It doesn’t make sense to say that this subjective personal probability (which, by the way, he chose to calculate based on a tiny subset of the vast amounts of information he has in his mind) based on his observed evidence is somehow the absolute probability that, say, evolution is “true”.
Where does he? I assume as a Bayesian he would deny the reality of any such “absolute probability”.
It doesn’t make sense to say that this subjective personal probability (which, by the way, he chose to calculate based on a tiny subset of the vast amounts of information he has in his mind) based on his observed evidence is somehow the absolute probability that, say, evolution is “true”.
Where does he? I assume as a Bayesian he would deny the reality of any such “absolute probability”.
There are such things as objective Bayesians, though I’m pretty sure Eliezer is a subjective Bayesian.
Subjectively objective, by his words.