Assuming “should” is meant in a moral sense, we can say that “We should paint all the buildings in town blue!” is in fact a claim in need of evidence. Specifically, it says (to 2 decimal places) that we would all be better off / happier / flourish more if the buildings are painted blue. This is certainly true if it turns out the majority of the town really likes blue, so that they would be happier, but it does not entirely follow from Bob’s claim that he likes blue—if the rest of the town really hated blue, then it would be reasonable to say that their discomfort outweighed his happiness. In this case he would be factually incorrect to say “We should paint all the buildings in town blue!”.
In contrast, you can treat “We should make sure women remain barefoot and pregnant” as a claim in need of evidence, and in this case we can establish it as false. Most obviously because the proposed situation would not be very good for women, and we shouldn’t do something that harms half the human race unnecessarily.
Not at all and I don’t see why would you assume a specific morality.
Bob says “We should paint all the buildings in town blue!” to mean that it would make him happier and he doesn’t care at all about what other people around think about the idea.
Bob is not a utilitarian :-)
you can treat “We should make sure women remain barefoot and pregnant” as a claim in need of evidence
Exactly the same thing—Charlie is not a utilitarian either. He thinks he will be better off in the world where women are barefoot and pregnant.
But he says “We should” not “I want” because there is the implication that I should also paint the buildings blue. But if the only reason I should do so is because he wants me to, it raises the question of why I should do what he wants. And if he answers “You should do what I want because it’s what I want”, it’s a tautology.
Putin has a way of adding his wants to my wants, through fear, bribes, or other incentives. But then the direct cause of my actions would be the fear/bribe/etc, not the simple fact that he wants it.
Presumably, Bob doesn’t have a way of making me care about what he wants (beyond the extent to which I care about what a generic stranger wants). If he were to pay me, that would be different, but he can’t make me care simply because that’s his preference. When he says “We should paint the buildings blue” he’s saying “I want the buildings painted blue” and “You want the buildings painted blue”, but if I don’t want the buildings painted blue, he’s wrong.
Presumably, Bob doesn’t have a way of making me care about what he wants
Why not? Much of interactions in a human society are precisely ways of making others care what someone wants.
In any case, the original issue was whether Bob’s preference for blue could be described as “correct” or “wrong”. How exactly does Bob manage to get what he wants is neither here nor there.
he’s saying … “You want the buildings painted blue”
The original statement was “I like the color blue! We should paint all the buildings in town blue!” His preference for blue can neither be right nor wrong, but the second sentence is something that can be ’correct” or “wrong”.
I wonder if that someone will make the logical step to insisting that moral egoists should be reeducated to make them change to a “valid” moral position :-/
In contrast, you can treat “We should make sure women remain barefoot and pregnant” as a claim in need of evidence, and in this case we can establish it as false. Most obviously because the proposed situation would not be very good for women
That’s just looking at one of the direct consequences, accepting for the sake of argument that most women would prefer not to be “barefoot and pregnant”. The problem is that, for these kinds of major social changes, the direct effects tend to be dominated by indirect effects and your argument makes no attempt to analyze the indirect effects.
Technically you are correct, so you can read my above argument as figuratively “accurate to one decimal place”. The important thing is that there’s nothing mysterious going on here in a linguistic or metaethical sense.
I partly agree, but a tradition that developed under certain conditions isn’t necessarily optimal under different conditions (e.g. much better technology and medicine, less need for manual labour, fewer stupid people (at least for now), etc.).
Otherwise, we’d be even better off just executing our evolved adaptations, which had even more time to develop.
accepting for the sake of argument that most women would prefer not to be “barefoot and pregnant”.
Depends on the context :-D In China a few centuries ago a woman quite reasonably might prefer to be barefoot (as opposed to have her feet tightly bound to disfigure them) and pregnant (as opposed to barren which made her socially worthless).
Assuming “should” is meant in a moral sense, we can say that “We should paint all the buildings in town blue!” is in fact a claim in need of evidence. Specifically, it says (to 2 decimal places) that we would all be better off / happier / flourish more if the buildings are painted blue. This is certainly true if it turns out the majority of the town really likes blue, so that they would be happier, but it does not entirely follow from Bob’s claim that he likes blue—if the rest of the town really hated blue, then it would be reasonable to say that their discomfort outweighed his happiness. In this case he would be factually incorrect to say “We should paint all the buildings in town blue!”.
In contrast, you can treat “We should make sure women remain barefoot and pregnant” as a claim in need of evidence, and in this case we can establish it as false. Most obviously because the proposed situation would not be very good for women, and we shouldn’t do something that harms half the human race unnecessarily.
Not at all and I don’t see why would you assume a specific morality.
Bob says “We should paint all the buildings in town blue!” to mean that it would make him happier and he doesn’t care at all about what other people around think about the idea.
Bob is not a utilitarian :-)
Exactly the same thing—Charlie is not a utilitarian either. He thinks he will be better off in the world where women are barefoot and pregnant.
But he says “We should” not “I want” because there is the implication that I should also paint the buildings blue. But if the only reason I should do so is because he wants me to, it raises the question of why I should do what he wants. And if he answers “You should do what I want because it’s what I want”, it’s a tautology.
Imagine Vladimir Putin visiting a Russian village and declaring “We should paint all the buildings blue!”
Suddenly “You should do what I want because it’s what I want” is not a tautology any more but an excellent reason to get out your paint brush :-/
Putin has a way of adding his wants to my wants, through fear, bribes, or other incentives. But then the direct cause of my actions would be the fear/bribe/etc, not the simple fact that he wants it.
And what difference does that make?
Presumably, Bob doesn’t have a way of making me care about what he wants (beyond the extent to which I care about what a generic stranger wants). If he were to pay me, that would be different, but he can’t make me care simply because that’s his preference. When he says “We should paint the buildings blue” he’s saying “I want the buildings painted blue” and “You want the buildings painted blue”, but if I don’t want the buildings painted blue, he’s wrong.
Why not? Much of interactions in a human society are precisely ways of making others care what someone wants.
In any case, the original issue was whether Bob’s preference for blue could be described as “correct” or “wrong”. How exactly does Bob manage to get what he wants is neither here nor there.
No, he is not saying that.
The original statement was “I like the color blue! We should paint all the buildings in town blue!” His preference for blue can neither be right nor wrong, but the second sentence is something that can be ’correct” or “wrong”.
Without specifying a particular value system, no, it can not.
Full circle back to the original.
There already is an existing value system—what Bob and I already value.
I think we’re pretty close to someone declaring that egoism isn’t a valid moral position, again.
I wonder if that someone will make the logical step to insisting that moral egoists should be reeducated to make them change to a “valid” moral position :-/
That’s just looking at one of the direct consequences, accepting for the sake of argument that most women would prefer not to be “barefoot and pregnant”. The problem is that, for these kinds of major social changes, the direct effects tend to be dominated by indirect effects and your argument makes no attempt to analyze the indirect effects.
Technically you are correct, so you can read my above argument as figuratively “accurate to one decimal place”. The important thing is that there’s nothing mysterious going on here in a linguistic or metaethical sense.
But in a practical sense these things can’t be computed from first principals, so it is necessary to rely on tradition at least to some extent.
I partly agree, but a tradition that developed under certain conditions isn’t necessarily optimal under different conditions (e.g. much better technology and medicine, less need for manual labour, fewer stupid people (at least for now), etc.).
Otherwise, we’d be even better off just executing our evolved adaptations, which had even more time to develop.
Revealed preferences of women buying shoes and contraception?
Depends on the context :-D In China a few centuries ago a woman quite reasonably might prefer to be barefoot (as opposed to have her feet tightly bound to disfigure them) and pregnant (as opposed to barren which made her socially worthless).