I do realize that, but I wasn’t sure if my text was understandable in the first place, so I decided to keep it simple.
Using our world (where 200k-300k people die of natural causes every day), and using random people and circumstances where saving 10 people would be 10⁄3 times better than saving 3 people, I argue that 30% chance of saving 10 people (and 70% for saving 0) is equivalent in terms of everything to 100% chance of saving 3 people (it probably requires a few more assumptions, because the cause of their death might be a special illness where if it kills 3 people it could be researched, but not if it kills 10 people). So if my model of expected value is valid, it shouldn’t matter which choice you pick.
But that’s unnecessary and beyond the point. I’d prefer to say that the one is equivalent to the other in terms of people saved on the moment and not as consequences of the choice.
I do realize that, but I wasn’t sure if my text was understandable in the first place, so I decided to keep it simple.
Using our world (where 200k-300k people die of natural causes every day), and using random people and circumstances where saving 10 people would be 10⁄3 times better than saving 3 people, I argue that 30% chance of saving 10 people (and 70% for saving 0) is equivalent in terms of everything to 100% chance of saving 3 people (it probably requires a few more assumptions, because the cause of their death might be a special illness where if it kills 3 people it could be researched, but not if it kills 10 people). So if my model of expected value is valid, it shouldn’t matter which choice you pick.
But that’s unnecessary and beyond the point. I’d prefer to say that the one is equivalent to the other in terms of people saved on the moment and not as consequences of the choice.