Libertarians can say that free agency is the execution of an algorithm, too. It’s just that it would be an indeterministic algorithm.
Libertarian algorithmic explanation have to be quite different from compatibilist one. At least, it needs to account for the source of connection between possible futures in your mind and ‘real’ possible futures, the nature of this ‘realness’, has its own different way to reduce ‘couldness’ and ‘possibility’ to being, has a model of what happens to all the alternative future branches, how previously undeterminable events become determinated by actually happening in the present and how combination of determinable and indeterminable events produce free will. If you think these are answered questions, please make a separate post about it.
(Incidentally, no one has put forward any reason that any algorithm should feel like anything).
Not really relevant, but here is a reason for you. Feeling X is having a representation of X in your model of self. Some things are encoded to have representation in it and some are not, depending on whether this information is deemed important for central planning agent by evolution. Global desicion making is extremely important and maybe even the reason why central planning agent exists in the first place, so the steps of this algorithm are encoded in the model of the self.
No. An indeterministic coin-flip has two really possible outcomes.
Call them real as much as you want, it’s still either head or tails, when you actually flipped the coin, not both.
ie., it doesn’t.
Sigh. We’ve had multiple opportunities to discuss these issues before and sadly you haven’t manage to explain anything about libertarianism to my satisfaction and kept talking pass me. Not sure whether it’s more of your fault or mine but In any case I’d like to discuss these questions with someone who I have more hope of understanding my position and explaining theirs. So this is my last reply to you in this thread. I repeat my request to write your own post on the matter if you think you have something to say. Frankly, I find the fact that you write replies in a thread addressed to compatibilists, a bit gauche.
Libertarian algorithmic explanation have to be quite different from compatibilist one
Of course: they have to explain more.
At least, it needs to account for the source of connection between possible futures in your mind and ‘real’ possible futures,
Of course, but that’s just a special case of accurate map-making, not some completely unique problem.
the nature of this ‘realness’
Determinism is a special case of indeterminism. Indeterminism is tautologically equivalent to real possibilities. Since determinism is a special case, it is more in need of defense than the special case.
I explained that in my PM of 1st July 2022, which you never replied to.
I previously said that determinism is just a special case of indeterminism where some of the transitions have probabilities less than 1.0. Likewise,a causal diagram is a special case of a probabilistic state transition diagram.
.
If a causal diagram is a full explanation of determinism, a probabilistic state transition diagram is a full explanation of indeterminism.
What, in general is the problem? If you know what a word means , it is usually easy figure out what the opposite means. “Poor” means not-rich … so if you know what “rich” means without additional information or additional concepts. Why would “indeterminism” be an exception to rule?development/1592730043_ch44lev1sec4.html
If a causal diagram is a full explanation of determinism, a probabilistic state transition diagram is a full explanation of indeterminism.
What, in general is the problem? If you know what a word means , it is usually easy figure out what the opposite means. “Poor” means not-rich … so if you know what “rich” means without additional information or additional concepts. Why would “indeterminism” be an exception to rule?
how previously undeterminable events become determinated by actually happening in the present and how combination of determinable and indeterminable events produce free will. If you think these are answered questions, please make a separate post about it.
No libertarian makes the claim that undeterminable events become determined. Undetermined future events eventually happen..which does not make them causally determinist in retrospect. (Once they have happened, we can determine their values, but that is a different sense of “determine”).
I have already explained that in my July 1st reply, quoting previous explanations I had already given.
It just seems that it’s the way the universe is. And while not a really satisfying answer it at least makes sense. If the universe allows causality—no surprise that we have causality. Compare to this: universe doesn’t allow some things to be determinable but we still somehow are able to determine them. - This seems as an obvious contradiction to me and is the reason I can’t grasp an understanding of indeterminism on a gut level
It’s not a contradiction because the two “determines” mean different things.
That’s conflating two meanings of “determined”. There’s an epistemic meaning by which you “determine” that something has happened, you gain positive or “determinate”.knowledge of it. And there’s causal determinism, the idea that a situation can only turn out out or evolve in one particular way. They are related , but not in such a way that you can infer causal determinism from epistemic determinism. You can have determinate knowledge of an indeterminate coin flip.
Feeling X is having a representation of X in your model of self
No one has put forward.a reason why having a representation of X should feel like anything.
Call them real as much as you want, it’s still either head or tails, when you actually flipped the coin, not both.
You are saying what...? That there cannot have been two possibilities, because there is only one actuality? But that there can be is the whole point of the word “possibility”, even for in-the-mind possibilities.
We’ve had multiple opportunities to discuss these issues before and sadly you haven’t manage to explain anything about libertarianism to my satisfaction
You ignored my long message of July 1st. It’s not that I am not trying to communicate.
Libertarian algorithmic explanation have to be quite different from compatibilist one. At least, it needs to account for the source of connection between possible futures in your mind and ‘real’ possible futures, the nature of this ‘realness’, has its own different way to reduce ‘couldness’ and ‘possibility’ to being, has a model of what happens to all the alternative future branches, how previously undeterminable events become determinated by actually happening in the present and how combination of determinable and indeterminable events produce free will. If you think these are answered questions, please make a separate post about it.
Not really relevant, but here is a reason for you. Feeling X is having a representation of X in your model of self. Some things are encoded to have representation in it and some are not, depending on whether this information is deemed important for central planning agent by evolution. Global desicion making is extremely important and maybe even the reason why central planning agent exists in the first place, so the steps of this algorithm are encoded in the model of the self.
Call them real as much as you want, it’s still either head or tails, when you actually flipped the coin, not both.
Sigh. We’ve had multiple opportunities to discuss these issues before and sadly you haven’t manage to explain anything about libertarianism to my satisfaction and kept talking pass me. Not sure whether it’s more of your fault or mine but In any case I’d like to discuss these questions with someone who I have more hope of understanding my position and explaining theirs. So this is my last reply to you in this thread. I repeat my request to write your own post on the matter if you think you have something to say. Frankly, I find the fact that you write replies in a thread addressed to compatibilists, a bit gauche.
Of course: they have to explain more.
Of course, but that’s just a special case of accurate map-making, not some completely unique problem.
Determinism is a special case of indeterminism. Indeterminism is tautologically equivalent to real possibilities. Since determinism is a special case, it is more in need of defense than the special case.
I explained that in my PM of 1st July 2022, which you never replied to.
No libertarian makes the claim that undeterminable events become determined. Undetermined future events eventually happen..which does not make them causally determinist in retrospect. (Once they have happened, we can determine their values, but that is a different sense of “determine”).
I have already explained that in my July 1st reply, quoting previous explanations I had already given.
No one has put forward.a reason why having a representation of X should feel like anything.
You are saying what...? That there cannot have been two possibilities, because there is only one actuality? But that there can be is the whole point of the word “possibility”, even for in-the-mind possibilities.
You ignored my long message of July 1st. It’s not that I am not trying to communicate.