There seems to be some confusion—when I say “an objective morality capable of being scientifically investigated (a la Sam Harris or others)”—I do NOT mean something like a “one true, universal, metaphysical morality for all mind-designs” like the Socratic/Platonic Form of Good or any such nonsense. I just mean something in reality that’s mind-independent—in the sense that it is hard-wired, e.g. by evolution, and thus independent/prior to any later knowledge or cognitive content—and thus can be investigated scientifically
I think you are bringing up two separate questions:
Can science tell us what we value?
This question do not rely on whether morality is universal, any more than the scientific investigation of hippos food preference rely on elephants having the same.
Can science tell us what to value? If I have not misunderstood Harris, his central claim in The Moral Landscape is that science can. Harris have been criticized for not actually showing that but rather if one presupposes that maximum “well-being” (defined) is morally good—suffering bad—then science can tell us what is moral good/bad action. But this is no different form claiming that if we define morally good the amount of paperclips there are, then science than tell us what is good/bad action.
I have many problems with his book, but I think he is fundamentally taking the perfect approach: rejecting both intrincisist religious dogmatism and subjectivist moral relativism, and putting forward a third path- an objective morality discoverable by science. You’re right though, he just presupposes “well-being” as the standard and doesn’t really try to demonstrate that scientifically. Eliezer’s Complexity of value sequence is the only place I’ve seen anyone begin to approach this properly (although I have some problems with him as well).
but I think he is fundamentally taking the perfect approach: rejecting both intrincisist religious dogmatism and subjectivist moral relativism, and putting forward a third path- an objective morality discoverable by science.
I see, but as I asked before what would satisfy as “an objective morality discoverable by science.”? What would the world look like if objective morality existed vs if it did not? You need to know what you are looking for, or at least have a crude sketch of how objective morality would work.
I think you are bringing up two separate questions:
Can science tell us what we value? This question do not rely on whether morality is universal, any more than the scientific investigation of hippos food preference rely on elephants having the same.
Can science tell us what to value? If I have not misunderstood Harris, his central claim in The Moral Landscape is that science can. Harris have been criticized for not actually showing that but rather if one presupposes that maximum “well-being” (defined) is morally good—suffering bad—then science can tell us what is moral good/bad action. But this is no different form claiming that if we define morally good the amount of paperclips there are, then science than tell us what is good/bad action.
The latter question is the relevant one.
I have many problems with his book, but I think he is fundamentally taking the perfect approach: rejecting both intrincisist religious dogmatism and subjectivist moral relativism, and putting forward a third path- an objective morality discoverable by science. You’re right though, he just presupposes “well-being” as the standard and doesn’t really try to demonstrate that scientifically. Eliezer’s Complexity of value sequence is the only place I’ve seen anyone begin to approach this properly (although I have some problems with him as well).
I see, but as I asked before what would satisfy as “an objective morality discoverable by science.”? What would the world look like if objective morality existed vs if it did not? You need to know what you are looking for, or at least have a crude sketch of how objective morality would work.