public opinion catastrophe (basically in free fall, by the standards of the time), was militarily weakened severely which was why the US allied with China against the USSR (the USSR asserting military forces on China’s border was a costly indicator of Soviet strength and Chinese turmoil), and failing to prevent the oil shocks in formerly US-friendly middle eastern regimes, which were economic catastrophes that each could have done far more damage if luck was worse (if they were mission-critical for the US economy, why couldn’t the CIA keep the oil going?). Meanwhile, the USSR remained strong militarily in spite of the economic stagnation.
I just found out that some historians might be claiming that the US wasn’t really weakened much at all, which absolutely REEKS of the usual suspects. Of course, it’s not hard to believe that the US moved much closer to parity with the USSR whereas during the 50s 60s and 70s it was the leader due to being vastly economically superior and substantially technologically superior. But the idea that the US was doing fine after Vietnam, including relative to the Soviets, is not very easy to believe, all things considered.
That’s another highly contentious assertion. Even at the height of Vietnam, the US never considered Southeast Asia to be the main domain of competition against the Soviet Union. The primary focus was always on fielding a military force capable of challenging the Soviets in Western Europe. Indeed, one of the reasons the US failed in Vietnam is because the military was unwilling to commit its best units and commanders to what the generals perceived was a sideshow.
why the US allied with China against the USSR
Was the US ever allied with China? What we did as a result of the Sino-Soviet split was simply let the People’s Republic of China back into the international system from which they had been excluded. The US certainly did not pursue any greater alignment with China until much later, at which point the Soviet Union was well into its terminal decline.
failing to prevent the oil shocks in formerly US-friendly middle eastern regimes, which were economic catastrophes that each could have done far more damage if luck was worse
More evidence is needed. The oil shocks were certainly very visible, but it’s not clear from the statistical data that they did much damage to the US economy. In fact, the political response to the oil shocks (rationing, price controls, etc) did arguably more to hurt the economy than the oil shocks themselves.
Meanwhile, the USSR remained strong militarily in spite of the economic stagnation.
The actual readiness of Soviet forces, as opposed to the hilariously false readiness reports published by unit commanders, is a matter of great debate. After the Cold War, when US commanders had a chance to tour Soviet facilities in ex-Warsaw Pact states, they were shocked at the poor level of repair of equipment and poor level of readiness among the troops. Furthermore, by the Soviets’ own admission, the performance of their troops in Afghanistan wasn’t very good, even when compared against the relatively poor level of training and equipment of the insurgent forces.
But the idea that the US was doing fine after Vietnam, including relative to the Soviets, is not very easy to believe, all things considered.
Vietnam was certainly a blow to US power, but it was nowhere near as serious a blow as you seem to believe.
I looked into it, this is the kind of research that’s really hard to get good info on. I need to do some digging, but generally, it’s well known that the US had a historically unprecedented public opinion catastrophe (basically in free fall, by the standards of the time), was militarily weakened severely which was why the US allied with China against the USSR (the USSR asserting military forces on China’s border was a costly indicator of Soviet strength and Chinese turmoil), and failing to prevent the oil shocks in formerly US-friendly middle eastern regimes, which were economic catastrophes that each could have done far more damage if luck was worse (if they were mission-critical for the US economy, why couldn’t the CIA keep the oil going?). Meanwhile, the USSR remained strong militarily in spite of the economic stagnation.
I just found out that some historians might be claiming that the US wasn’t really weakened much at all, which absolutely REEKS of the usual suspects. Of course, it’s not hard to believe that the US moved much closer to parity with the USSR whereas during the 50s 60s and 70s it was the leader due to being vastly economically superior and substantially technologically superior. But the idea that the US was doing fine after Vietnam, including relative to the Soviets, is not very easy to believe, all things considered.
That’s another highly contentious assertion. Even at the height of Vietnam, the US never considered Southeast Asia to be the main domain of competition against the Soviet Union. The primary focus was always on fielding a military force capable of challenging the Soviets in Western Europe. Indeed, one of the reasons the US failed in Vietnam is because the military was unwilling to commit its best units and commanders to what the generals perceived was a sideshow.
Was the US ever allied with China? What we did as a result of the Sino-Soviet split was simply let the People’s Republic of China back into the international system from which they had been excluded. The US certainly did not pursue any greater alignment with China until much later, at which point the Soviet Union was well into its terminal decline.
More evidence is needed. The oil shocks were certainly very visible, but it’s not clear from the statistical data that they did much damage to the US economy. In fact, the political response to the oil shocks (rationing, price controls, etc) did arguably more to hurt the economy than the oil shocks themselves.
The actual readiness of Soviet forces, as opposed to the hilariously false readiness reports published by unit commanders, is a matter of great debate. After the Cold War, when US commanders had a chance to tour Soviet facilities in ex-Warsaw Pact states, they were shocked at the poor level of repair of equipment and poor level of readiness among the troops. Furthermore, by the Soviets’ own admission, the performance of their troops in Afghanistan wasn’t very good, even when compared against the relatively poor level of training and equipment of the insurgent forces.
Vietnam was certainly a blow to US power, but it was nowhere near as serious a blow as you seem to believe.