If functioning lie detectors were to be invented, incentive structures as we know them would be completely replaced with new ones that are far more effective. E.g. you can just force all your subordinates to wear an EEG or go into an fMRI machine, and ask all of them who the smartest/most competent person in the office is, promote the people who are actually top performers, and fire any cliques/factions of people who you detect as coordinating around a common lie. Most middle managers with access to functioning lie detection technology would think of those things, and many other strategies that have not yet occurred to me, over the course of the thousands of hours they spend as middle managers with access to functioning lie detection technology.
Maybe, but as far as I can tell (at least, hearing from secondhand from people in the military and with security clearances)… This is not how they are used? Instead the questions are extremely specific, stuff akin to “Are you an agent of foreign intelligence services?”
My model definitely points towards a large proportion of polygraph machines just being empty boxes, since it’s about monopolizing advanced technology, not just monopolizing competent VIPs (as a side note, I think that “hypercompetent” was a poor choice of words on my part, since the crux of the post is that it’s difficult to evaluate the competence of opaque systems). Some lie detection machines will be running better and more modern tech than others, but it still makes sense to ask everyone a question that (ideally) only agents of foreign intelligence services would give off weird readings in response to.
A big reason why my competent inner regime model runs into falsifiability problems is because the competent trustworthy VIPs and the monopolized technology (e.g. functioning lie detectors) would be deployed conservatively, because stretching networks thin means more surface area, which means more risk of being compromised by foreign intelligence agencies.
Maybe, but as far as I can tell (at least, hearing from secondhand from people in the military and with security clearances)… This is not how they are used? Instead the questions are extremely specific, stuff akin to “Are you an agent of foreign intelligence services?”
My model definitely points towards a large proportion of polygraph machines just being empty boxes, since it’s about monopolizing advanced technology, not just monopolizing competent VIPs (as a side note, I think that “hypercompetent” was a poor choice of words on my part, since the crux of the post is that it’s difficult to evaluate the competence of opaque systems). Some lie detection machines will be running better and more modern tech than others, but it still makes sense to ask everyone a question that (ideally) only agents of foreign intelligence services would give off weird readings in response to.
A big reason why my competent inner regime model runs into falsifiability problems is because the competent trustworthy VIPs and the monopolized technology (e.g. functioning lie detectors) would be deployed conservatively, because stretching networks thin means more surface area, which means more risk of being compromised by foreign intelligence agencies.