It could be anything because KL divergence basically does not restrict the expected value of anything heavy-tailed. You could get finite utility and ∞ error, or the reverse, or infinity of both, or neither converging, or even infinite utility and negative infinity error—any of these with arbitrarily low KL divergence.
To draw any conclusions, you need to assume some joint distribution between the error and utility, and use some model of selection that is not optimal policies under a KL divergence penalty or limit. If they are independent and you think of optimization as conditioning on a minimum utility threshold, we proved last year that you get 0 of whichever has lighter tails and ∞ of whichever has heavier tails, unless the tails are very similar. I think the same should hold if you model optimization as best-of-n selection. But the independence assumption is required and pretty unrealistic, and you can’t weaken it in any obvious way.
Realistically I expect that error will be heavy-tailed and heavier-tailed than utility by default so error goes to infinity. But error will not be independent of utility, so the expected utility depends mostly on how good extremely high error outcomes are. The prospect of AIs creating some random outcome that we overestimated the utility of by 10 trillion points does not seem especially good, so I think we should not be training AIs to maximize this kind of static heavy-tailed reward function.
My expectation is that error and utility are both extremely heavy tailed, and arguably in the same order of magnitude for heavy tails.
But thanks for answering, the real answer is we can predict effectively nothing without independence, and thus we can justify virtually every outcome of real-life Goodhart.
Maybe it’s catastrophic, maybe it doesn’t matter, or maybe there’s anti-goodhart, but I don’t see a way to predict what will reasonably happen.
Also, why do you think that error is heavier tailed than utility?
Also, why do you think that error is heavier tailed than utility?
Goodhart’s Law is really common in the real world, and most things only work because we can observe our metrics, see when they stop correlating with what we care about, and iteratively improve them. Also the prevalence of reward hacking in RL often getting very high values.
If the reward model is as smart as the policy and is continually updated with data, maybe we’re in a different regime where errors are smaller than utility.
It could be anything because KL divergence basically does not restrict the expected value of anything heavy-tailed. You could get finite utility and ∞ error, or the reverse, or infinity of both, or neither converging, or even infinite utility and negative infinity error—any of these with arbitrarily low KL divergence.
To draw any conclusions, you need to assume some joint distribution between the error and utility, and use some model of selection that is not optimal policies under a KL divergence penalty or limit. If they are independent and you think of optimization as conditioning on a minimum utility threshold, we proved last year that you get 0 of whichever has lighter tails and ∞ of whichever has heavier tails, unless the tails are very similar. I think the same should hold if you model optimization as best-of-n selection. But the independence assumption is required and pretty unrealistic, and you can’t weaken it in any obvious way.
Realistically I expect that error will be heavy-tailed and heavier-tailed than utility by default so error goes to infinity. But error will not be independent of utility, so the expected utility depends mostly on how good extremely high error outcomes are. The prospect of AIs creating some random outcome that we overestimated the utility of by 10 trillion points does not seem especially good, so I think we should not be training AIs to maximize this kind of static heavy-tailed reward function.
My expectation is that error and utility are both extremely heavy tailed, and arguably in the same order of magnitude for heavy tails.
But thanks for answering, the real answer is we can predict effectively nothing without independence, and thus we can justify virtually every outcome of real-life Goodhart.
Maybe it’s catastrophic, maybe it doesn’t matter, or maybe there’s anti-goodhart, but I don’t see a way to predict what will reasonably happen.
Also, why do you think that error is heavier tailed than utility?
Goodhart’s Law is really common in the real world, and most things only work because we can observe our metrics, see when they stop correlating with what we care about, and iteratively improve them. Also the prevalence of reward hacking in RL often getting very high values.
If the reward model is as smart as the policy and is continually updated with data, maybe we’re in a different regime where errors are smaller than utility.