Actually, I would say that this is more about the design stance than the intentional stance. For example, the rabbit mold becomes easier to understand by going from the physical stance to the design stance, but not by going from the design stance to the intentional stance.
That being said, Dennett is pretty liberal with his definition of intentional systems, which can encompass pretty much anything that can be predicted through the intentional stance (whether it’s useful compared to the design stance or not).
But to go back to the topic of the post, even Dennett kind of agrees that systems without comprehension, or with a limited amount of comprehension, of their reasons, are less intentional that systems that understand their own reasons.
I didn’t understand (remember) Dennett’s distinctions between the design and intentional stances. I was thinking that design is a feature or part of intentional systems, e.g. a rabbit mold or the intricate structure of a (living) rabbit’s leg. They both seem to be for some purpose.
Maybe I was conflating the two because of the idea that a sufficiently complicated design might seem (or even be usefully modeled as) intentional? Like thinking of Nature as an intentional system designing rabbits (and people that then design rabbit molds).
Yes, that’s a great intuition pump of his – the ‘intentional stance’, i.e. many systems act as if they had reasons or purpose.
Actually, I would say that this is more about the design stance than the intentional stance. For example, the rabbit mold becomes easier to understand by going from the physical stance to the design stance, but not by going from the design stance to the intentional stance.
That being said, Dennett is pretty liberal with his definition of intentional systems, which can encompass pretty much anything that can be predicted through the intentional stance (whether it’s useful compared to the design stance or not).
But to go back to the topic of the post, even Dennett kind of agrees that systems without comprehension, or with a limited amount of comprehension, of their reasons, are less intentional that systems that understand their own reasons.
I didn’t understand (remember) Dennett’s distinctions between the design and intentional stances. I was thinking that design is a feature or part of intentional systems, e.g. a rabbit mold or the intricate structure of a (living) rabbit’s leg. They both seem to be for some purpose.
After skimming the Wikipedia article on the intentional stance I realized I was thinking of ‘design stance’ as you correctly pointed out.
Maybe I was conflating the two because of the idea that a sufficiently complicated design might seem (or even be usefully modeled as) intentional? Like thinking of Nature as an intentional system designing rabbits (and people that then design rabbit molds).