Things that my brain tells me are green, are green. Things that your brain tells you are green, are green. In cases where we disagree, split the label into my!green and your!green.
Things that my brain tells me are green, are green. Things that your brain tells you are green, are green. In cases where we disagree, split the label into my!green and your!green.
To see the problem with the above statement, try replacing the word “green” with “true”.
Truth is an abstract, rationally defined property that has a meaning beyond my mind. To say that “things my brain tells me are true, are true” is a similar kind of claim would imply that green, like true, has a working definition beyond the perceptual. If this is the case, I’d like to know it. I’m fairly sure it’s not actually possible to be wrong about a perceived color, excluding errors in memory. It’s possible to consider a statement and be mistaken about its truthfulness, but is it possible to look at an object and be mistaken about the color one perceives it as? That seems nonsensical.
To say that “things my brain tells me are true, are true” is a similar kind of claim would imply that green, like true, has a working definition beyond the perceptual.
So can you provide a working definition of “true”?
If there was definitely such a thing as an objective reality, my answer would be “a claim that is not in contradiction with objective reality”. As it stands, I’ll have to settle for “a claim that is never in contradiction with perceived reality. ” Note that, for instance, ludicrous claims about the distant past do in fact stand in contradiction with perceived reality since “things like that seem to not happen now, and the behavior of the universe seems to be consistent over time” is a true claim which a ludicrous but unverifiable claim would contradict with. Note that the degree to which you believe truth can be objective is exactly proportional to the degree to which you believe reality is objective and modelled by our observations.
His entire point is that the very fact that we percieve colors need to be explained.
I can close my eyes and visualize any color I want, but how is that possible when colors do not exist objectively ?
So in order to avoid postulating that the mind is a separate entity with it’s own “reality” with colors, Mitchell Porter is trying to get colors in our reality.
I am not convinced anything as drastic as quantum mechanisms is needed to explain this and I am very much a functionalist, but the issues he want to investigate is definitely worth digging into.
But since you claim this post is a waste of time, please elaborate on exactly how colors arise in experience...
I have no idea; I’m not a neurobiologist. I’d guess that colors arise in experience by virtue of being fundamentally indexical; what a color “is” is merely a defined unique association in our brains that links sensory data to a bunch of learned responses. It’s like the human soul—any property of it that you’d use to make it “unique”, to differentiate your soul from another’s, or to differentiate red from green, can be described as neurological activation of an associative pattern. Memories—neurological. Instinct, learning, feelings, hormones, habits—all biological or neurological. What is red? It’s like fire, like roses, like blood. All associative. Could you build a brain that perceives red meaningfully differently from green while having no such associations, built-in or learned? I suspect that if I was such a being, I would not even be able to differentiate red from green, because my brain would never have been given occasion to treat a red thing with a different response than a green thing. How would you expect there to be nerves for that kind of differentiation if there was never a need for it?
Colors are associated responses and groupings for certain kinds of sensory data. They have no further identity.
That’s my take.
[edit] The real stupid thing is that mysteriousness is a property of the question, not the answer! Even if we weren’t able to put out a good guess as to how colors work that wouldn’t make it a topic to call the entirety of reductionism into question. The correct answer should then be “We don’t know yet, but it’s probably something in the brain and not magical and/or mysterious”. Haven’t we learned our lesson with consciousness?
And this view seems to be consistent with this bbc documentary excerpt, relevant part starts at 03:00. The Himba have different and less color categories, probably because they don’t need more or others.
Things that my brain tells me are green, are green. Things that your brain tells you are green, are green. In cases where we disagree, split the label into my!green and your!green.
Now can we move on? This post is a waste of time.
To see the problem with the above statement, try replacing the word “green” with “true”.
You mean, “to see the problem with a wholly unrelated statement”. Green is not the same kind of property as true.
Could you expand on that.
Truth is an abstract, rationally defined property that has a meaning beyond my mind. To say that “things my brain tells me are true, are true” is a similar kind of claim would imply that green, like true, has a working definition beyond the perceptual. If this is the case, I’d like to know it. I’m fairly sure it’s not actually possible to be wrong about a perceived color, excluding errors in memory. It’s possible to consider a statement and be mistaken about its truthfulness, but is it possible to look at an object and be mistaken about the color one perceives it as? That seems nonsensical.
So can you provide a working definition of “true”?
If there was definitely such a thing as an objective reality, my answer would be “a claim that is not in contradiction with objective reality”. As it stands, I’ll have to settle for “a claim that is never in contradiction with perceived reality. ” Note that, for instance, ludicrous claims about the distant past do in fact stand in contradiction with perceived reality since “things like that seem to not happen now, and the behavior of the universe seems to be consistent over time” is a true claim which a ludicrous but unverifiable claim would contradict with. Note that the degree to which you believe truth can be objective is exactly proportional to the degree to which you believe reality is objective and modelled by our observations.
This comment is beyond stupid.
His entire point is that the very fact that we percieve colors need to be explained. I can close my eyes and visualize any color I want, but how is that possible when colors do not exist objectively ? So in order to avoid postulating that the mind is a separate entity with it’s own “reality” with colors, Mitchell Porter is trying to get colors in our reality.
I am not convinced anything as drastic as quantum mechanisms is needed to explain this and I am very much a functionalist, but the issues he want to investigate is definitely worth digging into.
But since you claim this post is a waste of time, please elaborate on exactly how colors arise in experience...
I have no idea; I’m not a neurobiologist. I’d guess that colors arise in experience by virtue of being fundamentally indexical; what a color “is” is merely a defined unique association in our brains that links sensory data to a bunch of learned responses. It’s like the human soul—any property of it that you’d use to make it “unique”, to differentiate your soul from another’s, or to differentiate red from green, can be described as neurological activation of an associative pattern. Memories—neurological. Instinct, learning, feelings, hormones, habits—all biological or neurological. What is red? It’s like fire, like roses, like blood. All associative. Could you build a brain that perceives red meaningfully differently from green while having no such associations, built-in or learned? I suspect that if I was such a being, I would not even be able to differentiate red from green, because my brain would never have been given occasion to treat a red thing with a different response than a green thing. How would you expect there to be nerves for that kind of differentiation if there was never a need for it?
Colors are associated responses and groupings for certain kinds of sensory data. They have no further identity.
That’s my take.
[edit] The real stupid thing is that mysteriousness is a property of the question, not the answer! Even if we weren’t able to put out a good guess as to how colors work that wouldn’t make it a topic to call the entirety of reductionism into question. The correct answer should then be “We don’t know yet, but it’s probably something in the brain and not magical and/or mysterious”. Haven’t we learned our lesson with consciousness?
And this view seems to be consistent with this bbc documentary excerpt, relevant part starts at 03:00. The Himba have different and less color categories, probably because they don’t need more or others.