Yes. I’ve witnessed how John Searle turns undergrad Cognitive Science majors against reductionism at UC Berkeley. Searle’s “emergence” and Chinese Room argument would be very fertile topics for a diavlog.
It would be interesting to see Searle debate anyone who didn’t defer to his high status and common-sense-sounding arguments and pressed him to the wall on what exactly would happen if you, say, simulated a human brain in high resolution. His intuition pumps are powerful (“thought is just like digestion, you don’t really believe a computer will digest food if you simulate gastric enzymes, do you?”), but he never really presents any argument on his views of consciousness or AI, at least what I’ve seen.
The Chinese Room argument seems to me so deeply misguided and silly that I doubt an interesting dialog on it is possible, any more than a fruitful discussion of religion with a well-educated theist.
I know little of his work other than the aforementioned argument, but it doesn’t really paint a flattering picture of his ability to engage in clear thinking.
Searle’s actually pretty brilliant and he’s mostly on the right side on this one. When you cast the debate as between Searle and Dennett, Dennett is obviously right. But in a broader context, Searle and Dennett are on the same side.
But I agree that there’s no reason to talk about the Chinese Room. Either you’re convinced by Dennett, or there’s no use talking further about it.
So you’re arguing, then, that there’s no point in trying to be “less wrong”? Either you’re absolutely correct or you’re “deeply misguided and silly” and can’t “engage in clear thinking”?
Your attitude doesn’t seem conducive to creating harmony amongst mostly like-minded people. Do you have many professional acquaintances?
ETA: that’s harsh—I disagreed with your comment and upvoted it, and within moments of being posted it was at −1. What’s with people around here?
So you’re arguing, then, that there’s no point in trying to be “less wrong”?
Not at all. If you have many arguments, it is useful to reduce the number of them that are invalid and increase the number that are valid.
An argument itself, though, can be only valid or invalid. If some section of it is incompatible with the rules of logic, it’s in violation of those rules and cannot be valid.
Either you’re absolutely correct or you’re “deeply misguided and silly” and can’t “engage in clear thinking”?
Again, not at all. A valid argument isn’t necessarily true, for one thing. For another, merely not violating the rules doesn’t imply correctness—if you never construct an argument it can’t violate logic, but you’ll never reach a true conclusion that way. People often refuse to investigate theses when they don’t want to have to acknowledge an unpleasant truth that they suspect lurks at the end of a chain of reasoning. That is an error of integrity, not (directly) one of logic.
Your attitude doesn’t seem conducive to creating harmony amongst mostly like-minded people.
Setting harmony as an goal is destructive and misleading. Seek the truth, and to ensure that everyone applies the appropriate standards of evaluation, and harmony will arise as a natural consequence. Try to create harmony directly and you become trapped in falsity and error.
There can be no ‘harmony’ between theists and anti-theists, for example. The two positions are incompatible. Logic and the available evidence support one and not the other. This community should not seek to create harmony of that sort; by insisting on rigorous standards of reason, the community requires that theists must either abandon their position or leave their association with the group.
(Or, of course, keep their beliefs secret and imply by silence that they’re not theists. It is difficult to identify such a strategy. LW does not have inquisitors...)
Not at all. If you have many arguments, it is useful to reduce the number of them that are invalid and increase the number that are valid.
Why did you assume that “he’s mostly on the right side on this one” meant that he has one “almost correct” argument, rather than meaning that most of his arguments are sound?
Because I know that most of his arguments are not sound, and I tend to assume that the people I’m speaking with are familiar with basic realities of the topic. So that interpretation is ruled out.
Why did you assume that thomblake would know (i) that Searle’s arguments are mostly not sound, but not (ii) that an argument either meets the standards of correctness, or it doesn’t? Certainly both (i) and (ii) count as basic realities for you.
Because 1) thomblake is usually pretty sharp, 2) I know he’s very interested in philosophy generally, and 3) Searle is well-known and has been taken down more often than I care to remember.
That addresses (i).
As for (ii), people almost always ignore that point, and frequently try to gloss over or deny it in arguments. It’s warm and fuzzy to “look for the good” in positions and it’s a common strategy to wear down resistance in opponents by ‘acknowledging their claims to be partly valid’ even when they aren’t.
His studies have taught thomblake well, but he is not a rationalist yet.
And yet, thomblake’s reply makes it clear that you would have been more correct to assume that thomblake would know (ii) but not (i). Interesting. ETA: Or not.
I pretty much agree with Annoyance’s response. I’ve argued about Searle with him before, which I think is evidence for (i), and I’ve disputed the relevance of (ii).
Admittedly, the fact that they’re fans of his strongly suggests that they’re lacking in the ability to engage in clear thinking. That probably has something to do with why they never seem to grasp the arguments demonstrating the problems with the ‘Chinese Room’.
Searle has problems grasping that systems can be analyzed in terms of their constituent parts, and that various parts can be put together to create a system—thus, his criticism that the Chinese Room can’t be said to understand because no part of the room understands it.
Aside from being an object lesson in cognitive failure, I don’t see what any discussion with him could accomplish.
And since “reducing things to constituent parts” is involved with all of reasoning, it indicates a gross inability to reason.
I mean really, who only refers to the universe as a seamless whole? And who has produced anything of note by refusing to refer to distinct and separate things?
Searle would be a good example of the difference between being bright, and being intelligent. He is clever, but not smart.
I don’t think my point is really that unclear though. Consider: Rube Goldberg-like ‘solutions’ to problems require cleverness, but are so inefficient and overly complex that only a very foolish person would think that their design and construction would be a good idea. Seriously making such a design requires lots of raw brainpower and a lack of effective judgment.
I think the idea behind Rube Goldberg devices is to have fun, not to use them regularly to actually solve problems. Only in movies does anyone have a residence or business rigged up Rube Goldberg Style.
A person who created such a design would need to be very clever, yet very foolish.
I’m confused. Are you ignoring the faction that would be clever enough to create these designs and would do so for fun; calling such people foolish for having this hobby; or assuming that they don’t exist?
People who design and build Rube Goldbergs just for fun are (if successful) necessarily clever; very, very few of them believe that the resulting machines are actually useful in any meaningful sense, I think, so there would be no grounds for considering them foolish.
When you fully explain your bright/intelligent distinction you should also include a list of synonyms and antonyms for each. It seems like you’re using “foolish” as an antonym for one and not the other, “brainy” as a synonym for one and not the other, etc.
John Searle on Strong AI.
Yes. I’ve witnessed how John Searle turns undergrad Cognitive Science majors against reductionism at UC Berkeley. Searle’s “emergence” and Chinese Room argument would be very fertile topics for a diavlog.
It would be interesting to see Searle debate anyone who didn’t defer to his high status and common-sense-sounding arguments and pressed him to the wall on what exactly would happen if you, say, simulated a human brain in high resolution. His intuition pumps are powerful (“thought is just like digestion, you don’t really believe a computer will digest food if you simulate gastric enzymes, do you?”), but he never really presents any argument on his views of consciousness or AI, at least what I’ve seen.
The Chinese Room argument seems to me so deeply misguided and silly that I doubt an interesting dialog on it is possible, any more than a fruitful discussion of religion with a well-educated theist.
I know little of his work other than the aforementioned argument, but it doesn’t really paint a flattering picture of his ability to engage in clear thinking.
Searle’s actually pretty brilliant and he’s mostly on the right side on this one. When you cast the debate as between Searle and Dennett, Dennett is obviously right. But in a broader context, Searle and Dennett are on the same side.
But I agree that there’s no reason to talk about the Chinese Room. Either you’re convinced by Dennett, or there’s no use talking further about it.
There’s no such thing as being “mostly” on the right side, no more than an argument can be “mostly” logically valid.
Either it meets the standards, or it doesn’t.
So you’re arguing, then, that there’s no point in trying to be “less wrong”? Either you’re absolutely correct or you’re “deeply misguided and silly” and can’t “engage in clear thinking”?
Your attitude doesn’t seem conducive to creating harmony amongst mostly like-minded people. Do you have many professional acquaintances?
ETA: that’s harsh—I disagreed with your comment and upvoted it, and within moments of being posted it was at −1. What’s with people around here?
Not at all. If you have many arguments, it is useful to reduce the number of them that are invalid and increase the number that are valid.
An argument itself, though, can be only valid or invalid. If some section of it is incompatible with the rules of logic, it’s in violation of those rules and cannot be valid.
Again, not at all. A valid argument isn’t necessarily true, for one thing. For another, merely not violating the rules doesn’t imply correctness—if you never construct an argument it can’t violate logic, but you’ll never reach a true conclusion that way. People often refuse to investigate theses when they don’t want to have to acknowledge an unpleasant truth that they suspect lurks at the end of a chain of reasoning. That is an error of integrity, not (directly) one of logic.
Setting harmony as an goal is destructive and misleading. Seek the truth, and to ensure that everyone applies the appropriate standards of evaluation, and harmony will arise as a natural consequence. Try to create harmony directly and you become trapped in falsity and error.
There can be no ‘harmony’ between theists and anti-theists, for example. The two positions are incompatible. Logic and the available evidence support one and not the other. This community should not seek to create harmony of that sort; by insisting on rigorous standards of reason, the community requires that theists must either abandon their position or leave their association with the group.
(Or, of course, keep their beliefs secret and imply by silence that they’re not theists. It is difficult to identify such a strategy. LW does not have inquisitors...)
Why did you assume that “he’s mostly on the right side on this one” meant that he has one “almost correct” argument, rather than meaning that most of his arguments are sound?
Because I know that most of his arguments are not sound, and I tend to assume that the people I’m speaking with are familiar with basic realities of the topic. So that interpretation is ruled out.
Why did you assume that thomblake would know (i) that Searle’s arguments are mostly not sound, but not (ii) that an argument either meets the standards of correctness, or it doesn’t? Certainly both (i) and (ii) count as basic realities for you.
Because 1) thomblake is usually pretty sharp, 2) I know he’s very interested in philosophy generally, and 3) Searle is well-known and has been taken down more often than I care to remember.
That addresses (i).
As for (ii), people almost always ignore that point, and frequently try to gloss over or deny it in arguments. It’s warm and fuzzy to “look for the good” in positions and it’s a common strategy to wear down resistance in opponents by ‘acknowledging their claims to be partly valid’ even when they aren’t.
His studies have taught thomblake well, but he is not a rationalist yet.
And yet, thomblake’s reply makes it clear that you would have been more correct to assume that thomblake would know (ii) but not (i). Interesting. ETA: Or not.
It’s like theism. It’s obviously wrong, but most people either support it or don’t realize it’s obviously wrong.
Possibly my reaction was not perfectly calibrated for thomblake, but it works pretty well generally.
Cyan,
I pretty much agree with Annoyance’s response. I’ve argued about Searle with him before, which I think is evidence for (i), and I’ve disputed the relevance of (ii).
And it is true, I’m an irrationalist.
Huh. Once again I am schooled in the typical mind fallacy.
He can probably do better than a team of Adam Frank and Jaron Lanier.
Yes, but that’s not exactly saying much…
It’s saying he thinks clearly enough for an EY bloggingheads conversation partner.
But he has lots of fans.
Admittedly, the fact that they’re fans of his strongly suggests that they’re lacking in the ability to engage in clear thinking. That probably has something to do with why they never seem to grasp the arguments demonstrating the problems with the ‘Chinese Room’.
Searle has problems grasping that systems can be analyzed in terms of their constituent parts, and that various parts can be put together to create a system—thus, his criticism that the Chinese Room can’t be said to understand because no part of the room understands it.
Aside from being an object lesson in cognitive failure, I don’t see what any discussion with him could accomplish.
IDWYC but agree that Searle’s emergence seems like a pointer to confusion and reveals a really basic failure to understand reductionism.
And since “reducing things to constituent parts” is involved with all of reasoning, it indicates a gross inability to reason.
I mean really, who only refers to the universe as a seamless whole? And who has produced anything of note by refusing to refer to distinct and separate things?
Searle would be a good example of the difference between being bright, and being intelligent. He is clever, but not smart.
You do plan to elaborate on your bright/intelligent distinction eventually, right? Until then, this is just you being unclear.
Yes, I do.
I don’t think my point is really that unclear though. Consider: Rube Goldberg-like ‘solutions’ to problems require cleverness, but are so inefficient and overly complex that only a very foolish person would think that their design and construction would be a good idea. Seriously making such a design requires lots of raw brainpower and a lack of effective judgment.
I think the idea behind Rube Goldberg devices is to have fun, not to use them regularly to actually solve problems. Only in movies does anyone have a residence or business rigged up Rube Goldberg Style.
Certainly, but someone who actually thought they’d be useful would need to be foolish.
A person who created such a design would need to be very clever, yet very foolish.
Similarly, Searle must be pretty brainy, but his arguments make so little sense that they’re absurd.
I’m confused. Are you ignoring the faction that would be clever enough to create these designs and would do so for fun; calling such people foolish for having this hobby; or assuming that they don’t exist?
I just didn’t address them.
People who design and build Rube Goldbergs just for fun are (if successful) necessarily clever; very, very few of them believe that the resulting machines are actually useful in any meaningful sense, I think, so there would be no grounds for considering them foolish.
When you fully explain your bright/intelligent distinction you should also include a list of synonyms and antonyms for each. It seems like you’re using “foolish” as an antonym for one and not the other, “brainy” as a synonym for one and not the other, etc.