They are supposed to test consistency of beliefs. I mean, if you think some part of the experiment is impossible, like separating your thoughts from your experiences, say so. I just want to know what your beliefs are.
And the part about memory or colors is not a thought experiment but just an observation about reality? You do agree about that part, that whatever sensation you name, you can be wrong about having it, right?
You do agree about that part, that whatever sensation you name, you can be wrong about having it, right?
Can you give me a concrete example of this? I can be wrong about what is happening to produce some sensation, but what in concrete terms would be an example of being wrong about having the sensation itself? No speculations about magic electrodes in the brain please.
I can be wrong about what is happening to produce some sensation
And about having it in the past, and about which sensation you are having. To calibrate you about how unsurprising it should be.
Well, it’s hard to give impressive examples in normal conditions—it’s like asking to demonstrate nuclear reaction with two sticks—brain tries to not be wrong about stuff. Non-impressive examples include lying to yourself—deliberately thinking “I’m feeling warmth” and so on, when you know, that you don’t. Or answering “Yes” to “Are you feeling warm?” when you are distracted and then realizing, that no, you weren’t really tracking your feelings at that moment. But something persistent that survives you actually querying relevant parts of the brain, and without externally spoofing this connection… Something like reading, that you are supposed to feel warmth, when looking at kittens, believing it, but not actually feeling it?
I guess I’ll go look what people did with actual electrodes, if “you can misidentify sensation, you can be wrong about it being present in any point in time, but you can’t be wrong about having it now” still seems likely to you.
Sure, I’m not saying you are usually wrong about your sensations, but it still means there are physical conditions on your thoughts being right—when you are right about your sensation, you are right because that sensation influenced your thoughts. Otherwise being wrong about past sensation doesn’t work. And if there are conditions, then they can be violated.
Such thought experiments are just a game of But What If, where the proposer’s beliefs are baked into the presuppositions. I don’t find them useful.
They are supposed to test consistency of beliefs. I mean, if you think some part of the experiment is impossible, like separating your thoughts from your experiences, say so. I just want to know what your beliefs are.
And the part about memory or colors is not a thought experiment but just an observation about reality? You do agree about that part, that whatever sensation you name, you can be wrong about having it, right?
Can you give me a concrete example of this? I can be wrong about what is happening to produce some sensation, but what in concrete terms would be an example of being wrong about having the sensation itself? No speculations about magic electrodes in the brain please.
And about having it in the past, and about which sensation you are having. To calibrate you about how unsurprising it should be.
Well, it’s hard to give impressive examples in normal conditions—it’s like asking to demonstrate nuclear reaction with two sticks—brain tries to not be wrong about stuff. Non-impressive examples include lying to yourself—deliberately thinking “I’m feeling warmth” and so on, when you know, that you don’t. Or answering “Yes” to “Are you feeling warm?” when you are distracted and then realizing, that no, you weren’t really tracking your feelings at that moment. But something persistent that survives you actually querying relevant parts of the brain, and without externally spoofing this connection… Something like reading, that you are supposed to feel warmth, when looking at kittens, believing it, but not actually feeling it?
I guess I’ll go look what people did with actual electrodes, if “you can misidentify sensation, you can be wrong about it being present in any point in time, but you can’t be wrong about having it now” still seems likely to you.
This does not describe any experience of mine.
I don’t think that will help.
Sure, I’m not saying you are usually wrong about your sensations, but it still means there are physical conditions on your thoughts being right—when you are right about your sensation, you are right because that sensation influenced your thoughts. Otherwise being wrong about past sensation doesn’t work. And if there are conditions, then they can be violated.