I think your argument here equivocates between two different claims.
“When we use the word ‘truth’ or ‘true’ we may mean different things by it, so the meaning of a sentence with ‘truth’ or ‘true’ in it is dependent on somewhat-arbitrary choices made by humans.”
“That specific thing you (or I) mean by ‘truth’ is dependent on somewhat arbitrary choices made by humans.”
The first is hard to disagree with. (And the same applies for literally any other term as well as “truth”/”true”.) The second, not so much.
An analogy: Suppose something is vibrating and I say “The fundamental frequency of that vibration is approximately 256 Hz”. Just as we can all propose subtly (or not so subtly) different ideas of what it means to say that something is “true”, so we can all propose different definitions for “hertz”.[1] Or for that matter for “fundamental” or “frequency”. So two people making that statement might mean different things. But I don’t think it’s helpful to say that this means that the fundamental frequency of an oscillation is subjective. Once you decide what you would like “fundamental frequency” to mean and what units you’d like it to be in, any two competently done measurements will give the same value.
[1] If you think this is silly, you might want to suppose that instead I had said ”… is approximately that of middle C”. You could measure frequency in “octaves relative to middle C” exactly as well as in hertz, but different groups of people at different times really have called different frequencies “middle C”.
Similarly, at least prima facie it’s possible that (a) everything you say about the existence of different criteria-for-truth is correct but none the less (b) there is a fact of the matter, not dependent on anyone’s kinda-arbitrary decisions, about e.g. what things remain when you stop believing in them, or what beliefs will reliably lead a given class of agent to more accurate predictions about the future, or what sets of beliefs and inference rules constitute consistent formal systems.
Perhaps it turns out that for some or many or all plausible notions of truth (b) is not, er, true, so that what I claimed claim 2 above is, er, true. That would be an interesting, er, truth—to me, much more interesting than the less controversial claim 1. But if you’ve given any reason here for believing it, I haven’t seen it.
But I don’t think it’s helpful to say that this means that the fundamental frequency of an oscillation is subjective.
I think you might be imagining I’m saying more than I am, because as I see it this statement of yours contains exactly the point I’m making in this post. The very fact that claiming some claim about truth can be “helpful” is a manifestation of the point that I’m making.
I’m not saying the choice of what truth means is arbitrary. I’m saying it’s contingent on what matters to humans. Another way to make my point: can you define truth in a way that is sensible to rocks?
Let me try to restate what I think you’re saying your point is, to see whether I have it right. “When we say something is ‘true’, there are any number of different things we could conceivably mean. The specific meaning we have in mind, to whatever extent there is one, will depend on what we are interested in and what we want. So it is a mistake to think of ‘truth’ as some sort of objective thing not dependent on human interests and preferences.”
If my paraphrase is correct or near to it, then I think my point stands. The last sentence in that paraphrase, which if I’ve got it right expresses your main conclusion, is importantly ambiguous, and the version of it that follows from what’s gone before is (it seems to me) not actually interesting or important.
The version that follows from what’s gone before is just observing that the way we define our words, and the questions we find it worth asking, depend on our interests and preferences. Yup, they do, but that doesn’t conflict with what I think people (at least otherwise sensible and clever people) generally mean when they say things like “I believe in objective truth”.
No, I can’t define truth, or anything, in a way that is sensible to rocks, because nothing is sensible to rocks. And because nothing is sensible to rocks, the fact that I can’t define truth to be sensible to rocks tells us nothing about truth that would distinguish it from beauty, or rest mass, or anything else.
Perhaps I am all wrong in thinking that the “weak” version of the final claim is not interesting or important. Could you maybe give an example of a concrete error you think someone generally sensible and clever has made as a result of not seeing the truth of the “weak” version, and which they would plausibly not have made if they had seen it?
(I think what you’re saying by “contingent on what matters to humans” is much the same as what I was saying by “somewhat arbitrary”, just with different emphasis. I would not disagree, e.g., with “somewhat arbitrary, with the particular choices we tend to make being shaped by what matters to us”. It is not coincidence that my choice of the word “helpful” is consonant with the point you’re making; it was deliberately chosen to be.)
That you don’t think it’s interesting or important suggests you probably already grasp the point of this post and are just framing it differently than I would. For some readers what I’m saying here is sort of bind-blowing because they’re walking about thinking that truth is like an objective, hard, real thing that exists totally independent of humans, hence my choice of emphasis. Sounds to me like you may already grasp my fundamental point and are seeing that it all adds back up to normality.
That said, I wrote a post a while ago with several examples of how understanding the “weak” version of the final claim matters.
For some readers what I’m saying here is sort of bind-blowing because they’re walking about thinking that truth is like an objective, hard, real thing that exists totally independent of humans, hence my choice of emphasis.
Another hypothesis here is that some readers misunderstand your point and think you’re saying something different than you intend to say.
If I follow the discussion so far (and I confess I’ve just skimmed it), then the meaning I take from the words “truth doesn’t exist independent of humans” is not a meaning you intend to convey. To convey the meaning I think you intend to convey, I would say something like: “”truth” doesn’t exist independent of humans, in that we can define the word in many ways; but truth itself, for most definitions of the word in common use, does exist independent of humans”.
And I agree with what I think gjm to be saying, that this is trite. It may indeed be that some people find it mind blowing.
But, it seems to me that most commenters on this post took you to be saying the same thing that I took you as saying; roughly, the thing that the words “truth doesn’t exist independent of humans” conveys to me.
So I consider it a decent guess, that if someone thinks the thing you’re saying is deep, it’s not because they think the-thing-I-think-is-trite is deep. It may be they they misunderstood you in the same way that most commenters on this post misunderstood you.
Nothing exists independently. Everything is causally connected. So although I’m making a point about truth here because I think it’s a case where failing to understand this interconnectedness matters, it’s a fully general point.
Perhaps the real problem is I didn’t try to convince folks in this post of this, rather than focusing on a specific consequences that I think is rather important for folks who read Less Wrong.
It’s not clear to me how this was intended as a respose to my comment. Was it “I reject that hypothesis because...” or “no you’re misunderstanding what’s being said” or...?
But it seems to me that the biggest problem with the post is likely one of two things:
You’re not yourself confusing the quotation with the referent, but you write in a way that doesn’t clearly distinguish them. This makes some readers think you’re confusing them. Perhaps it makes other readers think you’re saying something deep.
If this is the problem, then explaining why you’re making the point you’re making might be helpful. But I suggest it would be more helpful to make the point you’re making clearer, and that explicitly distinguishing quotation from referent would help with that.
You are confusing the quotation with the referent. For example, when you say “I’m making a point about truth here”, you think you are indeed making a point about truth; whereas I (and I believe gjm) claim you are making a point about the word “truth”. I read you as saying to gjm “yeah you understand what I’m saying, you just don’t think it’s very interesting, that’s fine, other people do”. Perhaps so, but another possibility I have to consider is that you yourself misunderstand what you’re making a point about, and misunderstand gjm when he tries to explain.
I think your argument here equivocates between two different claims.
“When we use the word ‘truth’ or ‘true’ we may mean different things by it, so the meaning of a sentence with ‘truth’ or ‘true’ in it is dependent on somewhat-arbitrary choices made by humans.”
“That specific thing you (or I) mean by ‘truth’ is dependent on somewhat arbitrary choices made by humans.”
The first is hard to disagree with. (And the same applies for literally any other term as well as “truth”/”true”.) The second, not so much.
An analogy: Suppose something is vibrating and I say “The fundamental frequency of that vibration is approximately 256 Hz”. Just as we can all propose subtly (or not so subtly) different ideas of what it means to say that something is “true”, so we can all propose different definitions for “hertz”.[1] Or for that matter for “fundamental” or “frequency”. So two people making that statement might mean different things. But I don’t think it’s helpful to say that this means that the fundamental frequency of an oscillation is subjective. Once you decide what you would like “fundamental frequency” to mean and what units you’d like it to be in, any two competently done measurements will give the same value.
[1] If you think this is silly, you might want to suppose that instead I had said ”… is approximately that of middle C”. You could measure frequency in “octaves relative to middle C” exactly as well as in hertz, but different groups of people at different times really have called different frequencies “middle C”.
Similarly, at least prima facie it’s possible that (a) everything you say about the existence of different criteria-for-truth is correct but none the less (b) there is a fact of the matter, not dependent on anyone’s kinda-arbitrary decisions, about e.g. what things remain when you stop believing in them, or what beliefs will reliably lead a given class of agent to more accurate predictions about the future, or what sets of beliefs and inference rules constitute consistent formal systems.
Perhaps it turns out that for some or many or all plausible notions of truth (b) is not, er, true, so that what I claimed claim 2 above is, er, true. That would be an interesting, er, truth—to me, much more interesting than the less controversial claim 1. But if you’ve given any reason here for believing it, I haven’t seen it.
I think you might be imagining I’m saying more than I am, because as I see it this statement of yours contains exactly the point I’m making in this post. The very fact that claiming some claim about truth can be “helpful” is a manifestation of the point that I’m making.
I’m not saying the choice of what truth means is arbitrary. I’m saying it’s contingent on what matters to humans. Another way to make my point: can you define truth in a way that is sensible to rocks?
Let me try to restate what I think you’re saying your point is, to see whether I have it right. “When we say something is ‘true’, there are any number of different things we could conceivably mean. The specific meaning we have in mind, to whatever extent there is one, will depend on what we are interested in and what we want. So it is a mistake to think of ‘truth’ as some sort of objective thing not dependent on human interests and preferences.”
If my paraphrase is correct or near to it, then I think my point stands. The last sentence in that paraphrase, which if I’ve got it right expresses your main conclusion, is importantly ambiguous, and the version of it that follows from what’s gone before is (it seems to me) not actually interesting or important.
The version that follows from what’s gone before is just observing that the way we define our words, and the questions we find it worth asking, depend on our interests and preferences. Yup, they do, but that doesn’t conflict with what I think people (at least otherwise sensible and clever people) generally mean when they say things like “I believe in objective truth”.
No, I can’t define truth, or anything, in a way that is sensible to rocks, because nothing is sensible to rocks. And because nothing is sensible to rocks, the fact that I can’t define truth to be sensible to rocks tells us nothing about truth that would distinguish it from beauty, or rest mass, or anything else.
Perhaps I am all wrong in thinking that the “weak” version of the final claim is not interesting or important. Could you maybe give an example of a concrete error you think someone generally sensible and clever has made as a result of not seeing the truth of the “weak” version, and which they would plausibly not have made if they had seen it?
(I think what you’re saying by “contingent on what matters to humans” is much the same as what I was saying by “somewhat arbitrary”, just with different emphasis. I would not disagree, e.g., with “somewhat arbitrary, with the particular choices we tend to make being shaped by what matters to us”. It is not coincidence that my choice of the word “helpful” is consonant with the point you’re making; it was deliberately chosen to be.)
That you don’t think it’s interesting or important suggests you probably already grasp the point of this post and are just framing it differently than I would. For some readers what I’m saying here is sort of bind-blowing because they’re walking about thinking that truth is like an objective, hard, real thing that exists totally independent of humans, hence my choice of emphasis. Sounds to me like you may already grasp my fundamental point and are seeing that it all adds back up to normality.
That said, I wrote a post a while ago with several examples of how understanding the “weak” version of the final claim matters.
Another hypothesis here is that some readers misunderstand your point and think you’re saying something different than you intend to say.
If I follow the discussion so far (and I confess I’ve just skimmed it), then the meaning I take from the words “truth doesn’t exist independent of humans” is not a meaning you intend to convey. To convey the meaning I think you intend to convey, I would say something like: “”truth” doesn’t exist independent of humans, in that we can define the word in many ways; but truth itself, for most definitions of the word in common use, does exist independent of humans”.
And I agree with what I think gjm to be saying, that this is trite. It may indeed be that some people find it mind blowing.
But, it seems to me that most commenters on this post took you to be saying the same thing that I took you as saying; roughly, the thing that the words “truth doesn’t exist independent of humans” conveys to me.
So I consider it a decent guess, that if someone thinks the thing you’re saying is deep, it’s not because they think the-thing-I-think-is-trite is deep. It may be they they misunderstood you in the same way that most commenters on this post misunderstood you.
Nothing exists independently. Everything is causally connected. So although I’m making a point about truth here because I think it’s a case where failing to understand this interconnectedness matters, it’s a fully general point.
Perhaps the real problem is I didn’t try to convince folks in this post of this, rather than focusing on a specific consequences that I think is rather important for folks who read Less Wrong.
It’s not clear to me how this was intended as a respose to my comment. Was it “I reject that hypothesis because...” or “no you’re misunderstanding what’s being said” or...?
But it seems to me that the biggest problem with the post is likely one of two things:
You’re not yourself confusing the quotation with the referent, but you write in a way that doesn’t clearly distinguish them. This makes some readers think you’re confusing them. Perhaps it makes other readers think you’re saying something deep.
If this is the problem, then explaining why you’re making the point you’re making might be helpful. But I suggest it would be more helpful to make the point you’re making clearer, and that explicitly distinguishing quotation from referent would help with that.
You are confusing the quotation with the referent. For example, when you say “I’m making a point about truth here”, you think you are indeed making a point about truth; whereas I (and I believe gjm) claim you are making a point about the word “truth”. I read you as saying to gjm “yeah you understand what I’m saying, you just don’t think it’s very interesting, that’s fine, other people do”. Perhaps so, but another possibility I have to consider is that you yourself misunderstand what you’re making a point about, and misunderstand gjm when he tries to explain.
All I can do is point; you have to look for yourself.
My previous comment reflects the fact that I think there’s a big inferential gap here caused by having not tackled another topic.