“Know” is an ordinary word of English that every English speaker knows (at least until they start philosophizing about it, but you can cultivate mystery about anything by staring hard enough that it disappears). I am using the word in this ordinary, everyday sense. I do not know what sort of answer you are looking for.
We have non-ordinary theories about many things that ordinary words are about, like light. What I want is for you to consider implications of some proper theory of knowledge for your claim about knowing for a fact that you are conscious. Not “theory of knowledge” as some complicated philosophical construction—just non-controversial facts, like that you have to interact with something to know about it.
I have no theory to present. Theorising comes after. I know my own consciousness the way I know the sun, the way everyone has known the sun since before we knew how it shone: by our senses of sight and warmth for the sun, by our inner senses for consciousness.
You are asking me for a solution to the Hard Problem of consciousness. No-one has one, yet. That is what makes it Hard.
No, I’m asking you to constrain the space of solutions using the theory we have. For example, if you know your consciousness as sun’s warmth, then now we know you can in principle be wrong about being conscious—because you can think that you are feeling warmth, when actually your thoughts about it were generated by electrodes in your brain. Agree?
I can be mistaken about the cause of a sensation of warmth, but not about the fact of having such a sensation. In the case of consciousness, to speculate about some part not being what it seems is still to be conscious in making that speculation. There is no way to catch one’s own tail here.
I can be mistaken about the cause of a sensation of warmth, but not about the fact of having such a sensation.
That’s incorrect, unless you make it an axiom. You do at least agree that you can be mistaken about having a sensation in the past? But that implies that sensation must actually modify your memory for you to be right about it. You also obviously can be mistaken about which sensation you are having—you can initially think that you are seeing 0x0000ff, but after a second conclude that no, it’s actually 0x0000fe. And I’m not talking about external cause of you sensations, I’m talking about you inspecting sensations themselves.
In the case of consciousness, to speculate about some part not being what it seems is still to be conscious in making that speculation. There is no way to catch one’s own tail here.
You can speculate unconsciously. Like, if we isolate some part of you brain that makes you think “I can’t be wrong about being conscious, therefore I’m conscious”, put you in a coma and run just that thought, would you say you are not mistaken in that moment, even though you are in a coma?
They are supposed to test consistency of beliefs. I mean, if you think some part of the experiment is impossible, like separating your thoughts from your experiences, say so. I just want to know what your beliefs are.
And the part about memory or colors is not a thought experiment but just an observation about reality? You do agree about that part, that whatever sensation you name, you can be wrong about having it, right?
You do agree about that part, that whatever sensation you name, you can be wrong about having it, right?
Can you give me a concrete example of this? I can be wrong about what is happening to produce some sensation, but what in concrete terms would be an example of being wrong about having the sensation itself? No speculations about magic electrodes in the brain please.
I can be wrong about what is happening to produce some sensation
And about having it in the past, and about which sensation you are having. To calibrate you about how unsurprising it should be.
Well, it’s hard to give impressive examples in normal conditions—it’s like asking to demonstrate nuclear reaction with two sticks—brain tries to not be wrong about stuff. Non-impressive examples include lying to yourself—deliberately thinking “I’m feeling warmth” and so on, when you know, that you don’t. Or answering “Yes” to “Are you feeling warm?” when you are distracted and then realizing, that no, you weren’t really tracking your feelings at that moment. But something persistent that survives you actually querying relevant parts of the brain, and without externally spoofing this connection… Something like reading, that you are supposed to feel warmth, when looking at kittens, believing it, but not actually feeling it?
I guess I’ll go look what people did with actual electrodes, if “you can misidentify sensation, you can be wrong about it being present in any point in time, but you can’t be wrong about having it now” still seems likely to you.
Sure, I’m not saying you are usually wrong about your sensations, but it still means there are physical conditions on your thoughts being right—when you are right about your sensation, you are right because that sensation influenced your thoughts. Otherwise being wrong about past sensation doesn’t work. And if there are conditions, then they can be violated.
“Know” is an ordinary word of English that every English speaker knows (at least until they start philosophizing about it, but you can cultivate mystery about anything by staring hard enough that it disappears). I am using the word in this ordinary, everyday sense. I do not know what sort of answer you are looking for.
We have non-ordinary theories about many things that ordinary words are about, like light. What I want is for you to consider implications of some proper theory of knowledge for your claim about knowing for a fact that you are conscious. Not “theory of knowledge” as some complicated philosophical construction—just non-controversial facts, like that you have to interact with something to know about it.
I have no theory to present. Theorising comes after. I know my own consciousness the way I know the sun, the way everyone has known the sun since before we knew how it shone: by our senses of sight and warmth for the sun, by our inner senses for consciousness.
You are asking me for a solution to the Hard Problem of consciousness. No-one has one, yet. That is what makes it Hard.
No, I’m asking you to constrain the space of solutions using the theory we have. For example, if you know your consciousness as sun’s warmth, then now we know you can in principle be wrong about being conscious—because you can think that you are feeling warmth, when actually your thoughts about it were generated by electrodes in your brain. Agree?
I can be mistaken about the cause of a sensation of warmth, but not about the fact of having such a sensation. In the case of consciousness, to speculate about some part not being what it seems is still to be conscious in making that speculation. There is no way to catch one’s own tail here.
That’s incorrect, unless you make it an axiom. You do at least agree that you can be mistaken about having a sensation in the past? But that implies that sensation must actually modify your memory for you to be right about it. You also obviously can be mistaken about which sensation you are having—you can initially think that you are seeing 0x0000ff, but after a second conclude that no, it’s actually 0x0000fe. And I’m not talking about external cause of you sensations, I’m talking about you inspecting sensations themselves.
You can speculate unconsciously. Like, if we isolate some part of you brain that makes you think “I can’t be wrong about being conscious, therefore I’m conscious”, put you in a coma and run just that thought, would you say you are not mistaken in that moment, even though you are in a coma?
Such thought experiments are just a game of But What If, where the proposer’s beliefs are baked into the presuppositions. I don’t find them useful.
They are supposed to test consistency of beliefs. I mean, if you think some part of the experiment is impossible, like separating your thoughts from your experiences, say so. I just want to know what your beliefs are.
And the part about memory or colors is not a thought experiment but just an observation about reality? You do agree about that part, that whatever sensation you name, you can be wrong about having it, right?
Can you give me a concrete example of this? I can be wrong about what is happening to produce some sensation, but what in concrete terms would be an example of being wrong about having the sensation itself? No speculations about magic electrodes in the brain please.
And about having it in the past, and about which sensation you are having. To calibrate you about how unsurprising it should be.
Well, it’s hard to give impressive examples in normal conditions—it’s like asking to demonstrate nuclear reaction with two sticks—brain tries to not be wrong about stuff. Non-impressive examples include lying to yourself—deliberately thinking “I’m feeling warmth” and so on, when you know, that you don’t. Or answering “Yes” to “Are you feeling warm?” when you are distracted and then realizing, that no, you weren’t really tracking your feelings at that moment. But something persistent that survives you actually querying relevant parts of the brain, and without externally spoofing this connection… Something like reading, that you are supposed to feel warmth, when looking at kittens, believing it, but not actually feeling it?
I guess I’ll go look what people did with actual electrodes, if “you can misidentify sensation, you can be wrong about it being present in any point in time, but you can’t be wrong about having it now” still seems likely to you.
This does not describe any experience of mine.
I don’t think that will help.
Sure, I’m not saying you are usually wrong about your sensations, but it still means there are physical conditions on your thoughts being right—when you are right about your sensation, you are right because that sensation influenced your thoughts. Otherwise being wrong about past sensation doesn’t work. And if there are conditions, then they can be violated.