Granted, negative utilitarians would prefer to add a small population of beings with terrible lives over a very large beings with lives that are almost ideal, but this would not be a proper instance of the Sadistic Conclusion. See the formulation:
When I read the formulation of the Sadistic Conclusion I interpreted “people with positive utility” to mean either a person whose life contained no suffering, or a person whose satisfied preferences/happiness outweighed their suffering. So I would consider adding a small population of terrible lives instead of a large population of almost ideal lives to be the Sadistic Conclusion.
If I understand you correctly, you are saying that negative utilitarianism technically avoids the Sadistic Conclusion because it considers a life with any suffering at all to be a life of negative utility, regardless of how many positive things that life also contains. In other words, it avoid the SC because it’s criterion for what makes a life positive and negative are different than the criterion Arrenhius used when he first formulated the SC. I suppose that is true. However, NU does not avoid the (allegedly) unpleasant scenario Arrenhius wanted to avoid (adding a tortured life instead of a large amount of very positive lives).
Negative utilitarians try to minimize the total amount of preference-frustrations, or suffering....(Also note that being killed is only a problem if you have a preference to go on living, and that even then, it might not be the thing considered worst that could happen to someone.)
Right, but if someone has a preference to live forever does that mean that infinite harm has been done if they die? In which case you might as well do whatever afterwards, since infinite harm has already occurred? Should you torture everyone on Earth for decades to prevent such a person from being added? That seems weird.
The best solution I can currently think of is to compare different alternatives, rather than try to measure things in absolute terms. So if a person who would have lived to 80 dies at 75 that generates 5 years of unsatisfied preferences, not infinity, even if the person would have preferred to live forever. But that doesn’t solve the problem of adding people who wouldn’t have existed otherwise.
What I’m trying to say is, people have an awful lot of preferences, and generally only manage to satisfy a small fraction of them before they die. So how many unsatisfied preferences should adding a new person count as creating? How big a disutility is it compared to other disutilities, like thwarting existing preferences and inflicting pain on people.
A couple possibilities that occurs to me off the top of my head. One would be to find the difference in satisfaction between the new people and the old people, and then compare it to the difference in satisfaction between the old people and the counter-factual old people in the universe where the new people were never added.
Another possibility would be to set some sort of critical level based on what the maximum level of utility it is possible to give the new people given our society’s current level of resources, without inflicting greater disutilities on others than you give utility to the new people. Then weigh the difference between the new peoples actual utility and their “critical possible utility” and compare that to the dissatisfaction the existing people would suffer if the new people are not added.
Do either of these possibilities sound plausible to you, or do you have another idea?
I agree your points on the Sadistic Conclusion issue. Arrhenius acknowledges that his analysis depends on the (to him trivial) assumption that there are “positive” welfare levels. I don’t think this axiom is trivial because it interestingly implies that non-consciousness somehow becomes “tarnished” and non-optimal. Under a Buddhist view of value, this would be different.
Right, but if someone has a preference to live forever does that mean that infinite harm has been done if they die?
If all one person cared about was to live for at least 1′000 years, and all a second person cared about was to live for at least 1′000′000 years (and after their desired duration they would become completely indifferent), would the death of the first person at age 500 be less tragic than the death of the second person at age 500′000? I don’t think so, because assuming that they value partial-progress on their ultimate goal the same way, they both ended up reaching “half” of their true and only goal. I don’t think the first person would somehow care less in overall terms about achieving her goal than the second person.
To what extent would this way of comparing preferences change things?
What I’m trying to say is, people have an awful lot of preferences, and generally only manage to satisfy a small fraction of them before they die.
I think the point you make here is important. It seems like there should be a difference between beings who have only one preference and beings who have an awful lot of preferences. Imagine a chimpanzee with a few preferences and compare him to a sentient AGI, say. Would both count equally? If not, how would we determine how much their total preference (dis)satisfaction is worth? The example I gave above seems intuitive because we were talking about humans who are (as specified by the unwritten rules of thought experiments) equal in all relevant respects. With chimps vs. AI it seems different.
I’m actually not sure how I would proceed here, and this is of course a problem. Since I’d (in my preference-utilitarianism mode) only count the preferences of sentient beings and not e.g. the revealed preferences of a tree, I would maybe weight the overall value by something like “intensity of sentience”. However, I suspect that I’m inclined to do this because I have strong leanings towards hedonistic views, so it would not necessarily fit elegantly with a purely preference-based view on what matters. And that would be a problem because I don’t like ad hoc moves.
Or maybe a better way to deal with it would be the following:
Preferences ought to be somewhat specific. If people just say “infinity”, they still aren’t capable to envision what this would actually mean. So maybe a chimpanzee could only envision a certain amount of things because of some limit of brain complexity, while typical humans could envision slightly more stuff, but nothing close to infinity. In order for someone to at a given moment have the preference to live forever, that person then would in this case need an infinitely complex brain to properly envision all this implies. So you’d get an upper bound that prevents the problems you mentioned from arising.
You could argue that humans actually want to live for infinity by making use of personal identity and transitivity (e.g. “if I ask in ten years, the person will want to live for the next ten years and be able to give you detailed plans; and keep repeating that every ten years), but here I’d say we should just try to minimize preference-dissatisfaction of all consciousness-moments, not of persons. I might be talking nonsense with the word “envision”, but something along these lines seems plausible to me too.
The two possibilities you propose don’t seem plausible to me. I have a general aversion to things you’d only come up with in order to fix a specific problem and that wouldn’t seem intuitive from the beginning / from a top-down perspective. I need to think about this further.
When I read the formulation of the Sadistic Conclusion I interpreted “people with positive utility” to mean either a person whose life contained no suffering, or a person whose satisfied preferences/happiness outweighed their suffering. So I would consider adding a small population of terrible lives instead of a large population of almost ideal lives to be the Sadistic Conclusion.
If I understand you correctly, you are saying that negative utilitarianism technically avoids the Sadistic Conclusion because it considers a life with any suffering at all to be a life of negative utility, regardless of how many positive things that life also contains. In other words, it avoid the SC because it’s criterion for what makes a life positive and negative are different than the criterion Arrenhius used when he first formulated the SC. I suppose that is true. However, NU does not avoid the (allegedly) unpleasant scenario Arrenhius wanted to avoid (adding a tortured life instead of a large amount of very positive lives).
Right, but if someone has a preference to live forever does that mean that infinite harm has been done if they die? In which case you might as well do whatever afterwards, since infinite harm has already occurred? Should you torture everyone on Earth for decades to prevent such a person from being added? That seems weird.
The best solution I can currently think of is to compare different alternatives, rather than try to measure things in absolute terms. So if a person who would have lived to 80 dies at 75 that generates 5 years of unsatisfied preferences, not infinity, even if the person would have preferred to live forever. But that doesn’t solve the problem of adding people who wouldn’t have existed otherwise.
What I’m trying to say is, people have an awful lot of preferences, and generally only manage to satisfy a small fraction of them before they die. So how many unsatisfied preferences should adding a new person count as creating? How big a disutility is it compared to other disutilities, like thwarting existing preferences and inflicting pain on people.
A couple possibilities that occurs to me off the top of my head. One would be to find the difference in satisfaction between the new people and the old people, and then compare it to the difference in satisfaction between the old people and the counter-factual old people in the universe where the new people were never added.
Another possibility would be to set some sort of critical level based on what the maximum level of utility it is possible to give the new people given our society’s current level of resources, without inflicting greater disutilities on others than you give utility to the new people. Then weigh the difference between the new peoples actual utility and their “critical possible utility” and compare that to the dissatisfaction the existing people would suffer if the new people are not added.
Do either of these possibilities sound plausible to you, or do you have another idea?
I agree your points on the Sadistic Conclusion issue. Arrhenius acknowledges that his analysis depends on the (to him trivial) assumption that there are “positive” welfare levels. I don’t think this axiom is trivial because it interestingly implies that non-consciousness somehow becomes “tarnished” and non-optimal. Under a Buddhist view of value, this would be different.
If all one person cared about was to live for at least 1′000 years, and all a second person cared about was to live for at least 1′000′000 years (and after their desired duration they would become completely indifferent), would the death of the first person at age 500 be less tragic than the death of the second person at age 500′000? I don’t think so, because assuming that they value partial-progress on their ultimate goal the same way, they both ended up reaching “half” of their true and only goal. I don’t think the first person would somehow care less in overall terms about achieving her goal than the second person.
To what extent would this way of comparing preferences change things?
I think the point you make here is important. It seems like there should be a difference between beings who have only one preference and beings who have an awful lot of preferences. Imagine a chimpanzee with a few preferences and compare him to a sentient AGI, say. Would both count equally? If not, how would we determine how much their total preference (dis)satisfaction is worth? The example I gave above seems intuitive because we were talking about humans who are (as specified by the unwritten rules of thought experiments) equal in all relevant respects. With chimps vs. AI it seems different.
I’m actually not sure how I would proceed here, and this is of course a problem. Since I’d (in my preference-utilitarianism mode) only count the preferences of sentient beings and not e.g. the revealed preferences of a tree, I would maybe weight the overall value by something like “intensity of sentience”. However, I suspect that I’m inclined to do this because I have strong leanings towards hedonistic views, so it would not necessarily fit elegantly with a purely preference-based view on what matters. And that would be a problem because I don’t like ad hoc moves.
Or maybe a better way to deal with it would be the following: Preferences ought to be somewhat specific. If people just say “infinity”, they still aren’t capable to envision what this would actually mean. So maybe a chimpanzee could only envision a certain amount of things because of some limit of brain complexity, while typical humans could envision slightly more stuff, but nothing close to infinity. In order for someone to at a given moment have the preference to live forever, that person then would in this case need an infinitely complex brain to properly envision all this implies. So you’d get an upper bound that prevents the problems you mentioned from arising.
You could argue that humans actually want to live for infinity by making use of personal identity and transitivity (e.g. “if I ask in ten years, the person will want to live for the next ten years and be able to give you detailed plans; and keep repeating that every ten years), but here I’d say we should just try to minimize preference-dissatisfaction of all consciousness-moments, not of persons. I might be talking nonsense with the word “envision”, but something along these lines seems plausible to me too.
The two possibilities you propose don’t seem plausible to me. I have a general aversion to things you’d only come up with in order to fix a specific problem and that wouldn’t seem intuitive from the beginning / from a top-down perspective. I need to think about this further.