I read these tricks for avoiding procrastination and I find myself terrified at the idea of trying them at a gut level, because what if they work? What if I actually find myself playing fewer videogames and surfing the internet less? That doesn’t actually sound better, now that I have to seriously consider the possibility of changing this state of affairs.
Based on this revelation, I have to say I am coming around to the point of view that a lot of what we call “akrasia” is just us not wanting to admit, to others or to ourselves, what our actual desires are, so we make up more socially acceptable desires and then when we pursue our actual desires instead we blame akrasia.
Another type of “fear of anti-akrasia techniques” that sometimes occurs, is fear/mistrust of what one’s own conscious decision-making process might goof up, if that decision-making process is abruptly given increased power. (This differs from Nominull’s description, because in this scenario you don’t specifically fear surfing the internet less, or any other specific foreseen change; you fear the effects of suddenly removing a system of internal checks and balances, and handing your internal reins over to a new and untested cognitive subsystem.)
Even if your consciously claimed preferences are your “real” preferences (which is not at all obvious, given that claimed preferences may be chosen for the purpose of affecting your self-image or your external social image, rather than for the purpose of choosing between future outcomes)...
… even in this case, there’s the additional problem that your consciously claimed “beliefs” may not be your actual anticipations, and, even if they are your actual anticipations, may be a worse model of the world than is the model implicit in our cultural action-patterns. A person who “believes” her actions will determine whether she spends eternity in heaven or hell, but who has ordinary levels of akrasia and mostly just does what the people around her are doing, is less harmed by her beliefs than she would be if she could actually act take the actions that her stated beliefs and preferences imply. Ditto for a person who believes a strange and unhealthy diet would be beneficial (but can’t seem to fully stick to the new diet), or who believes overconfidently that a particular particular peak oil scenario is “99% likely” (but takes some of his actions in a more ordinary manner anyhow).
If people were easily able to act on their consciously claimed beliefs and preferences, present levels of irrational beliefs might lead to considerably more disruption than they do. Conversely, if people had more reason to trust their “beliefs” and “preferences”, I wouldn’t be at all surprised if akrasia decreased.
This connection is one reason that learning to actually form reasonable beliefs (epistemic rationality), and learning to act in a manner that actually makes sense given one’s beliefs and preferences (overcoming “akrasia”), strike me as linked aspects of a single art.
Even in people whose conscious world models are basically sane (by our exacting LW standards), when they’re considering doing or planning for some weird, uncomfortable, and out-of-the-ordinary action seemingly justified by weighing costs and benefits, it seems to me that akrasia can sometimes be a rational stand-in for some considerations they don’t keep conscious track of, including but not limited to: reputation costs, willpower loss / ego depletion, other limits to worry, the inference that if one weird thing seems especially important now others are going to seem especially important in the future, the possibility that one might waste resources by not following through on a weird plan, the desirability of keeping one’s mind “cleaner” by keeping fewer chunks in one’s planning space, benefits of long-term happiness and of not associating unhappiness with rationality to oneself or to other people, benefits of having one’s actions and motivations make sense to other people, various self-image issues. There are going to be many unmodeled considerations in the other direction too, but I suspect they will normally be fewer.
It’s better to forego a 1-expected-util hare-brained scheme than let it distract you into a 20% chance of foregoing a 10-expected-util hare-brained scheme, or so Morgensternsai tells me.
On the other hand, I don’t want to hand people tools for mediocrity here; many times akrasia in these situations really is just irrational. I wish I had a better idea of when.
Another type of “fear of anti-akrasia techniques” that sometimes occurs, is fear/mistrust of what one’s own conscious decision-making process might goof up, if that decision-making process is abruptly given increased power. (This differs from Nominull’s description, because in this scenario you don’t specifically fear surfing the internet less, or any other specific foreseen change; you fear the effects of suddenly removing a system of internal checks and balances, and handing your internal reins over to a new and untested cognitive subsystem.)
It strikes me that this is similar to theists’ fear of taking God away and morality then being undetermined: they don’t trust themselves, or the rest of us. (But we knew that.) It’s interesting to consider it as a more general case of fear of thought about thought. The roots of anti-rationality get everywhere.
Based on this revelation, I have to say I am coming around to the point of view that a lot of what we call “akrasia” is just us not wanting to admit, to others or to ourselves, what our actual desires are, so we make up more socially acceptable desires and then when we pursue our actual desires instead we blame akrasia.
Yep—akrasia is anosognosia of the will. That is, a comfortable explanation for why we do things, when we actually have no real idea why we do them.
That’s why the only stable, life-enhancing anti-akrasia strategies are those that either include ways to satisfy all your existing desires, or that directly modify those existing desires. (“Unschedule”-type ideas fall into the former category, mindhacking techniques the latter.)
One simple way to partially satisfy existing desires are just to affirm them as part of your volition. Literally tell the agents that are those desires that you don’t intend to defect on them if they cooperate with you by using your ability to execute long-term efforts to stomp them out without giving them due consideration whatever that turns out, upon careful and caring reflection, to be.
Literally tell the agents that are those desires that you don’t intend to defect on them
Well, that’s a bit more anthropomorphic than necessary. More to the point, it continues the dissociation frame where you are disidentifying yourself from those desires. They are your desires, they don’t belong to some sort of independent agent in your skin. If you don’t take ownership of them, then you’re not going to be in control of them, either.
I would like to watch a video where you explain potentially successful “unschedule”-type ideas.
Not my area of specialty, really. People here have posted several, and have linked to explanations of Neil Fiore’s concept. To the extent that I work with the “satisfy all desires” mode, I merely help people learn to find out what their desires are, and to find more fulfilling ways of satisfying them.
Interesting data point. I too have felt a strange fear of actually overcoming akrasia. However, I interpret it as a fear of inconsistency—like being afraid of waking up one day as a completely different person (albeit a better one by my own standards), and not being able to explain what happened. I try to tell myself that the part of myself that is so afraid is being silly: I don’t need to fear winning too quickly, because that just doesn’t happen, and if it did I should only be grateful—and if someone were to explicitly ask how the radical discontinuity came about, I could simply express my honest ignorance.
Strange that we would seem to describe similar experiences (fear of the outcome marked “Success” actually occurring), but that you should count it as evidence that akrasia is an excuse, whereas I don’t. For myself, it still seems (more than ever, really) that I do want to change—for I have changed, however slowly. I don’t play games anymore, and count myself happier for it.
...is just us not wanting to admit, to others or to ourselves, what our actual desires are
That’s definitely a possible mistake. Sort of reminds me of how people say, “everyone acts rationally because they always do what they want to do. It is impossible to be irrational!” This isn’t true, however, if you’re trying to maximize utility within your expected lifetime.
But I think most of us use the word to categories the the feeling that arises from wanting to (not) want something. Because, after all, we aren’t just trying to maximize utility for the moment we are in.
I read these tricks for avoiding procrastination and I find myself terrified at the idea of trying them at a gut level, because what if they work? What if I actually find myself playing fewer videogames and surfing the internet less? That doesn’t actually sound better, now that I have to seriously consider the possibility of changing this state of affairs.
Based on this revelation, I have to say I am coming around to the point of view that a lot of what we call “akrasia” is just us not wanting to admit, to others or to ourselves, what our actual desires are, so we make up more socially acceptable desires and then when we pursue our actual desires instead we blame akrasia.
Another type of “fear of anti-akrasia techniques” that sometimes occurs, is fear/mistrust of what one’s own conscious decision-making process might goof up, if that decision-making process is abruptly given increased power. (This differs from Nominull’s description, because in this scenario you don’t specifically fear surfing the internet less, or any other specific foreseen change; you fear the effects of suddenly removing a system of internal checks and balances, and handing your internal reins over to a new and untested cognitive subsystem.)
Even if your consciously claimed preferences are your “real” preferences (which is not at all obvious, given that claimed preferences may be chosen for the purpose of affecting your self-image or your external social image, rather than for the purpose of choosing between future outcomes)...
… even in this case, there’s the additional problem that your consciously claimed “beliefs” may not be your actual anticipations, and, even if they are your actual anticipations, may be a worse model of the world than is the model implicit in our cultural action-patterns. A person who “believes” her actions will determine whether she spends eternity in heaven or hell, but who has ordinary levels of akrasia and mostly just does what the people around her are doing, is less harmed by her beliefs than she would be if she could actually act take the actions that her stated beliefs and preferences imply. Ditto for a person who believes a strange and unhealthy diet would be beneficial (but can’t seem to fully stick to the new diet), or who believes overconfidently that a particular particular peak oil scenario is “99% likely” (but takes some of his actions in a more ordinary manner anyhow).
If people were easily able to act on their consciously claimed beliefs and preferences, present levels of irrational beliefs might lead to considerably more disruption than they do. Conversely, if people had more reason to trust their “beliefs” and “preferences”, I wouldn’t be at all surprised if akrasia decreased.
This connection is one reason that learning to actually form reasonable beliefs (epistemic rationality), and learning to act in a manner that actually makes sense given one’s beliefs and preferences (overcoming “akrasia”), strike me as linked aspects of a single art.
Even in people whose conscious world models are basically sane (by our exacting LW standards), when they’re considering doing or planning for some weird, uncomfortable, and out-of-the-ordinary action seemingly justified by weighing costs and benefits, it seems to me that akrasia can sometimes be a rational stand-in for some considerations they don’t keep conscious track of, including but not limited to: reputation costs, willpower loss / ego depletion, other limits to worry, the inference that if one weird thing seems especially important now others are going to seem especially important in the future, the possibility that one might waste resources by not following through on a weird plan, the desirability of keeping one’s mind “cleaner” by keeping fewer chunks in one’s planning space, benefits of long-term happiness and of not associating unhappiness with rationality to oneself or to other people, benefits of having one’s actions and motivations make sense to other people, various self-image issues. There are going to be many unmodeled considerations in the other direction too, but I suspect they will normally be fewer.
It’s better to forego a 1-expected-util hare-brained scheme than let it distract you into a 20% chance of foregoing a 10-expected-util hare-brained scheme, or so Morgensternsai tells me.
On the other hand, I don’t want to hand people tools for mediocrity here; many times akrasia in these situations really is just irrational. I wish I had a better idea of when.
It strikes me that this is similar to theists’ fear of taking God away and morality then being undetermined: they don’t trust themselves, or the rest of us. (But we knew that.) It’s interesting to consider it as a more general case of fear of thought about thought. The roots of anti-rationality get everywhere.
Yep—akrasia is anosognosia of the will. That is, a comfortable explanation for why we do things, when we actually have no real idea why we do them.
That’s why the only stable, life-enhancing anti-akrasia strategies are those that either include ways to satisfy all your existing desires, or that directly modify those existing desires. (“Unschedule”-type ideas fall into the former category, mindhacking techniques the latter.)
One simple way to partially satisfy existing desires are just to affirm them as part of your volition. Literally tell the agents that are those desires that you don’t intend to defect on them if they cooperate with you by using your ability to execute long-term efforts to stomp them out without giving them due consideration whatever that turns out, upon careful and caring reflection, to be.
Well, that’s a bit more anthropomorphic than necessary. More to the point, it continues the dissociation frame where you are disidentifying yourself from those desires. They are your desires, they don’t belong to some sort of independent agent in your skin. If you don’t take ownership of them, then you’re not going to be in control of them, either.
Just to be sure, is this supposed to be parsed as
?
del
Not my area of specialty, really. People here have posted several, and have linked to explanations of Neil Fiore’s concept. To the extent that I work with the “satisfy all desires” mode, I merely help people learn to find out what their desires are, and to find more fulfilling ways of satisfying them.
Interesting data point. I too have felt a strange fear of actually overcoming akrasia. However, I interpret it as a fear of inconsistency—like being afraid of waking up one day as a completely different person (albeit a better one by my own standards), and not being able to explain what happened. I try to tell myself that the part of myself that is so afraid is being silly: I don’t need to fear winning too quickly, because that just doesn’t happen, and if it did I should only be grateful—and if someone were to explicitly ask how the radical discontinuity came about, I could simply express my honest ignorance.
Strange that we would seem to describe similar experiences (fear of the outcome marked “Success” actually occurring), but that you should count it as evidence that akrasia is an excuse, whereas I don’t. For myself, it still seems (more than ever, really) that I do want to change—for I have changed, however slowly. I don’t play games anymore, and count myself happier for it.
That’s definitely a possible mistake. Sort of reminds me of how people say, “everyone acts rationally because they always do what they want to do. It is impossible to be irrational!” This isn’t true, however, if you’re trying to maximize utility within your expected lifetime.
But I think most of us use the word to categories the the feeling that arises from wanting to (not) want something. Because, after all, we aren’t just trying to maximize utility for the moment we are in.