Just because someone wasn’t successfully canceled, doesn’t mean there wasn’t a cancellation attempt, nor that most other people in their position would have withstood it
Just because they’re doing well now, doesn’t mean they wouldn’t have been doing better without the cancellation attempt
Even if the cancellation attempt itself did end up actually benefiting them, because they had the right personality and skills and position, that doesn’t mean this should have been expected ex ante
(After all, if it’s clear in advance to everyone involved that someone is uncancellable, then they’re less likely to try)
Even if it’s factually true that someone has the qualities and position to come out ahead after cancellation, they may not know or believe this, and thus the prospect of cancellation may successfully silence them
Even if they’re currently uncancellable and know this, that doesn’t mean they’ll remain so in the future
E.g. if they’re so good at what they do as to be unfireable, then maybe within a few years they’ll be offered a CEO position, at which point any cancel-worthy things they said years ago may limit their career; and if they foresee this, then that incentivizes self-censorship
The point is, cancellation attempts are bad because they create a chilling effect, an environment that incentivizes self-censorship and distorts intellectual discussion. And arguments of the form “Hey, this particular cancellation attempt wasn’t that bad because the target did well” fall down to one or more of the above arguments: they still create chilling effects and that still makes them bad.
But it wasn’t a cancellation attempt. The issue at hand is whether a policy of doxxing influential people is a good idea. The benefits are transparency about who is influencing society, and in which ways; the harms include the ones you’ve listed above, about chilling effects.
It’s hard to weigh these against each other, but one way you might do so is by following a policy like “doxx people only if they’re influential enough that they’re probably robust to things like losing their job”. The correlation between “influential enough to be newsworthy” and “has many options open to them” isn’t perfect, but it’s strong enough that this policy seems pretty reasonable to me.
To flip this around, let’s consider individuals who are quietly influential in other spheres. For example, I expect there are people who many news editors listen to, when deciding how their editorial policies should work. I expect there are people who many Democrat/Republican staffers listen to, when considering how to shape policy. In general I think transparency about these people would be pretty good for the world. If those people happened to have day jobs which would suffer from that transparency, I would say “Look, you chose to have a bunch of influence, which the world should know about, and I expect you can leverage this influence to end up in a good position somehow even after I run some articles on you. Maybe you’re one of the few highly-influential people for whom this happens to not be true, but it seems like a reasonable policy to assume that if someone is actually pretty influential then they’ll land on their feet either way.” And the fact that this was true for Scott is some evidence that this would be a reasonable policy.
(I also think that taking someone influential who didn’t previously have a public profile, and giving them a public profile under their real name, is structurally pretty analogous to doxxing. Many of the costs are the same. In both cases one of the key benefits is allowing people to cross-reference information about that person to get a better picture of who is influencing the world, and how.)
The benefits are transparency about who is influencing society
In this particular case, I don’t really see any transparency benefits. If it was the case that there was important public information attached to Scott’s full name, then this argument would make sense to me.
(E.g. if Scott Alexander was actually Mark Zuckerberg or some other public figure with information attacked to their real full name then this argument would go through.)
Fair enough if NYT needs to have a extremely coarse grained policy where they always dox influential people consistently and can’t do any cost benefit on particular cases.
If it was the case that there was important public information attached to Scott’s full name, then this argument would make sense to me.
In general having someone’s actual name public makes it much easier to find out other public information attached to them. E.g. imagine if Scott were involved in shady business dealings under his real name. This is the sort of thing that the NYT wouldn’t necessarily discover just by writing the profile of him, but other people could subsequently discover after he was doxxed.
To be clear, btw, I’m not arguing that this doxxing policy is correct, all things considered. Personally I think the benefits of pseudonymity for a healthy ecosystem outweigh the public value of transparency about real names. I’m just arguing that there are policies consistent with the NYT’s actions which are fairly reasonable.
Many comments pointed out that NYT does not in fact have a consistent policy of always revealing people’s true names. There’s even a news editorial about this which I point out in case you trust the fact-checking of NY Post more.
I think that leaves 3 possible explanations of what happened:
NYT has a general policy of revealing people’s true names, which it doesn’t consistently apply but ended up applying in this case for no particular reason.
There’s an inconsistently applied policy, and Cade Metz’s (and/or his editors’) dislike of Scott contributed (consciously or subconsciously) to insistence on applying the policy in this particular case.
There is no policy and it was a purely personal decision.
In my view, most rationalists seem to be operating under a reasonable probability distribution over these hypotheses, informed by evidence such as Metz’s mention of Charles Murray, lack of a public written policy about revealing real names, and lack of evidence that a private written policy exists.
Ok, let’s consider the case of shadowy influencers like that. It would be nice to know who such people were, sure. If they were up to nefarious things, or openly subscribed to ideologies that justify awful actions, then I’d like to know that. If there was an article that accurately laid out the nefarious things, that would be nice. If the article cherry-picked, presented facts misleadingly, made scurrilous insinuations every few paragraphs (without technically saying anything provably false)—that would be bad, possibly quite bad, but in some sense it’s par for the course for a certain tier of political writing.
When I see the combination of making scurrilous insinuations every few paragraphs and doxxing the alleged villain, I think that’s where I have to treat it as a deliberate cancellation attempt on the person. If it wasn’t actually deliberate, then it was at least “reckless disregard” or something, and I think it should be categorized the same way. If you’re going to dox someone, I figure you accept an increased responsibility to be careful about what you say about them. (Presumably for similar reasons, libel laws are stricter about non-public figures. No, I’m not saying it’s libel when the statements are “not technically lying”; but it’s bad behavior and should be known as such.)
As for the “they’re probably robust” aspect… As mentioned in my other comment, even if they predictably “do well” afterwards, that doesn’t mean they haven’t been significantly harmed. If their influence is a following of 10M people, and the cancellation attempt reduces their influence by 40%, then it is simultaneously true that (a) “They have an audience of 6M people, they’re doing fine”, and (b) “They’ve been significantly harmed, and many people in such a position who anticipated this outcome would have a significant incentive to self-censor”. It remains a bad thing. It’s less bad than doing it to random civilians, sure, but it remains bad.
In general, I would say:
Just because someone wasn’t successfully canceled, doesn’t mean there wasn’t a cancellation attempt, nor that most other people in their position would have withstood it
Just because they’re doing well now, doesn’t mean they wouldn’t have been doing better without the cancellation attempt
Even if the cancellation attempt itself did end up actually benefiting them, because they had the right personality and skills and position, that doesn’t mean this should have been expected ex ante
(After all, if it’s clear in advance to everyone involved that someone is uncancellable, then they’re less likely to try)
Even if it’s factually true that someone has the qualities and position to come out ahead after cancellation, they may not know or believe this, and thus the prospect of cancellation may successfully silence them
Even if they’re currently uncancellable and know this, that doesn’t mean they’ll remain so in the future
E.g. if they’re so good at what they do as to be unfireable, then maybe within a few years they’ll be offered a CEO position, at which point any cancel-worthy things they said years ago may limit their career; and if they foresee this, then that incentivizes self-censorship
The point is, cancellation attempts are bad because they create a chilling effect, an environment that incentivizes self-censorship and distorts intellectual discussion. And arguments of the form “Hey, this particular cancellation attempt wasn’t that bad because the target did well” fall down to one or more of the above arguments: they still create chilling effects and that still makes them bad.
But it wasn’t a cancellation attempt. The issue at hand is whether a policy of doxxing influential people is a good idea. The benefits are transparency about who is influencing society, and in which ways; the harms include the ones you’ve listed above, about chilling effects.
It’s hard to weigh these against each other, but one way you might do so is by following a policy like “doxx people only if they’re influential enough that they’re probably robust to things like losing their job”. The correlation between “influential enough to be newsworthy” and “has many options open to them” isn’t perfect, but it’s strong enough that this policy seems pretty reasonable to me.
To flip this around, let’s consider individuals who are quietly influential in other spheres. For example, I expect there are people who many news editors listen to, when deciding how their editorial policies should work. I expect there are people who many Democrat/Republican staffers listen to, when considering how to shape policy. In general I think transparency about these people would be pretty good for the world. If those people happened to have day jobs which would suffer from that transparency, I would say “Look, you chose to have a bunch of influence, which the world should know about, and I expect you can leverage this influence to end up in a good position somehow even after I run some articles on you. Maybe you’re one of the few highly-influential people for whom this happens to not be true, but it seems like a reasonable policy to assume that if someone is actually pretty influential then they’ll land on their feet either way.” And the fact that this was true for Scott is some evidence that this would be a reasonable policy.
(I also think that taking someone influential who didn’t previously have a public profile, and giving them a public profile under their real name, is structurally pretty analogous to doxxing. Many of the costs are the same. In both cases one of the key benefits is allowing people to cross-reference information about that person to get a better picture of who is influencing the world, and how.)
In this particular case, I don’t really see any transparency benefits. If it was the case that there was important public information attached to Scott’s full name, then this argument would make sense to me.
(E.g. if Scott Alexander was actually Mark Zuckerberg or some other public figure with information attacked to their real full name then this argument would go through.)
Fair enough if NYT needs to have a extremely coarse grained policy where they always dox influential people consistently and can’t do any cost benefit on particular cases.
In general having someone’s actual name public makes it much easier to find out other public information attached to them. E.g. imagine if Scott were involved in shady business dealings under his real name. This is the sort of thing that the NYT wouldn’t necessarily discover just by writing the profile of him, but other people could subsequently discover after he was doxxed.
To be clear, btw, I’m not arguing that this doxxing policy is correct, all things considered. Personally I think the benefits of pseudonymity for a healthy ecosystem outweigh the public value of transparency about real names. I’m just arguing that there are policies consistent with the NYT’s actions which are fairly reasonable.
Many comments pointed out that NYT does not in fact have a consistent policy of always revealing people’s true names. There’s even a news editorial about this which I point out in case you trust the fact-checking of NY Post more.
I think that leaves 3 possible explanations of what happened:
NYT has a general policy of revealing people’s true names, which it doesn’t consistently apply but ended up applying in this case for no particular reason.
There’s an inconsistently applied policy, and Cade Metz’s (and/or his editors’) dislike of Scott contributed (consciously or subconsciously) to insistence on applying the policy in this particular case.
There is no policy and it was a purely personal decision.
In my view, most rationalists seem to be operating under a reasonable probability distribution over these hypotheses, informed by evidence such as Metz’s mention of Charles Murray, lack of a public written policy about revealing real names, and lack of evidence that a private written policy exists.
In effect Cade Metz indirectly accused Scott of racism. Which arguably counts as a cancellation attempt.
Ok, let’s consider the case of shadowy influencers like that. It would be nice to know who such people were, sure. If they were up to nefarious things, or openly subscribed to ideologies that justify awful actions, then I’d like to know that. If there was an article that accurately laid out the nefarious things, that would be nice. If the article cherry-picked, presented facts misleadingly, made scurrilous insinuations every few paragraphs (without technically saying anything provably false)—that would be bad, possibly quite bad, but in some sense it’s par for the course for a certain tier of political writing.
When I see the combination of making scurrilous insinuations every few paragraphs and doxxing the alleged villain, I think that’s where I have to treat it as a deliberate cancellation attempt on the person. If it wasn’t actually deliberate, then it was at least “reckless disregard” or something, and I think it should be categorized the same way. If you’re going to dox someone, I figure you accept an increased responsibility to be careful about what you say about them. (Presumably for similar reasons, libel laws are stricter about non-public figures. No, I’m not saying it’s libel when the statements are “not technically lying”; but it’s bad behavior and should be known as such.)
As for the “they’re probably robust” aspect… As mentioned in my other comment, even if they predictably “do well” afterwards, that doesn’t mean they haven’t been significantly harmed. If their influence is a following of 10M people, and the cancellation attempt reduces their influence by 40%, then it is simultaneously true that (a) “They have an audience of 6M people, they’re doing fine”, and (b) “They’ve been significantly harmed, and many people in such a position who anticipated this outcome would have a significant incentive to self-censor”. It remains a bad thing. It’s less bad than doing it to random civilians, sure, but it remains bad.