So if there’s 30% chance to save 10 people’s lives, that’s the same as saving 3 lives.
No, it is not “the same”, i.e., equivalent for all purposes. The two scenarios have one particular statistic, the mean lives saved, equal. That does not make them “the same” for all purposes. (Assuming that there was also a 70% chance of saving 0 lives in the first scenario, which you didn’t specify, but seemed implied.)
It’s too easy to equivocate here.
One could just as well say that the two scenarios do not have equal expected outcomes. The maximum likelihood outcome for the first is 0 lives saved, while the maximum likelihood outcome for the second is 3 lives saved.
Or, one could say that the value to you of your two scenarios is not the same, if you have a preference between them.
An unqualified “Same” is something to taboo. The “Same” according to what equivalence classes? According to what measure? Many don’t even see the issue. Once they’ve calculated “sameness” according to some verbal or numerical equivalence class, they think that “logic dictates” they must treat the two things “the same” too. Wrong. Choose your equivalence classes according to your purpose, instead of constraining your choices according to your equivalence classes.
I do realize that, but I wasn’t sure if my text was understandable in the first place, so I decided to keep it simple.
Using our world (where 200k-300k people die of natural causes every day), and using random people and circumstances where saving 10 people would be 10⁄3 times better than saving 3 people, I argue that 30% chance of saving 10 people (and 70% for saving 0) is equivalent in terms of everything to 100% chance of saving 3 people (it probably requires a few more assumptions, because the cause of their death might be a special illness where if it kills 3 people it could be researched, but not if it kills 10 people). So if my model of expected value is valid, it shouldn’t matter which choice you pick.
But that’s unnecessary and beyond the point. I’d prefer to say that the one is equivalent to the other in terms of people saved on the moment and not as consequences of the choice.
No, it is not “the same”, i.e., equivalent for all purposes. The two scenarios have one particular statistic, the mean lives saved, equal. That does not make them “the same” for all purposes. (Assuming that there was also a 70% chance of saving 0 lives in the first scenario, which you didn’t specify, but seemed implied.)
It’s too easy to equivocate here.
One could just as well say that the two scenarios do not have equal expected outcomes. The maximum likelihood outcome for the first is 0 lives saved, while the maximum likelihood outcome for the second is 3 lives saved.
Or, one could say that the value to you of your two scenarios is not the same, if you have a preference between them.
An unqualified “Same” is something to taboo. The “Same” according to what equivalence classes? According to what measure? Many don’t even see the issue. Once they’ve calculated “sameness” according to some verbal or numerical equivalence class, they think that “logic dictates” they must treat the two things “the same” too. Wrong. Choose your equivalence classes according to your purpose, instead of constraining your choices according to your equivalence classes.
I do realize that, but I wasn’t sure if my text was understandable in the first place, so I decided to keep it simple.
Using our world (where 200k-300k people die of natural causes every day), and using random people and circumstances where saving 10 people would be 10⁄3 times better than saving 3 people, I argue that 30% chance of saving 10 people (and 70% for saving 0) is equivalent in terms of everything to 100% chance of saving 3 people (it probably requires a few more assumptions, because the cause of their death might be a special illness where if it kills 3 people it could be researched, but not if it kills 10 people). So if my model of expected value is valid, it shouldn’t matter which choice you pick.
But that’s unnecessary and beyond the point. I’d prefer to say that the one is equivalent to the other in terms of people saved on the moment and not as consequences of the choice.